

≡ Book Reviews ≡

Shakespeare. By Johann Gottfried Herder. Translated, edited, and with an introduction by Gregory Moore (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), xlii + 86 pp. \$12.95/£7.95 cloth.

J. G. Herder's essay *Shakespeare* appeared in *On German Character and Art* (1773), "the manifesto of the Sturm und Drang" (viii), writes translator and editor Gregory Moore. Moore published translations of Herder, including this essay, in the 2006 collection *Selected Writings on Aesthetics*. While those seeking a scholarly edition should consult that volume, this more compact, affordable edition will attract students of Shakespeare reception.

Moore's introduction traces Herder's motivation in decrying the neoclassicism of both Voltaire (who bemoaned Shakespeare's tastelessness and ignorance of dramaturgical rules) and J. C. Gottsched (who insisted upon such rules). Herder built upon groundwork laid by Edward Young and G. E. Lessing, as well as H. W. von Gerstenberg, the addressee of the first draft of *Shakespeare*. While Moore considers neither this nor another draft, his contextualization helps establish Herder as a counter-Enlightenment and "proto-Romantic" (vii) thinker.

But the primary contributions of Moore's introduction lie elsewhere. First, its focus on Herder's "historicist... approach to cultures and their products" (vii) highlights Herder's concern with the specific historical "soil" from which the "fruit" of dramatic literature grows. Shakespeare, unlike Sophocles, could be a model for Herder's disjointed 'Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation' because Shakespeare, too, found his national culture "still unformed" (xx). Neglect for this crucial matter of cultural-historical "soil" robbed French dramatists, Herder thought, of any "fruit," preoccupied as they were with the "husk," the strictures of form. Thus French

neoclassicist drama amounted, as Moore elegantly translates it, to "effigy treading the boards" (17).

Second, Moore admirably situates *Shakespeare* within Herder's oeuvre, relating it to *Yet Another Philosophy of History* (1774), in which history is "an apparently aimless chain of events whose plan is inscrutable and known only to God," "a mighty drama in which props and players are moved about on a cosmic stage so that the Divine Author's purpose may be achieved." *Shakespeare*, then, is "a stepping-stone toward the understanding of historical processes advanced" a year later (xxxix–xxxii), which illuminates Herder's claim that Shakespeare is "no poet, but a creator!" (41). Or as Moore writes: "The poet is a creator in miniature, an intermediary between God and the world, whose work is akin to Revelation" (xxxix).

Herder's essay is in its own right an intriguing read. Its re-examination of the development of tragedy should be of interest for any student of literature, as should its discussion of grandeur and catharsis in Aristotle. Moore's translation reads well, and is often impressively graceful. It is frequently an improvement on that of Joyce Crick, which does however have the advantage of appearing in two scholarly editions that place Herder's texts alongside those of Lessing and others. Moore's notes, printed at the end of *Shakespeare* (along with an index), are helpful, particularly with respect to writings of and about Shakespeare and the relevant sections of Aristotle's *Poetics*. Inconveniently, these notes and the pages they refer to are not cross-referenced, leaving the reader some guesswork and page-flipping. In all, though, this is a pleasant edition of a historically important essay.

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In the Name of Love: Romantic Ideology and Its Victims. By Aaron Ben-Ze'ev and Ruhama Goussinsky (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), xi + 278 pp. £19.95 cloth.

At a time when cult series such as *Sex and the City* bring us into people's bedrooms, offering a public peep show of all we wanted to know about sex and love but were afraid to ask, Aaron Ben-Ze'ev and Ruhama Goussinsky's *In the Name of Love* takes us on a U-turn back to romance and love, their victors and victims. Each of the eight chapters discusses an aspect of Romantic Ideology, defined as comprehensive, uncompromising and unconditional love.

The book provides insights into the nature of love by focusing on loving relationships, the difficulties faced by lovers in modern society, and their implications. It discusses the future of marriage and the prospect of long-term romantic relationships; it explores wife murder, perpetrated allegedly 'out of love,' suggesting a way of understanding this "phenomenon" and how its incidence can be reduced. Love, then, is not only intrinsically ambivalent, but may have dangerous consequences: some of the worst crimes have been committed in its name (as, too, in the name of God).

By examining different love situations and complications, such as loving two people at the same time, hating the person you love, and violating romantic norms, the book provides unique analyses of the positive and negative aspects of romantic love. People yearn to experience the idealized love depicted in so many novels, movies, poems, and popular songs. Ironically, it is this idealization of love that arms it with its destructive power. Popular media consistently remind us that love is all we need, but statistics concerning the rate of depression and suicides after divorce or a romantic breakup are a reminder of what might happen if "all that we need" is taken away. Thus the book is also about our ideals of love and our experiences of love, the actual disparity between the two, and the manners of coping with this disparity.

All in all this fruitful collaboration of a leading philosopher in the field of emotions, Ben-Ze'ev, with a social scientist, Goussinsky—*In the Name of Love* presents fascinating insights into romantic love and its future in modern society. By piecing together the puzzle of love, the authors suggest that modernity has to some

extent killed romance: people today seem to have neither the interest nor the time for it. A conclusion to be drawn from this is perhaps that we moderns may be well dressed, well fed, sexually pleased and very close to Huxley's vision of everyone being happy but hollow, devoid of emotion. We seem content with those values that earn us more money and reputation, but which have reduced love and romance to Baudrillard's simulacra. In such a world love is definitely a rare luxury.

This discerning book proposes that romantic love has always played a central role in human life: it is crucial for personal fulfillment and happiness, which in turn need to be nurtured and preserved. But romantic love has at times been a major factor in human misery, causing disappointments and unfulfilled hopes. Despite the gloomier aspects of love and romance, the authors conclude that we are witnessing an impressive comeback of romantic love. The book thus celebrates love in what at first glance seems a loveless world.

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Creativity in Exile. Edited by Michael Hanne (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004), 298 pp. €75.00/\$94.00 cloth.

Michael Hanne has brought together an interdisciplinary collection that features the works of twenty-eight different artists in order to both showcase their work and at the same time, "illustrate just how productive, on the human, the aesthetic and the intellectual level, a broadly inclusive conception of 'artists in exile' can be" (3). Hanne was inspired by a collection of writings entitled *The Pen in Exile*, published by the International PEN Club for Writers in Exile, which included creative writing by forty-three writers who had experienced exile. However, he points out the limitations of that collection, which mainly emphasized the work of survivors of the Nazi regime. His objective in this more inclusive volume is to bring together artists from many different countries, who express themselves in a variety of genres—essays, creative writing, academic papers, music, and sculpture. In order to accomplish this, Hanne offers the

reader a text with printed works as well as a DVD, which features both audio and video.

Hanne seeks to return to a more traditional definition of the word *exile* with the works he has chosen for this collection, noting that recently, the word has been used in a broad, almost nostalgic way, even including metaphorical exile. In his opinion, “this has had the effect of devaluing the reality of the terror and the loss experienced by those who have fled for their lives” (5). His compendium, therefore, presents and explores the work of artists who have been forced to leave their homelands. While Hanne has chosen a more traditional meaning for exile, he has, at the same time, expanded the range of artistic production usually chosen for such a volume, including not only written texts, but music, drama, sculpture, weaving, painting, interviews and other media.

This rich collection offers the reader the opportunity to explore and understand some of the experience of exile. One notable contribution to this collection is the poem, “Can you Tell Me?” by Yilma Tafere Tasew, which speaks of longing for connection to home and family (13–17). Shahin Yazdani’s film *Three Riders of the Apocalypse*, which is available on the DVD, is a seven-minute surrealistic piece that examines the effect of war on humanity. Emad Jabbar contributes two poems found in English in the book (206–10) and read in Arabic on the DVD. His “Do not live a day in a homeland’s memory” concerns the pain of exile from two viewpoints, that of exile and that of the homeland itself.

Overall, this collection, with its broad approach, adds depth to the field of exile literature and art. Hanne has provided us a rare look at exile and the exiled from diverse and yet interconnected viewpoints.

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War and Ethics: A New Just War Theory.

By Nicholas Fotion (London: Continuum, 2007), viii + 178 pp. \$90.00/£ 45.00 cloth; \$16.95/£ 9.99 paper.

This excellent little book is part of the Think Now series, which according to the jacket

notes “offer sophisticated and provocative yet engaging writing on political and cultural themes of genuine concern to the educated reader.” If the other works in the series are of a similar standard as this book, then the series looks to be a very worthwhile one. The aim of the book is to introduce Just War Theory and to assess whether it is of any use in the modern world. While mainly aimed at the reader who has little or no knowledge of the theory, the book contains a number of discussions and arguments that will also be of interest to scholars in the field.

Nicholas Fotion begins with a chapter that examines the relationship between Just War Theory and applied ethics more generally, and he succeeds in demonstrating an all too infrequently recognised point: discussions of the ethical issues involved in decisions about when it is right to go to war and about how warfare ought to be conducted once a war has commenced are the same type of ethical decisions made in professions such as medicine, journalism and law. When a doctor decides to undertake a risky operation because of his belief that the operation is the only way to save a patient’s life, the doctor is engaged in the same type of reasoning as the leader of a country who decides to go to war to protect another country from being overrun by an aggressor; the difference in war is one of scale rather than type.

The principles of modern Just War Theory, as well as the main objections to the theory, are examined over the next few chapters, with much of the discussion being illuminated through the use of case studies. The first group of cases, divided by Fotion into easy cases (Germany, Japan, Korea) and hard ones (Serbia, Russia, Kosovo, Iraq), leads him to his first modification of the main principles of Just War Theory: the idea that the “Just Cause” requirement of the theory might need to be broadened from its traditional “single” cause for war. Fotion notes that while a single overriding just cause for war may still exist, such as protecting a small state from a large belligerent neighbour, it seems reasonable to suggest that many small causes might, when taken together, add up to a sufficient “Just Cause” for war, even though none of them would appear sufficient when examined individually.

In the second half of the book, Fotion moves on to examine even more difficult cases, and it is here that the scholar in the field is

likely to really sit up and take notice. Through discussion of state versus non-state conflicts, including Cuba, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Thailand, Fotion determines that Just War Theory is in need of even more extensive modification, and that in fact not one but two theories of Just War are required: one for dealing with the ethics of traditional wars between nations (which Fotion labels JWT-R), and a second for dealing with the ethics of modern “asymmetrical” wars, fought between nations and non-nation groups (labelled JWT-I). JWT-R is simply the traditional Just War Theory, modified to allow for multiple just causes for war. But JWT-I marks a significant departure from traditional Just War Theory in that various aspects of the theory apply asymmetrically to the opposing combatants.

In recent times it has often been noted that Just War Theory seems to have difficulty in dealing with asymmetrical wars, not least because the traditional theory apparently places requirements on the conduct of national armies that do not apply to the non-nation groups that they are fighting in such wars. Indeed, it has become common to claim that applying the Laws of War to such conflicts leaves the nation to fight with one arm tied behind its back while placing no such restrictions on the non-national groups that oppose it. Yet Fotion’s claim is that this is a mistaken view of the situation, and that using JWT-I to assess the justness of an asymmetric war will reveal that all the advantages do not fall on one side. He notes that a non-nation group can fight a just war without fulfilling the “likelihood of success” and “legitimate authority” standards, but claims that nations fighting such wars have more scope with regard to the “just cause” and “last resort” principles, and that it can be legitimate for nations to engage in preventative strikes in such conflicts, where such strikes would be seen as unjust under traditional Just War Theory.

Unfortunately, the introductory nature of the book means that Fotion has time to do little more than float these ideas, and he does not defend his proposed changes to Just War Theory in any depth. Serious scholars are thus likely to be intrigued by his ideas while at the same time being frustrated by the lack of a sophisticated defence of his new twin theories of just war. Nevertheless, this book is a well-written examination of modern Just War

Theory, and well worth the time it takes to read and consider.

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Allies for Armageddon: The Rise of Christian Zionism. By Victoria Clark (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), x + 331 pp. \$28.00 cloth.

In this disturbing and, at times, frightening book, Victoria Clark recounts the four-hundred-year-old Christian fundamentalist tradition that began among seventeenth-century Puritans and has impacted Christian Zionism even up to the twenty-first century. Millions of devout Christians are convinced that the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 belong to the Jews because of God’s miraculous intervention. Additionally, they find no Palestinian state in their biblical texts or any peace in the area until Jesus launches his “Second Coming” that will establish his one-thousand-year reign of peace.

Part 1 of this study surveys millenarian fundamentalism from 1621 to 1948, and Part 2 extends from 1948 to the present. Clark carefully associates the early Puritans in their exodus from England with the Israelites during their Egyptian and Babylonian captivities. Her narrative nicely connects the Puritan Divines with Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Seventh Earl of Shaftsbury, who was President of the London Jews’ Society from 1848 to 1885. His puritanical brand of Christianity was the basis of his claim to have been the first gentile to have succeeded in marrying a biblical interest in the Jews and their ancient homeland with the colder contingencies of England’s foreign policy. Shaftsbury’s style of religious politics in the cause of the Jews is what links Britain’s Arthur Balfour and Lloyd George to President Harry Truman and to the televangelists Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, who built the American religious right during the 1980s and 1990s, and subsequently to such Christian Zionists as the contemporary Pastor John Hagee of Cornerstone Church in San Antonio, Texas.

The seeds of this conservative religious movement were germinated in the anxious

anti-intellectualism of early-twentieth-century America. It consisted of a stubborn defense of biblical literalism as well as a preoccupation with the role to be played by Jews and their land in nurturing the Kingdom of God on earth. In the course of the century, the battle lines would be drawn between two oppositional camps: the liberal one, which viewed the Bible in the context of history, and the conservative one, which viewed history and the future in the context of the Bible. Christian Zionists have frequently exhibited a somewhat surprising anti-Semitism. They paradoxically compare the “right kind of Jew” (warlike in the mold of ancient Jewish heroes) and the “wrong kind of Jew” (complaining, cunning people as in the anti-Semitic stereotype).

Clark’s book is an analytical masterpiece. She has interviewed a variety of leaders and followers who see the world in terms of Good and Evil, of Syria and Iran battling Israel and the Second Coming. She has explored the Christian Zionist connections to prominent political circles in the United States, and has exposed this lobby and its role in the eruptive politics of the Middle East. Her work represents a cutting-edge research mind as familiar with real people through her conversations with them as it is with the scholarly resources of the library. She has connected the tissue of religious ideals with politics and has shown that ideas do have consequences.

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Living Forms of the Imagination. By Douglas Hedley (London: T & T Clark, 2008), x + 308 pp. £24.99 paper.

In this nuanced, lucid, and scholarly work, Douglas Hedley argues that a major hindrance to reflective faith is the failure of imagination. Additionally, he contends that the reductive concept of philosophical reason inspired the amazing burst of Romanticism, characterized by an energetic imagination, which is still being confronted. His work focuses on the indirect apprehension of transcendent reality, that is, the types of imagination that allow finite beings to apprehend eternal and immutable verities.

Through poetry, humans are immersed in the real drama of ethical existence as a struggle between good and evil, a pilgrimage of the soul to God. Hedley includes reflections on such disparate figures as Plato, the early Christian apologists up to Dante and Milton, as well as on such theologically marginal figures as Proust, Thomas Mann, Coleridge, and Wordsworth.

In brief, Hedley insists that imagination allows humans to interact with God in the world. Persons can know God through imaginative analogy and through faith in the hierarchy of Being. In the first chapter, Hedley explores the impact of imagination on theology. He uses Plato’s forms to show that imagination can manifest the unseen Forms to particular individuals. Romanticism has been nurtured by this Platonic legacy. In Chapter 2, Hedley investigates imagination from a variety of angles: psychological-psychoanalytical, metaphysical, epistemological, and aesthetic. He concludes by insisting that creativity is an inalienable and irreducible part of the human mind and is an essential component in the proposition that the human soul made in the image of God has infinite value.

Theologically, Hedley then uses Chapter 3 to illustrate the thesis that the human mind points to a transcendent source and that imagination is “reason in its most exalted mood” (6). In Chapter 4, he explores the view that religion is essentially symbolic, and so the Romantic perspective of Coleridge and Schelling has a crucial significance for this study. Hedley turns in Chapter 5 from religion to the apocalyptic dimension of ethics, in which the “ought” expresses the supernatural within us. This view of ethics leads in Chapter 6 into the importance of narratives, in which the religious and metaphysical implications of perfection reside. In Chapter 7, Hedley looks at the Christian story and employs Austin Farrer’s attempt to utilize poetic imagination as the key to comprehending scriptural imagination. Finally, the author investigates the “social imaginary” to illustrate that the fabric of our common life is suffused with the symbols and the memories of a specific historical culture. He has successfully challenged the anthropological and sociological theorists who have reduced religion to a social cement or a product of evolutionary development.

Hedley has produced a fascinating conversational partnership among such disparate

persons as Plato, the Romantics, and Tolkien, as they all explore how humans made in the image of God come to a knowledge of the source (God). In our technological age, characterized by the search for specific solutions to concrete problems, this book is a welcome reminder of the full panoply of human resources available for revealing God.

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Subverting the Leviathan: Reading Thomas Hobbes as a Radical Democrat.

By James R. Martel (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), xi + 309 pp. \$34.50/£20.50 cloth.

James Martel would like us to think of Thomas Hobbes as a radical democrat. He announces his premise as follows: “The greatest achievement of *Leviathan* is to enable its readers to catch the author in the act of producing his own textual authority and furthermore, the authority of the sovereign” (38). Martel claims that by making the production of authority transparent, Hobbes invites his readers to subvert his authority and “by extension, the authority of the national sovereign” (2). These subversions become the basis for radical democracy.

To make this argument, Martel turns to Parts 3 and 4 of *Leviathan*. Here he argues that radical democratic notions emerge from Hobbes’ approach to reading Scripture. Martel asserts that Hobbes’ religious beliefs “complicate his overt political message” (16). Included among these is the Holy Spirit, which functions as a “subversive and counterhegemonic power” opposed to sovereignty. For Martel, Hobbes’ reflections on the early Christian church are useful for thinking against sovereignty because the church is a model of “politically decentered interpretive communities” operating “in the absence of any overarching power” (178).

While reading Hobbes as a democrat is not entirely original (e.g., Richard Tuck’s recent work), Martel innovates by thinking about *Leviathan* as a text with radical democratic elements, using theology and what he describes as Hobbes’ theory of reading to do this. Hobbes

emerges looking like a republican version of Nietzsche—Martel makes the comparison (199)—rather than as an author deeply concerned with mitigating political conflicts generated by disputes over interpretation. If this sounds rather unlike Hobbes, all the better according to Martel. The latter doesn’t “think it matters much anyway” what Hobbes “really meant” (18). This jaunty attitude toward historical accuracy will be provocative to some political theorists.

Using Hobbes to get at contemporary themes isn’t necessarily objectionable, particularly if he helps us illuminate a political question. However, Martel spends so much time arguing for Hobbes as a radical democrat that he neglects explaining sufficiently the problem Hobbes helps us with. This neglect is amplified by his willfully antihistorical approach. Is the ‘sovereignty’ that is supposedly a problem today the same as that of seventeenth-century England? Martel believes that it is the same for ‘liberals’ and singles out Constant, Mill, Berlin, and Rawls for consideration. His discussion here is quite brief (227–30) and seems insufficient to understand a rather complicated question: liberalism’s relationship to sovereignty. While the discussion partially clarifies why Martel wants to read Hobbes as a radical democrat, it appears only in the conclusion.

Moreover, there is little discussion of what radical democracy actually *is*, both today and in Hobbes’ time. This is troubling given its importance for Martel’s book. The closest we get to a definition is a “practice that depends on nothing but its own ongoing moments of self-structuring” (3). What all this means for *politics* is difficult to gather. It appears to mean a demos-generated foundation that seeks nothing beyond itself. Where, or when, such a foundation is needed in political practice, and why *Hobbes* is necessary to get us there, are less clear.

Martel waits until his final page to address the concrete politics he is after: the politics of “the early Christian church” and “our own time, when sovereignty is destabilized” (is it?), and of “the myriad political revolutions of the last two hundred years” (which ones?) (247). Without knowing more about these various moments and the political problem(s) that Martel sets out to solve, it is difficult to assess the utility of his unorthodox reading of Hobbes. Indeed, we are left wondering

whether Martel ultimately beheads the *Leviathan* or replaces the beast with a Hydra.

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Influence and Confluence: Yeats Annual No. 17: A Special Number. Edited by Warwick Gould (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), xxxiv + 487 pp. \$100.00/£65.00 cloth.

The 17th Yeats Annual, given the title “Influence and Confluence,” is a treasure trove of information, interpretation, and arcane speculation for scholars and admirers of the great Irish poet. With a wide variety of subjects and points of view, the single reader is bound to find something to treasure, but perhaps not to find all of vivid interest.

I found the book reviews most interesting, especially Colin McDowell’s review of Ann Saddlemyer’s copious biography of George Yeats. And for those who have labored in the Cornell project of publishing and deciphering Yeats’s manuscripts, this volume contains no less than five long and very thorough and appreciative reviews of the manuscript volumes.

The Yeats Industry is like an extended family, and we do have our family feuds. In the preface by the indefatigable editor Warwick Gould, he gives very generous and touching memorial tributes to Michael Yeats, the poet’s son (to whom the volume is dedicated) and to George Mills Harper. But I wish that Gould had left the task of writing about the career of the late Richard Finneran to someone else. Gould and Finneran were frequent adversaries in editorial disputes over Yeatsian matters, and it is difficult not to give a partisan slant to a eulogy, a form which calls for “speaking well.”

The main articles in the yearbook range from articles on narrowly focused subjects to extended monographs.

Unfulfillment is a theme which runs through Neil Mann’s article about Yeats’s unsuccessful alchemical attempt to “raise up the ghost of a rose,” and Yeats never did get to Japan in 1920, but Edward Marx’s essay on Yone Noguchi offers much illumination on a

Japanese poet who had considerable influence on Yeats’s fascination with the No drama form. And in Wayne K. Chapman’s editing of the manuscripts of Yeats’s unfinished play, which he calls “Guardians of the Tower and Stream,” gives an intriguing, if fragmented, picture of what the finished play would have been like.

With copious, and vivid illustrations, Derek Roper offers Leonardo da Vinci caricatures and a painting as possible inspirations for Yeats’s line “Did Quattrocento finger fashion it,” in reference to Maud Gonnet’s appearance in old age, in “Among School Children.”

Deborah Ferrelli’s monograph on “Yeats and Dorothy Wellesley” arouses my interest in Wellesley’s own personality and talents and tips the balance away from the usual gossipy treatment of their poetic/personal relationship. Rory Ryan valiantly tries to explain “The Opening and Closing of the Tinctures” in Yeats’s *A Vision*, a subject of rather specialized interest.

Sally Connolly’s essay on elegies by Auden and Heaney in relation to Yeats has some provoking insights into the problems and possibilities of this ancient form. In summary, the wide and multifaceted appeal of Yeats’s life and works is writ large, and small, in this ambitious and information-rich volume.

There are a few proofing errors along the way, including the inevitable “Yeasts’s” (424), which my thesis director once queried with the comment “a rising poet?”

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Terrorism: The New World Disorder. By Nicolas Fotion, Boris Kashnikov, and Joanne K. Lekea (London: Continuum, 2007), xix + 187 pp. £45.00 cloth/£9.99 paper.

Terrorism: The New World Disorder represents a carefully argued deconstruction of the predominant conceptions of *terrorism* particularly as the term has been used and abused since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. The focus of the book is on the ethics of “terrorism” and “counter-terrorism”; it is one of the few

works on the general subject of terrorism that explores the intent and consequences of both anti-state terrorism, although it uses the questionable term “non-state,” and state-supported terrorism. Here, so-called “non-state actors” could really be secret agents of states, or else unwitting agents for states; but I prefer the term “anti-state” actors since these groups generally define themselves against the government or regime in power. In analysing the complex concept and interpretations of terrorism, it is one of the few books that recognizes the fact that it is very difficult to label differing acts of violence with differing intents as acts of terror; furthermore, those engaged in such acts of violence may not recognize their actions as acts of terror, but may believe that they are acting either in the service of a just cause or as a duty to their country.

Most crucially, Chapter 9 “Arguments against Terrorism” provides a very perceptive critique of “just war theory” as it applies to the use of terror by both states and non-state actors; the chapter critiques the justification for the use of force and violence in terms of both *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. Although its interpretation of some of the historical examples of acts of both state and non-state terrorism can be disputed, the book provides an excellent overall analytical framework for critiquing the nature of acts of terrorism in general and for developing an ethical approach to the question of the use of violence as a tool to promote various state or non-state interests and goals. Overall, it is different from the onslaught of books now written on the subject and well-worth reading.

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How and Why Species Multiply: The Radiation of Darwin’s Finches. By Peter R. Grant and B. Rosemary Grant (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), xix + 250 pp. £19.95 cloth.

Humans throughout the ages have been intrigued and fascinated by the wild abundance and diversity of life around us. God, according

to the Bible, brings about this world teeming with living creatures in but a few, bold strokes. Modern-day evolutionary biologists, though, posit a different explanation for the presence of so many life forms: from a single starting point some four billion years ago, the living world has become more complex and diversified through the process of evolution. In *How and Why Species Multiply*, the authors aim to better understand this diversity and its origins by carefully examining speciation in Darwin’s finches—birds that the Grants have intensively studied for the past thirty years.

The common ancestor of these finches is thought to have emigrated to the Galápagos Islands nearly two-and-a-half million years ago and the original birds have since diversified into at least fourteen identifiable species. These finches are worth close study for a number of practical reasons, one of which is that they live in the same, largely undisturbed environment where they evolved, and that across the island chain the whole process of their speciation—from its earliest to latest stage—is represented.

The first part of the book is largely descriptive and is concerned with examining the finches’ history and environment on the islands, detailing such things as changing weather patterns, changing food availability, and the increasing number of islands on the archipelago. After introducing the relevant theory on speciation, the authors focus their description more on the finches themselves, with two topics standing out. The first, which most readers will be familiar with, is the variety of the finches’ beaks. The different types of beaks—whose functions can be likened to different types of pliers that an electrician might carry around—provide powerful evidence of how a morphological trait that can better exploit the environment and is heritable becomes more prevalent in a population.

A second aspect of the finches’ biography that stands out is their early song learning. Apparently, young finches will learn the song of their father, or a nearby male. This feature of their learning is crucial since young finches will likely go on to mate with only those who have also learned the same song. Thus, an important reason why finches don’t interbreed—and hence there are so many finch species—has to do with cultural, in contrast to genetic, transmission. According to the authors,

researchers have not given due weight to the former (or this?) cause of speciation.

Although well-organized and written in admirably clear prose, general readers will likely be turned off by the book's emphasis on data and specificity. For example, it often refers to the finches by their Latin names *Geospiza magnirostris* and *Camarhynchus pallidus*. The writing is more textbook-like in style and presentation than casual in tone or devoted to advancing an argument. Tension in the book picks up toward the end, however, when the authors try to synthesize their understanding of speciation in the finches with theories of adaptive radiation more generally. The colorful illustrations also deepen one's appreciation of how these tiny birds differ from one another, of the raw, naturalistic environment they inhabit, and of the research enterprise itself.

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Spinoza's *Ethics*: A Reader's Guide. By J. Thomas Cook (London: Continuum, 2007), ix + 174 pp. \$16.95 paper.

J. Thomas Cook has penned a readable and detailed introduction to one of the most difficult works of the western philosophical tradition. The title of Spinoza's work, the *Ethics* (which was published posthumously in 1678), has always misled readers into believing that it is focused exclusively on the meaning and practice of morality. While Spinoza certainly wrote a great deal about moral principles and behavior, the *Ethics* is also a work of metaphysics and psychology. In studying the often turbulent relation between reason and the passions, Spinoza provided the theoretical groundwork for moral praxis. His account of human nature is at once a repudiation of the reductionist psychology of materialism and a bold articulation of depth psychology: human beings, who are torn between the power of reason and the passions, must use both to avoid existing as divided and disordered persons.

Cook provides a section by section commentary on the *Ethics*, with helpful

questions for student readers at the end of each discussion. Throughout the work, and particularly in the last chapter, the author provides an understanding of the controversy surrounding Spinoza and his philosophy. It is regrettable, however, that Cook joins the vast majority of scholars who portray Spinoza as a purely secular thinker. Cook does not challenge the conventional view that Spinoza was a defender of what Jonathan Israel calls the "radical enlightenment," or the seventeenth-century rationalist assault on revealed religion. What this all too common reading ignores is that both the *Ethics* and his other major work *The Theologico-Political Tractatus* defend the truth of the Bible. Spinoza absolutely rejects the modern dualism between reason and faith. In defending true religion as the "intellectual love of God," Spinoza targets both religious fundamentalists and secular skeptics alike for ignoring that the Bible, properly interpreted, teaches the rational *and* religious meaning of relation: that our love of God reveals our love of humanity, just as our hatred of God and humanity represent a denial of existence altogether.

Cook also (unhappily) accepts without criticism the conventional view that Spinoza owed his most important concepts to Greek philosophy. In comparing Spinoza with the Stoic Epictetus, Cook does not adequately recognize that Spinoza decisively repudiated the dualisms between soul and body, reason and passion, and divine and human, all of which plague the ancient Greek mind. The author then cannot explain why Spinoza rejects the Socratic teaching that one cannot know the good, and therefore cannot choose the good. The teaching of Spinoza that we can deliberately and knowingly choose the bad is dependent on the biblical concept of sin, an idea which is unthinkable to both Socrates and every Greek philosopher.

Spinoza is first and last a philosopher of relation, or what Buber famously called the "I-Thou," the opposite of both dualism and monism. The choice which Spinoza poses is not between religion and reason but between the intellectual (and religious) love of God and the embrace of hateful passions which reject both God and Man.

GRANT HAVERS

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War of No Pity: The Indian Mutiny and Victorian Trauma. By Christopher Herbert (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), xiii + 352 pp. \$35.00/£19.95 cloth.

In this brilliant, passionate, and provocative book, Christopher Herbert explores the reaction of literate Victorians to the Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the savage war of retribution that followed. He argues that although by twentieth-century standards the number of casualties in India was not high, the Mutiny caused a lasting trauma in the British national psyche. The horror of the experience as a whole exposed deep fault lines in the British mentality. As a result, the Mutiny and the British reaction to it amounted to an end of the mid-Victorian epoch and the beginning of the very different, angst-filled late-Victorian period.

Herbert's account of the national psychic trauma refutes much of the standard postcolonial interpretation of Victorian culture. Instead of a monolithic and coherent ideology of Victorian imperialism that dominated the culture, Herbert finds a multitude of evidence for ambivalence, contradictions, and incoherence in British ideas and attitudes. To be sure, the literature on the Mutiny and subsequent war that flooded the book market praised British heroism and pluck, but it also condemned British arrogance and racism, as well as the bloodthirstiness of the British repression. Likewise, their Christian philanthropic and humanitarian impulses were matched by their equally powerful drive for retribution and cruelty; indeed, according to Herbert, the humane and the savage in evangelical Christianity were inextricably entwined.

Herbert's method is close reading of a wide range of texts arising from the Mutiny—firsthand accounts, memoirs, histories, and fiction—all of which he reads with intensity, imagination, and a deep understanding of Victorian culture. The result is a salutary lesson for ideologically-driven students of empire and imperialism: it is a mistake to assume what the British *must* have thought and said; instead, one must actually read the texts carefully. This, Herbert does with such admirable energy and insight that his study of the responses to the Mutiny helps us appreciate now-forgotten histories of the Mutiny and understand in a new way well-known texts like Dickens' *A Tale of Two Cities* and Mary

Elizabeth Braddon's popular *Lady Audley's Secret*. Hence, though Herbert regrettably does not engage in any study of the Victorian readers' responses to the texts he explores, his tight textual focus does open out into penetrating observations about the complex inner tensions of Victorian culture.

This book is sure to provoke much discussion among scholars of Victorian Britain and British imperialism. It will surely draw healthy attention to the anti-imperialist strain of nineteenth-century British thought. It will also focus attention on the nature of Victorian Christianity, for the most provocative and perhaps questionable of Herbert's interpretations have to do with evangelicalism. Herbert rightly sees evangelicalism as central to middle-class Victorianism, but throughout he identifies evangelicalism with Calvinism, in theology as well as in spirit. His understanding of evangelicalism seems to be informed mainly by Ludwig Feuerbach and John Stuart Mill, which suggests that on this subject Herbert himself may have allowed a prior ideological commitment to cloud his reading of certain texts. But this weakness, if it is one, is minor compared to the impressive achievements of Herbert's book. It should be required reading for every scholar of Victorian culture and above all for students of imperialism and the Empire.

THOMAS WILLIAM HEYCK
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Realities and Representation: State Building in Early Modern Europe and European America. Edited by Maija Jansson (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), xiv + 237 pp. £ 42.50 cloth.

The English word *representation* is highly polysemous. Here the topic is political representation, contrasting with direct democracy, where the entire population participates directly, as in Ancient Greece. Ancient Greek has no word for *representation*—the modern Greek expression *αντιπροσωπείω* “to represent,” ‘to act on someone’s behalf,’ is a learned neologism. *Representation*, designating the practice of electing someone to a legislative body to act on behalf of others, is first recorded in

English in 1769 (SOED), the verb *to represent* somewhat earlier (1655), the adjective *representative* a bit earlier still (1643), while the French *représentatif* dates from 1764 (Robert), and *représentation* from 1772. The representative represents a *constituency*, a word first used in this sense in English in 1831. This is, of course, a key concept: whom does the representative actually represent? There is also the question of accountability: what or who ensured that a representative would truly represent?

"In the history of early modern Europe, kings and queens, dynastic succession and royal decisions dominate the story and form the core of the narrative...[but] side by side with church and crown at this time were fledgling representative institutions struggling to maintain and even to expand the liberties and privileges confirmed by kings of earlier ages. These assemblies were a critical component of state building in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries"—so writes Maija Jansson in her introduction to this volume.

The volume offers three articles on England, one each on France, Germany, Ireland, Scandinavia, and Spain, and two on "European America," which, for the purposes of this book refers to the British and French colonies along the North Atlantic coast.

In England, the settlement of the Glorious Revolution ensured that sovereignty was shared among King, Lords, and Commons. The legacy of the civil wars and the Glorious Revolution was an awakening of thought about government in general and English government in particular; but at this stage it was believed that the Commons should represent "property and not persons," and this principle was confirmed in law by the Landed Qualification Act of 1711. The history of representation in France is far more complicated than that of England. Alongside the increasingly strong monarch ("L'état, c'est moi") there were also the *parlements* or law courts which were able to "remonstrate" with the king, but these *parlements* never emerged as representative bodies. During the Revolution various schemes were effected, but they all failed. In the German lands the rulers were forced in some cases to seek a compromise with the traditional noble élites as represented by the provincial diets (*Landtage*). In areas where diets no longer met, noble corporations survived and "preserved the collective memory of ancient privileges."

In Denmark, the old institutions collapsed in 1657–60, but in Sweden a "well-developed representative political system" thrived, and Sweden's military prowess can be attributed to the spirit and efficiency of the *Riksdag*.

There is no mention anywhere of East-Central, Eastern, or South-Eastern Europe. Perhaps there were no representative institutions in these parts of Europe in early modern times, but one suspects that this lacuna reflects the assumption that the area is *terra incognita*. With this reservation, one can say that this volume represents definitive research on this topic.

PETER M. HILL

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A Wall of Two: Poems of Resistance and Suffering from Kraków to Buchenwald and Beyond.

By Henia Karmel and Ilona Karmel. Translated from the Polish by Arie A. Galles and Warren Niesluchowski (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007), xxxviii + 120 pp. £9.95 paper.

My friend from a strange planet
Did you even understand
That my song was a scream?

The two sisters, Henia Karmel and Ilona Karmel, who wrote these haunting poems in 1943–45 on their nightmarish journey from the Kraków ghetto through the inferno of German labour camps ending in Buchenwald and its apocalyptic "dissolution" by the SS, were born to a distinguished family and had received a first-class education when the war broke out. They were seventeen and twenty at the time. Their poems, written on the blank side of worksheets and sown into the hems of their dresses, miraculously survived; some were subsequently published in Poland, some translated into Hebrew, but it was only in 2000, after the death of Ilona, the younger sister, that the entire collection was given to Fanny Howe, a friend of the family and a poet herself, who from a literal translation produced by two Polish-born writers, made or rather recreated these English versions. They are published here for the first time. As Howe explains in her very sympathetic biographical account, neither of the two sisters

apparently wrote any more poetry, after their fortunate escape into freedom, though from 1948/9, having settled in the United States, they both wrote fiction in English.

Two years after their ordeal, while they were convalescing in Sweden, Henia and Ilona wrote a brief "Preface to an unknown reader" in Polish, where they describe their poems as "inscriptions on a prison wall" (1947). Even in this evidently rather free English translation they convey something of the appalling and desperate circumstances of their creation. Some, like "The March of the Fifteen-Year-Old Boys" or "Procession" (by Henia) strike one as the naked expression of raw terror and helpless pain; others, like "To a Friend from a Strange Planet" and "Autobiography" (Ilona) are desperate cries to a silent universe from utter desolation. All are vibrant documents of extreme suffering, lonely despair, hunger, disease and wistful memories of a lost childhood and a once hoped-for happiness. Ilona's "Autobiography" concludes with:

I have no childhood dreams, only
visitations from the fearful
nightmares of those years.

Worse for being known
but now with nowhere to run
for comfort from them.
No maternal hands.

The story ends here
when I am twenty.

For many thousands like the two sisters, the story really did end here, but one must be grateful for this eloquent memorial and to the editor for her well-deserved tribute.

Nothing can better describe the message of this moving collection than the final sentence of the authors' "preface" written sixty years ago: "These poems, and thousands of other creations, form one cry only: 'Remember'."

CHRISTA JANSOHN
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The Fairy Tales of Oscar Wilde. By Jarlath Killeen (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007), viii + 194 pp. \$99.95/£50.00 cloth.

Touted as "the first full-length study of Wilde's fairy tales," Jarlath Killeen's new book certainly

delivers in terms of comprehension. *The Fairy Tales of Oscar Wilde* provides an extensive treatment of every fairy tale from Wilde's two collections, *The Happy Prince and Other Tales* (1888) and *A House of Pomegranates* (1891). Killeen has obviously done his homework, and there can be little doubt about the critical necessity of his project. His introduction supplies an excellent overview of the scholarship devoted to Wilde's still undervalued fairy tales, but as Killeen correctly remarks, many of these critics have marginalized the tales due to their "anomalous" and "tangential" relationship to Wilde's other writings (1). Killeen promises to rectify this oversight by shedding some light on the troublesome "mystery" that surrounds the tales. Apparently, this mystery confounds the competing camps of Wildean critics—those who wish to paint Wilde as a bulwark of the moral conservatives and those who prefer a more devious, subversive Wilde. Thus, Killeen argues for a healthy middle ground, suggesting that Wilde exhibits the "qualities of a conservative as well as a radical writer" (1).

Nevertheless, Killeen's proposed solution to the critics' dichotomous approach to the tales seems less like a program for reconciliation between extremes, and more like another provincial theory about Wilde's aesthetic "message" based on dubious cultural and biographical influences. Because Wilde was an Irishman—though probably one of the single most absent of all Irish absentees—his tales' social concerns are Irish concerns, and because of his well-known aesthetic interest in the Roman Catholic Church, the religious symbolism employed in his tales is "folk-Catholic" symbolism. According to Killeen, Wilde's subversion extends only far enough to "undercut the morality of late Victorian England," whereupon his Irish conservatism kicks in, and he replaces one angry headmaster with another (15). Killeen's substitute orthodoxy is "folk-Catholicism," an artistic mode Wilde imbibed from his parents, both avid readers and anthologizers of Irish folklore, and from his brief trip to Western Ireland in 1875.

Undoubtedly, these factors would have made an impression on the young Wilde, but to suggest that the tales should be read as pseudo-Yeatsian invocations of Irish spiritualism and cultural identity, as Killeen does

repeatedly in his book, seems to strain credulity. For example, in his chapter on “The Young King,” Killeen cites the oft-referenced colonial equation of the Irish with children as sufficient evidence to support reading the tale’s main character as a stand-in for Ireland itself, pinning his correlative assertion that the young king is an “Irish King” on an ironic comment Wilde once made about his desire to see Ireland rule over England (107–9). Similarly, because the Irish nationalist Patrick Pearse read Wilde’s “The Selfish Giant” as an allegorical rendering of the 1880s land wars between Irish Catholic tenant farmers and their Protestant landlords, Killeen assures his reader that “submerged or allegorical elements of the original narrative have implications for Irish issues” (63). Such criticism is vastly reductive, and one longs for the return of a little of that pesky “mystery” that Killeen set out to dispel.

JUSTIN T. JONES

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The Invention of Politics in the European Avant-Garde (1906–1940). Edited by Sascha Bru and Gunther Martens (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), 290 pp. €60.00/\$75.00 cloth.

The Invention of Politics in the European Avant-Garde deals with one of the most significant art movements in European history, and may be said to explore the multiple processes of inventing a collective or individual self. As Julia Kristeva has argued in *The Revolution of Language*, the subversion of aesthetic form always entails a political critique, given that it is formed and articulated in a certain socio-political context that influences the way we speak, think and perceive. Thus the book investigates the multifaceted ways through which the avant-gardists “bended or even violated codified forms, modes and genres” (14), thereby overturning in a deep political sense the production of “cultural meaning” and along with it our notions of ourselves.

It is important that the book avoids being “lost in the general avant-garde text.” In various contributions in the book, for example by Berghaus, Bru, Martens, and Silverman, and

in its very focus on the “European,” it reminds us that the impact of most Western European avant-gardes went beyond their texts by trying to establish bonds with social, political and literary history.

In this respect the European avant-garde differs from the American avant-garde. Whereas the latter appropriated the precepts and ideas of Western European avant-gardes as textual material and signifying processes and built on them the “neo Avant-Garde” of the 1960s onward, the European avant-gardes always carried within them the long history of European ideas and politicized their subject, especially the futuristic, surrealist and dadaistic traditions with their radical critiques of bourgeois notions of culture.

Yet, equally, and without omitting the political dimension, other chapters of the book, including those by Winkiel, Berg, Berghaus, Sternstein, remind the reader that the avant-garde is also preoccupied with questions of subjectivity and language in general signification.

Despite the book’s interest in the early to the mid-twentieth-century movements its topic is still relevant today: for the avant-gardes remind us that one of the most important tasks of art is that it should not just be centered on itself. This relevance is seen in how, for example, the new dilemmas of multiculturalism offer alternatives to competing traditions of majorities and minorities, and how these alternatives are assimilated into the emerging ethnic canons of our postmodern postindustrial and virtual “palimpsestion.”

The contributions by Strom, Engels, Hunkeler, and Hjartarson all show that not only did the avant-garde actually revolutionize artistic expression, but that with proper adjustments it can still open up new possibilities.

The range of the book is impressive: it deals with a variety of political aspects—“The Centennial Debate on the Avant-Garde and Politics” (Sascha Bru), “On the Uses of the Inflammatory Rhetoric in Surrealism” (K. Strom), “Speech Acts on Political Modernity” (G. Martens), “Avant-Garde Manifestoes and the Myth of Racial Community” (L. Winkiel), “The French Debate on Surrealism on the Eve of the Cold War” (St. Engels); it explores community issues—“Citizenship and Sex in Czech Surrealism” (M. Sternstein), “Avant-Garde Utopianism in Dada” (H. Van Den

Berg), “The Futurist Political Party” (G. Berghaus); and it also discusses the relations of this complex art movement with societal dynamics and countries, such as France, England and Russia (Th. Hunkeler), or Spain (R. Silverman), and Iceland (B. Hjartarson). This volume represents a rich dialogue on its topic and the many contradictions of contemporary life and art. It is well-worth reading for all who are interested in the history of ideas and artistic evolution(s).

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The Highly Civilised Man: Richard Burton and the Victorian World. By Dane Kennedy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 354 pp. \$17.95 paper.

This important biography first released in 2005 is now available in paperback. Richard Burton is portrayed as a man of his times, admittedly responding to his age in interesting ways. There were many elements which must have been truly shocking to Victorian sensibilities, such as his frank discussions of sex and his opinions on Islam, particularly his positive assessment of the role of women in Islamic society. Dane Kennedy nevertheless provides a powerful case for seeing Burton as a Victorian iconoclast, constantly responding to the issues of the day. The biography is unified by the notion that Burton was obsessed, like his contemporaries, by the concept of difference—linguistic, racial, sexual.

Burton’s background is canvassed and his identity is set as a marginal figure virtually never resident in England, but still greatly influenced by the English paradigm. His birth at Torquay in 1821 of Anglo-Irish stock, his early life on the Continent in expatriate circles, and his failed career at Oxford are quickly despatched. It is relevant in the sense that he goes to join the British East India Company with a certain degree of resentment about Britain and the British, while at the same time participating in the colonial process. Here his contribution was related to an immense talent for language, and already considerable ability at discovering and appreciating cultural difference. His Orientalist

passions developed at this stage, and led to a prolific literary output. His reputation for sexual escapades is played down and a serious attempt is made to understand the influence of India on the development of his career.

After a period of leave in Britain, Burton embarked on an expedition to Arabia under the sponsorship of the Royal Geographical Society in 1852. Kennedy reproduces a photo of his guise on the famous Mecca venture in 1853, a simple blanket, the caption of which (written by Burton) provides the title for his book; it is devoid of the cultural locators, usually in evidence through background, dress and other trappings, and is emblematic of his avoidance of conformity to the expectations of caste.

Burton’s experience of Africa was mixed, and characterised by racism; it was soured by serious differences with Speke over methods, and the actual source of the Nile. He was in the wrong, but Kennedy thinks the Royal Geographical Society and its hierarchical ideas effectively demoted him. His visit to Harar in Somalia also failed to build his prestige.

His career continued in Brazil from 1865, then Damascus in 1869, and finally Trieste in 1873, until his death there in 1890. The appointment to Trieste was something of a comedown after failures in the other posts, including some evidence of anti-Semitism. He was well connected in bohemian circles when in London. Something of an iconoclast, he was a prominent member of ‘The Cannibal Club’ which was characterised by its free thinking.

Burton’s role as translator was also as iconoclast, and was in some quarters judged as an unworthy study of a debased and inferior civilisation (the Kama Sutra). He had both defenders and detractors; he answered with a vitriolic diatribe. He saw himself as an enlightened evangelist, unbuttoning the strait-laced Victorian Britons.

Kennedy believes that Burton in some ways anticipated cultural relativism, and it is certainly true that he had a wider appreciation of the implications of cultural difference than most of his contemporaries.

HUGH LINDSAY
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The Politics of the Veil. By Joan Wallach Scott (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), xii + 208 pp. \$ 24.95/£14.95 cloth.

Joan Wallach Scott's intent in her recent study of the headscarf controversy in France is to uncover the myth that lies at the heart of the current French construction of Islam: the fiction of republican universalism, a complex, multifaceted imagined way of dealing with national belonging, religious belief, gender and sexuality that is, in her view, "as dogmatic as it is phantasmatic." This particular ideological formation, a product of the country's philosophical and political history, informs the specific French way of dealing with issues of globalization and cultural difference faced by many other nations today.

Scott does not take as her starting point the reality of Islam in today's France, but rather what she calls "the discourse" on the veil, the invention of French Muslims as a single, homogeneous, virtual reality. She argues that the mythical version of French identity used to justify the ban of the veil in public schools is based on abstract categories and bipolar dichotomies that fail to "capture the complexities of either Islam or 'the West'." Rather, she writes, "they are polemics that in fact create their own reality: incompatible cultures, a clash of civilizations" (5).

In the course of her demonstration, the author revisits the history of French colonialism in Algeria, and uncovers several paradoxes and contradictions that disrupt the dominant version of Frenchness, which she describes as a mixture of racism, secularism, individualism, and home-grown notions of gender and sexuality (Scott devotes a chapter to each one of these major components of the current politics of the veil). The sticking point of French republicanist theory is that its abstract definition of citizenship allows "individuals to be conceived as the same (as universal), but sameness is measured in terms of concrete ways of being (as Frenchness)" (13).

Those whom the French philosophical framework make it impossible to view as "minorities" are caught in a double-bind: because sameness, in the republicanist version of inclusion as assimilation, is a prerequisite for equality, they are expected to shed the very ethnic and religious characteristics that mark them as different in the same place, and form

the basis of job and housing discrimination. Too visible as "immigrants" (even if they were born in France), they are supposed to become invisible as "citizens." Furthermore, banning from schools teenagers who wear the veil seems to imply that "education is a prerequisite for integration, rather than its outcome" (102).

Scott convincingly argues that the colonial discourse on France's civilizing mission was also racked by similar tensions and contradictions: "the stated goal was to civilize those who finally could not be civilized" because of their religious beliefs and sexual mores (47). Her insightful analysis points to the complexity of meanings that make up "the veil" as a symbolic marker situated at the intersection of colonial memory, racial discrimination, sexual politics, and the anticlerical legacy of French republican secularism.

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Five Days in August: How World War II Became a Nuclear War. By Michael D. Gordin (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), xv + 209 pp. \$24.95/£15.95 cloth.

From Hiroshima through the Cuban Missile Crisis to present-day fears of terrorist suitcase-sized bombs and international reactions to Iran, nuclear affairs have dominated our world. *Five Days in August: How World War II Became a Nuclear War* takes us back to behind the scenes at the dawn of the nuclear era. To us, these days look rather primitive and makeshift. Rather than focusing on World War II politics, this book tells a fascinating on-the-ground and in-the-air story of the military. In its coda, the author does provide a treasure trove of sources on the decision to drop the atomic bomb. Despite a few flaws (an example is an incorrect description of how plutonium is produced [42]), the book ably details the history transforming events of 1945. The author's major contention is that in 1945, the military considered the atomic bomb the same as conventional weapons and did not anticipate a quick end to the war.

This short book grips the general reader and leads the curious on to longer and more scholarly writings. Chapter 1, "Endings," introduces the book as a military history. Chapter 2, "Shock," sets the stage: massive firebombing of Tokyo and other cities advanced the American goal of unconditional surrender. The theme of Chapter 3, "Special," is captured in its opening sentence: "The decision to incorporate the atomic bomb as an essential element of the strategy of shock was not so much a thought-out decision as the fortuitous consequence of the vagaries of timing in military and diplomatic affairs in early summer 1945" (53). This chapter also points out that the scientists working on the bomb expected few problems from residual radiation.

Chapter 4, "Miracle," describes the seizure and development of Tinian Island, the staging point for the atomic bombing missions, the Hiroshima strike. Chapter 5, "Papacy," is named after the code name for Tinian Island. It sets out the post-Hiroshima reaction in the United States, the preparations to drop more bombs, and the bombing of Nagasaki. Chapter 6, "Revolution," recounts how the atomic bomb became special after the Japanese surrender. And Chapter 7, "Beginnings," traces the history of the early days of the Cold War.

The author has an interesting way of looking at nuclear history. Most of us do not think of World War II as a nuclear war. But at the end, it surely was. Secondly, he opines that, in a manner of speaking, President Truman's stop-order imposed after Nagasaki has never been rescinded (131). Truman steadfastly rejected the use of nuclear weapons in the Korean War, and, of course, no president since him has ordered their use.

The book ends on a somber note as it sets out the three opportunities when humanity could have put the nuclear genie back in the bottle. The first was after July 16, 1945, when the Trinity device was exploded at Alamogordo, New Mexico, and before August 6, 1945, when the United States bombed Hiroshima. The second was after the Japanese surrender when the fledgling United Nations considered arms control plans. Finally, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Cold War nuclear stalemate, perhaps the best opportunity came and went.

One is left with a hollow feeling that from the 1940s until today, humanity has been willing to let happenstance be the finger on the nuclear trigger.

EDWIN R. MCCULLOUGH
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Liberty and the News. By Walter Lippmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), xxi + 92 pp. £9.95 paper.

Walter Lippmann was an important figure in American journalism of the twentieth century, who, in the aftermath of the First World War, wrote *Liberty and the News*. Now, eighty years later, this collection of three essays reflecting on the role of the press in public life has been republished.

During the war Lippmann worked for Woodrow Wilson and was part of the team that formulated the "Fourteen Points"—Wilson's postwar plans for a peaceful world. He became the U.S. Representative on the Inter-Allied Propaganda Board and after the war assisted the U.S. delegation for the Versailles Peace conference. The disappointing result of the peace treaty left him disillusioned. In the three essays he questions the "manufacture of consent" by the press, which claims and defends its freedom but rejects being held responsible for its exercise: "If I lie in a lawsuit involving my neighbor's cow, I can go to jail. But if I lie to a million readers in a matter involving war and peace, I can lie my head off, and, if I choose the right series of lies, be entirely irresponsible" (24–25).

Lippmann's interest is in the relation between truth, liberty, and press responsibility. For him truth cannot be sacrificed on the altar of patriotism, since it is "but one more among myriad examples of the doctrine that the end justifies the means" (5). By trying to hold the press responsible for the facts they are reporting he enters the controversial territory of liberty and censorship. He therefore tries to show in his second essay that "without protection against propaganda, without standards of evidence, without criteria of emphasis, the living substance of all popular decision is exposed to every prejudice and to infinite exploitation.

That is why I have argued that the older doctrine of liberty was misleading" (37).

He came to this conclusion by discussing Milton's *Areopagitica* and John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty*, two classics for debating the freedom of the press. As he shows, the freedom of the press was never an end in itself: "the goal is never liberty, but liberty for something or others" (12). Lippmann advocates the necessity of professional training for journalists, where "the ideal of objective testimony is cardinal" (48). For Lippmann, the aim of the journalist should be to provide the public with the objective information necessary to form their own opinion and make their decisions accordingly.

Ronald Steel has written a very informative foreword to the three essays, placing them in the context of Lippmann's work. It is a pity that Sidney Blumenthal uses his afterword to make his case against the Bush administration and the role of the media in the war against Iraq. There was no need for it; whoever reads the three essays by Lippmann will or will not see the parallels and, as a reader, I prefer not to be told how to interpret a text.

MARKUS MECKL

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Media, Wars and Politics: Comparing the Incomparable in Western and Eastern Europe. By Ekaterina Balabanova (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2007), xviii + 172 pp. £55.00 cloth.

Behind the promising title *Media, Wars and Politics: Comparing the Incomparable in Western and Eastern Europe* hides an empirical study of how the Bulgarian and English medias reported the Kosovo war. Ekaterina Balabanova starts by comparing two models of media influence: The "Manufacturing Consent" and the "CNN Effect" thesis. Do political elites drive newsmakers to interpret global events in a particular way or is it the news that sets the political agenda and forces politicians to act? Through the well-explained media-policy interaction model the author questions the possibility of applying these models outside the American context for which they were originally developed.

In her second chapter Balabanova defines a new form of war in our times: wars are no longer fought between states but rather within the state. This kind of war, if it can be perceived as new, has led to a new manner of international response—the birth of humanitarian intervention.

In her third chapter Balabanova discusses the Kosovo conflict, its background and development and explains how this war fits into the category of a new war and a new military humanitarianism. At the end of the chapter she asks: "Was the news media an agenda-setter for the policy-makers?" (53). And the next chapter provides an informative overview of the Bulgarian media. But it is not until halfway through the book, in chapter 5, that the author begins to address the issue of the interaction of the press and foreign policy first in Bulgaria and then in the United Kingdom.

In order to analyze media-policy relations in Bulgaria and the United Kingdom Balabanova uses the model developed by Robinson: "This model predicts that when there is an elite consensus over an issue the news media are unlikely to produce coverage that challenges the consensus.... However, when an elite dissensus exists with regard to an issue...news media coverage reflects this debate and a variety of critical and supportive framing can be observed in media reports" (15–16).

The book provides a very good overview on the scholarly discussion of the impact of the media on policy making. It also explains the situation in Bulgaria, with which most readers in the English speaking world will be unfamiliar; however, it does not make any detailed comparison between the East and the West. One might also argue that reporting on a conflict taking place in a neighboring country, as is the case with Bulgaria and the Kosovo conflict, might have as much influence on the news reports as does the fact that Bulgaria is a post-Soviet Eastern European country.

Five pages of conclusion complete the book, and I have to admit that I still believe that the title of a book should set the agenda for its content.

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The Church in the Shadow of the Mosque: Christians and Muslims in the World of Islam. By Sidney H. Griffith (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), xiii + 220 pp. \$35.00/£19.95 cloth.

The front cover shows a papyrus depicting a Muslim ruler and his Christian physician involved in a lively conversation. The kind of discussions the two men seem to conduct has been all too rare in our times, something that works like Sidney H. Griffith's latest book are well-suited to address.

The first centuries of Islam were times of continuous and mutually influential dialogue between Christians and Muslims. This study primarily illuminates the ways the Oriental Churches were affected by this interchange. From the mid-seventh to the eleventh century more than half of the world's Christian population lived under Muslim rule. The arrival of the new religion forced the Oriental Churches to adjust their discourse so as not only to be understood but to be credible in the emerging society. This meant writing in the language of the opponents—in Arabic—as well as adapting their apologies to Islamic scholarly critique. Sidney H. Griffith reminds us repeatedly that both sides had deep knowledge of each other's theology: the Muslim writers went to great lengths to try to understand the Christian faith and the theological differences of the Christian churches.

Many thought-provoking conclusions can be drawn from this work. Any literary scholar should be interested in the ways the connotations of Arabic words, deeply associated with Islamic theology, influenced the thought of Oriental Churches. The dialogical genres which Christian authors employed deserve particular attention, especially in a comparative perspective with similar genres of other times and places. Another important contribution is the chapter on Christian philosophers of the early Islamic period, whose significance for philosophical thought in general is upgraded, as they are viewed in the power of their own philosophical writings and not only as translators.

The less knowledgeable reader may expect from the title to get a review of the history of all Christian communities that ever existed under Muslim rule. This, however, is not the case: the Oriental churches in the early Middle

Ages are the focus of the study, and among them not all, but only those that had an actual dialogue with the Islamic community; the fate of European Christians under Islamic rule in later times is left out. However natural this may be, given Professor Griffith's area of expertise, the image of "the church under the shadow of the mosque" risks being painted in colors brighter than motivated by historical reality.

Minor objections concerning the choice of material notwithstanding, Professor Griffith's latest book presents an introduction to Christian-Islamic relations that should be obligatory reading for anyone who deals with interreligious dialogue. The study offers engaging and accessible reading for the layman, as well as a helpful overview for the researcher—some thirty pages of reference literature will prove useful for anyone who embarks on the search of the earliest Christian-Muslim contacts.

LJUBICA MIOČEVIĆ
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Aristotle and Modernism: Aesthetic Affinities of T. S. Eliot, Wallace Stevens and Virginia Woolf. By Edna Rosenthal (Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2008), x + 152 pp. n.p.g.

In this wide-ranging study, informed by an encompassing engagement with many of the most significant literary critics and historians of our time, Edna Rosenthal argues that Aristotle's *Poetics* can provide us with a way of, if not reconciling the famously opposed concepts of modernism as championed by our literary experts, at least finding common ground among three major modernist writers whose aesthetics are often viewed as opposed to each other: Eliot, with his classical stance, on the one hand; and Stevens and Woolf, with their anti-classical stance, on the other.

While Rosenthal acknowledges that none of her three modernist authors explicitly engages the *Poetics* of Aristotle or overtly makes use of his ideas, she holds that it is their common "affectivism" (or what she also calls their "affectivist aesthetics") that reveals their common Aristotelian framework. She also calls upon the aesthetic ideas of Lessing

(who, while upholding the classical tradition of Aristotle, is scathing in his critique of French neo-classicism) and of Longinus and Edmund Burke, who, with their emphasis on the sublime, give a distinctively affectivist slant to the classical tradition of Aristotelian aesthetics.

It is important to take note of the considerable limitations that Rosenthal imposes on her study. With regard to Eliot, she considers only his critical writing, not his poetry or plays. While Rosenthal does cite a few lines of the poetry of Stevens, she is largely concerned with his critical writing (in *The Necessary Angel*). She devotes two chapters to Woolf, one to showing how, in her critical essays, her emphasis on character can be reconciled with Aristotle's primary interest in plot, and the second to a reading of Woolf's novel *Mrs Dalloway*. The summary that Rosenthal gives of Woolf's achievement in *Mrs Dalloway* is indicative of the approach that she takes overall in her study: "Woolf's conception of characterization reaffirms the central principles of Aristotelian aesthetics: she subtly dissolves the Aristotelian concept of the plot of tragedy into a praxis of character, and, by transforming character into the vehicle of tragic affect, Woolf tacitly adjusts the Aristotelian teleological principle of the cathartic end of art to the modern novel" (111).

It seems to me that Rosenthal would expect readers of her study to raise questions of two general kinds in response to it. The first is the hoary one. What does Athens have to do with Jerusalem? Surely, the Bible, with its utterly different concept of representation (mimesis) and thus of plot (i.e. history), character, *affectus* (i.e. love, which Spinoza makes central to his *Ethics*) . . . , not only affects but also, more significantly, "effects" (by creating) modernity. Is not what Aristotle understands by tragedy, based as it is on chance and fate, fundamentally different from Shakespearian tragedy, which presupposes the ethics of love and freedom? (Rosenthal refers to *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature* by Erich Auerbach but fails to note the distinction that he makes between Homeric narrative, which cannot be interpreted, and biblical narrative, which demands interpretation.) It is important to see that Rosenthal does not include in her discussion the three greatest theorists of modern aesthetics: Vico, who, in his new science of poetics, sharply distinguishes

the gentes (the ancients) from the Hebrews; Hegel, whose *Lectures on Fine Art*, the greatest work of modern aesthetics, concludes with a systematic demonstration of the fundamental difference between ancient and modern tragedy; and Kierkegaard, who shows in *Either/Or* Part II that aesthetics categorically presupposes love, love of the other as the neighbor. It is important to note, too, that Vico, Hegel, and Kierkegaard all indicate that authentic art embodies values that are central to biblical religion, which Hegel identifies with the life of the Spirit (Spirit recognizing Spirit), and that religion, precisely because it involves what Kierkegaard calls the indirect communication of metaphor, expresses, as he puts it, "the art of existing," and whose "Science," Vico holds, "must therefore be a rational civil theology of divine providence."

The second question concerns the content of the poetry of Eliot and Stevens (I pass over Woolf here). How are we to evaluate Eliot's commitment to the classical tradition in light of his explicitly religious (Christian) poetry? Surely, the passion of the incarnate Christ is for Eliot completely different from Aristotelian catharsis. Rosenthal does cite six lines from Stevens' poem "Description without Place," beginning with the claim: "Description is Revelation." But she omits the succeeding lines where Stevens, in calling upon "A text," "the book of reconciliation," the "canon central in itself," and "The thesis of the plentifullest John," then continues: "Thus the theory of description matters most. / It is the theory of the world for those / For whom the word is the making of the world . . ." Aristotelian aesthetics has no place for the creation of the world from nothing by the word (of God, of the poet).

We may say, then, that Rosenthal poses to her readers, if only silently, the question, which the literary critics and historians whom she invokes (Auerbach aside) also ask in remaining silent about it, whether aesthetics can be truly modern if it does not comprehend description (mimesis) as the revelation whose content is fundamentally ethical: love of (care for, liberation through) the other as the neighbor. Does not modern aesthetics essentially participate in the passion of Adam and Eve whose fall from pagan ignorance into the liberating knowledge of covenantal good and evil

involves and expresses at once (finite) death and (infinite) life?

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Rhythm and Race in Modernist Poetry and Science. By Michael Golston (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), xv + 272pp. \$50.00 cloth.

In the early decades of the twentieth century, the power of rhythm to mold, transform, unite and disaggregate bodies was a topic that fascinated scientists, industrialists, artists, and politicians. Bodily rhythms were, it was believed, shaped by geography and race—and in turn shaped culture and language. On a practical level, in the industrial workplace, rhythm was used to automate bodily movements, rendering them more efficient. On a more recreational level, eurhythmics was supposed to have healing properties because of its capacity to unite body and mind. Eventually, though, Hitler would exploit the so-called science of rhythm to disastrous effect—melding it with authoritarianism to lull and unleash the energies of the *Volk*, understood as one organism possessed of a collective mind.

Rhythmics also fascinated modernist poets. Michael Golston's book is a wide-ranging and in-depth interpretation of the links between modernist poetry and the so-called science of rhythm. While the fascist appropriation of rhythm is well-known, the ways in which modernist poetics fused formal innovations with ideology is less well-excavated. T. S. Eliot famously spoke of "purify[ing] the dialect of the tribe," which was in fact based on a theory of rhythm as explicitly blood- and race-based. W. B. Yeats also believed in a eugenics of rhythm. A people's racial metabolism, according to these poets, generated their national or *Volk* poetry. According to Golston, for these poets as well as for Ezra Pound, difference understood through the prism of rhythm became degenerative contamination rather than enrichment. In chapters on Pound and Yeats, Golston goes on to show how the stretched measures of *The Cantos* and the spectral haunting qualities of *A Vision* were rooted in these poets' understanding

of inaudible rhythms as dictating meaning even while occurring below the threshold of consciousness. As Golston explains, poetic rhythm was, for Pound and Yeats, part of the "machinery of conviction" and could therefore be used to bring about social and political change.

Golston expertly demonstrates the extent to which poetics is entangled with ideology, which is itself entangled with notions of the "science" of bodies. In his book, he reviews the science, and indeed resurrects forgotten but once seminal treatises of the early twentieth century. His book is thus in the "literature and science" mode popular in English departments since the 1990s: it assumes that formal changes in art and poetry as well as discursive ones occurred in tandem with scientific and/or technological innovations. Golston argues for direct causation (poets read and explicitly exploited the science) and for correlation (they reflected the prevailing *Zeitgeist*). He fittingly ends his book with William Carlos Williams' experiments with "measure." Race-based theories of rhythm were too fatally implicated with fascist ideology to survive the horrors of WWII. Williams' more apolitical, or as Golston puts it "dis-incorporated," notion of rhythm in fact set the stage for postmodernist innovations.

In all respects, Golston's subject matter is fascinating and opens up new avenues for research. Not only will modernism's entanglement with the science of rhythm henceforth have to be taken into account by scholars, but Golston's arguments can be applied to all manner of artists of the early twentieth century in addition to those he mentions in his book. For instance, the Futurist Italian poet F. T. Marinetti explicitly exploited the new science of the early century and glorified the power of rhythm to "magnetize" crowds for authoritarian ends. On the other end of the political spectrum, Virginia Woolf was among the first to deconstruct the threat contained in what she called "the rhythm of marching boots" combined with "the lure of charismatic leaders." In her last novels, she practiced a kind of antifascist poetics by exploiting the noise (or subversive rhythms) beneath authoritarian rhythms and by insisting on the individual mind's ability to confound the "messages" trumpeted from "on high."

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Hatred and Civility: The Antisocial Life in Victorian England. By Christopher Lane (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), xxviii + 228 pp. \$27.50/£18.50 cloth; \$20.00/£13.00 paper.

In this short but lively and densely argued work, Christopher Lane maintains that conventional assumptions about the spread of civility in Victorian culture have obscured “the range and intensity of its antisocial dynamics, including the cultural prevalence of acute misanthropy and *schadenfreude*” (xv). The idealized view of Victorian literature and art, as promoting duty, self-sacrifice and morality is subtly undermined by Lane, who depicts a literary world obsessed with villainy, hatred, and cruelty.

Lane also traces Victorian attitudes toward misanthropy over the course of several decades. As the nineteenth century advanced, hatred and misanthropy were increasingly condemned, yet continued to generate a perverse attraction. What had in the 1820s often been justified as an eccentric disdain for society’s foibles, by the 1860s was cast as a psychological condition bordering on insanity. And yet in trying to pathologize misanthropy, the Victorians actually “gave hatred new life” (11) by producing a vast corpus on mob violence, crime, class conflict, and mental derangement.

Lane convincingly makes his case through new and original readings of some classic Victorian texts—Charles Dickens’ *Our Mutual Friend*, George Eliot’s *Silas Marner*, and Robert Browning’s *The Ring and the Book*—as well as some less studied works like Bulwer Lytton’s *Paul Clifford* and Charlotte Brontë’s *Shirley*. In many of these works, Lane argues, the reader derives more pleasure from the discord in the narratives than from the harmony, and hatred is often depicted in nearly insoluble forms. Far from condemning it outright, many novels gave antisocial behavior “a thrilling, if vicarious, emancipatory, appeal” (xvii). In Lane’s view, for example, Bulwer Lytton’s novels often pointed hopelessly to social problems without much interest in their resolution, while Dickens was “captivated by the demonic energy and asocial drives” of his villains (69).

Lane’s most startling reinterpretations, however, involve the novels of George Eliot, which have long been viewed as the epitome of a Victorian promotion of fellowship and social

harmony. Lane counters that Eliot’s novels depict communities riven by petty jealousies and characters driven by a desire for revenge that are never completely neutralized by the cultivation of “fellow feeling.” There is instead an unresolved tension in her work, as she is unable completely to discredit or to sanction antisocial emotions like revenge.

Lane argues that in Eliot’s novels “participation in communities” is often “irreparably damaging to individuals” as this places them “at the mercy of others’ inexhaustible cruelty” (116, 126). In some cases, as in *Middlemarch*, social harmony is only possible upon the “humiliation, even annihilation” of another person (132). Although Eliot’s novels famously conclude on harmonious notes, Lane holds that such endings cannot erase “the unpleasant underside of communities” (135) that the novels have detailed with such extraordinary relish.

In addition to his close readings of Victorian novels and poetry, Christopher Lane has drawn upon an impressive array of nineteenth-century journalism, historical writing, memoirs, and medical and psychiatric literature. He also makes splendid use of numerous contemporary illustrations—cartoons, photographs, book illustrations, and paintings—that detail a Victorian fascination with rage and hatred. Lane’s masterful reinterpretation of Victorian culture should be of interest to historians and sociologists as well as to literary scholars. In providing a fresh view of our Victorian forebears, Christopher Lane also casts light on our own era’s seemingly intractable conflicts and hatreds.

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Cool Britannia? British Political Drama in the 1990s. Edited by Rebecca d’Monté and Graham Saunders (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), x + 251 pp. £15.99 paper.

Rebecca d’Monté and Graham Saunders have provided the world of theatre studies an excellent service by collecting eleven exceptional essays reflecting the political fringe British drama of the 1990s in *Cool Britannia?*

The centerpiece of the collection is Part 1: "In-yer-face Theatre: A Reconsideration," consisting of three insightful essays related to the political climate found within London during and following the Thatcher/Major eras. Aleks Sierz, the originator of the "in-yer-face" nomenclature for the theatrical movement, Ken Urban, and Mary Luckhurst, each provide opportunities to consider the edgy dramas of such important writers as Sarah Kane, Mark Ravenhill, and the grand guru of political theatre, Harold Pinter. It is Sierz who clearly defines this theatrical collection as (1) containing a sense of rupture and a severance with the past; (2) being avant-garde and confrontational; and (3) resonating with political fervor. This section of the book provides the basis for appreciating the essays that follow.

Part 2: "Thatcherism and (Post) Feminism," consisting of three additional essays by Rebecca d'Monté, Lynette Goddard, and Elaine Aston, brings attention to the works of new feminist writers such as Judy Upton, presents critical analysis of the works by minority playwrights, and offers conclusions and assessments related to the importance of the new feminism in Great Britain. Part 3: "Nation, Devolution, and Globalization," five final essays by David Pattie, Roger Owen, Nadine Holdsworth and Wallace McDowell, Dan Rebellato, and David Greig, expands the spectrum of British political theatre into Scotland, Wales, and Ireland. It is Greig's work, "Rough Theatre," the final entry in the volume, that brings the collection to its conclusion by indicating that the notion of political theatrical activism is not restricted to the British Isles but has found its way into such diverse cultures as Israel, South Africa, and the Persian Gulf.

Of special value in this volume is the comprehensive bibliography found as an appendix to the essays. Academic scholars interested in contemporary political theatre will find this resource of enormous importance.

The information about the fringe theatre scene of Great Britain found in *Cool Britannia?* is essential to understanding the nature of theatre not only within the British Isles but throughout the world. The political theatrical scene found in the United States is in line with what is presented in this collection. Other nations are equally involved: Tunisia, Spain, Hungary, Poland, and the Former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia, to name but a few. A companion collection is waiting to be developed, one which collects and measures the political theatrical impulse from the rest of the world. Perhaps such a volume is already in the offing. One can hope.

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Made with Words: Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics. By Philip Pettit (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 192 pp. \$29.95/£17.85 cloth.

The Thomas Hobbes who appears in this new book by Philip Pettit is one who (in Pettit's words) is the "inventor of the invention of language" (3). From this all else follows. Well, not exactly all else, since of course there are the passions that intrude in the later chapters of the book, but the fundamental concern for Pettit is how humans in contradistinction to other animals have invented language and how that invention has led to the construction of who we are, what we can do, how we interact with others, and, most importantly, how we construct the political community. He warns us, though, in the Introduction, that there is also a dark side to language, one that lets us "jump the barrier of the present" (97) to let us focus on the future, one that fosters the passions at the heart of competitiveness. But in the early chapters of the book Pettit takes us on a tour of the Hobbesian corpus to show how the language that we ourselves invent is in his Hobbes almost a "magic[al]" (25) "transformative technology" (27) by which we move ourselves beyond our animal existence. Employing a striking turn of phrase throughout the book, Pettit emphasizes that it is not nature's, not God's, but our own role in the construction of this technology that enables us to "bootstrap" ourselves out of an animal existence, creating not only the community that is the leviathan but, through what Pettit dubs "personation," our very selves.

Having "invented" language, we in turn are the source of reason, thereby "dethroning" (45) reason from any divine status. Reason is simply the skill of using what we have ourselves

created and, while we may use that skill to create ourselves through personation enabling commitments to others and the authorization of a leviathan, we may also use it to deceive. Herein lies the dark side of language subject to Hobbesian (and others') games of re-definition and thus miscommunication (chapter 3). And herein lies the section of the book begging for some more development. While the invention of language enables the "bootstrapping" so essential to the construction of even ourselves, the passions are present from the beginning. We do not create them, though language enables us to calculate how to pursue and satisfy them. Ancient theory from Plato forward set reason and the passions in opposition; Hobbes is famous for transforming that relationship with the famous phrase "reason is the scout of the passions," thereby obliterating that ancient hierarchy. But Pettit, so focused on the role of language, almost inverts the ancient hierarchy such that he can argue, for instance, that "the place of fear is subsidiary" (68).

Without actually acknowledging it, Pettit with his discussion of language has arranged for a new division between reason and the passions. Reason is the result of a man-made technology; passions are the internal motions that define life. The "bootstrapping" is necessary because of those passions, and thus the innovation of Hobbes may not so much be his role as the "inventor of the invention of language," but as creating a new opposition between art and nature. Try as he might to make the human being a self-construction independent of nature (or divinity), nature in the form of those internal passions reminds us that there are limits to how much bootstrapping we can do.

Despite its brevity, this book is dense in its arguments, filled with trenchant phrases, and effective in its recreation of Hobbes' theory as grounded on the invention of language and thereby reason, the bright side of language. The dark side emerges because of those passions that play far more than a "subsidiary" role in the construction and functioning of the leviathan.

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Heidegger beyond Deconstruction: On Nature. By Michael Lewis (London: Continuum, 2007), xii + 184 pp. £65.00 cloth.

For over a decade, there has been an unspoken need within the scholarship to develop Heidegger's thinking beyond its expression in his own technical vocabulary. In *Heidegger beyond Deconstruction*, Michael Lewis pursues this path by juxtaposing Heidegger's philosophy with four other thinkers, Karl Marx, Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Lacan, and Slavoj Žižek (8). In Chapter 1, Lewis examines the role that Heidegger's concept of "world" plays in both grounding the possibility of our instrumental use of things and the opposite possibility of the appearance of the thing in its singularity or uniqueness. "Being is no longer general intelligibility, *founded* upon finitude, but is itself the finitude of intelligibility, the singularity of the beings that are given to us, a singularity which *appears* but which is not *intelligible*" (34). In Chapter 2, Lewis follows up on his discussion of the "thing," by appealing to Lacan's psychoanalytic profile of the irruption of the "void" as a gulf between man and nature. "While in beings other than the thing nature does not show itself at all, in the thing nature shows itself in its absence, abeyance or default" (76).

In Levinas's quest to address the other *as* other (Chapter 3), Lewis discovers another counterpoint to Heidegger. "[Levinas's] discourse is an attempt to access the other in its trace such that one acknowledges this trace to betray the absolute other by making it into the relative other. This will surely mean that ethics and ontology are not opposed but mutually presuppose one another" (87). In Chapter 4, Lewis appeals to gaps in Žižek's reading of Heidegger, in order to show how nature can point as much to the singularity of being's manifestness as to being's present-at-hand. Conversely, only by developing this dynamic sense of nature is it possible to appreciate how Heidegger's thinking overcomes the metaphysics of subjectivity. "The event of revelation takes place in natural entities, or entities which do not elide nature in the process of their production" (125). In Chapter 5, Lewis completes his attempt "to draw [Heidegger] out of 'himself, away from deconstruction, and into the service of what is most urgent: the protection of nature" (128). Specifically, Lewis

argues that the same forces of production and consumption which, in Marx's thinking, have enslaved humanity, have also led to the exploitation and domination of nature. Unlike Heidegger, however, Marx remained ensnared in the anthropocentric assumptions of modern philosophy, and thereby did not recognize that the liberation of nature paves the way for the emancipation of humanity. Ironically, despite the subtitle of his book, Lewis's concept of nature remains somewhat truncated; as a result, he never addresses the possibility of a "transhuman" ethic aimed at safeguarding the earth *and* the animals that inhabit it. Despite this drawback, Lewis's book offers an insightful glimpse into an important, albeit overlooked area of Heidegger's thought.

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Aristotle on Teleology. By Monte Ransome Johnson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008), xi + 339 pp. \$ 42.00/£21.00 cloth.

Aristotle on Teleology, by the Canadian scholar Monte Ransome Johnson, constitutes an important contribution not only to Aristotle studies but to contemporary disputes in philosophy and science. Aware of the topical interest this issue holds, the author tries to reason around Aristotle's teleology. He does so by swinging between an ontological interpretation of teleology about causation and an epistemological reading of teleology about explanation of Aristotelian finalism, which becomes one of the thematic threads of this monograph. The other thematic thread, which touches on the most recent debates, concerns the discussion of reductionism. However, in spite of keeping these two threads firmly in the background, the book addresses specific problems of Aristotle's philosophy, most especially the problem of teleology, which is analysed in its conceptual and textual aspects. Johnson discusses the relationship of teleology to two other forms of determination, first the mechanical, and then "extensive" causation, whereby teleology is either delimited to individuals or extended to its universal dimension.

Johnson's approach is clearly presented in the first pages of his study. He acknowledges the importance of Aristotelian teleology for its usefulness in scientific research: "Aristotle's theory of teleology, in its application to such diverse disciplines as physics, biology, ethics, and politics, offers an opportunity to survey the uses and abuses of teleological reasoning across a broad spectrum of philosophical interest" (3). At the same time he wants to avoid any suspicion of adhering to the latest phase of the "intelligent design" hypothesis. On the contrary, Johnson finds Aristotelian teleology and evolutionism compatible: "Aristotle's explanations are more like contemporary biological theories of evolutionary adaptation, and quite different from either 'the teleological proof' or 'design argument' employed by natural theology, or its contemporary cosmological counterpart, 'the anthropic principle'" (4). We can also recognize in the author's intentions a sort of ethical ambition, a revision project, so to speak, based on Aristotle's way of seeing a relationship between human life and other forms of life and nature, in which horizon a moral of the "middle" is replaced with an ethic of "ends".

The book is carefully structured, maintaining philological rigour with extratextual philosophical digressions. The first chapter offers a synthetic survey of the most important interpretations of Aristotelian teleology. This "incipit" allows Johnson to eliminate every possible misunderstanding of Aristotle's philosophy, resulting from its contamination by subsequent uses. What Johnson has in mind are mainly the manipulations that utilize Aristotelian teleology to legitimate a creationist thesis, as well as some modern interpretations from Bacon to Kant. Both forms of manipulation suggest the heuristic value of Aristotle's philosophy. Following his discussion of these perspectives, Johnson states his preference for an ontological interpretative attitude: "I will argue that Aristotle explicitly rejected both the natural through perspective and the heuristic perspective" (15).

In the second and third chapters Johnson offers his analysis of the Aristotelian text, with the purpose of clarifying the difficulties (most because of the presence of different solutions for the same questions) implicit in its key concepts—causation, explanation, and teleology. In the second part of the book a more systematic analysis of the several types of

Aristotelian finalistic explanations is developed. It is here that we find a clarification of the relationship between the natural change principle, immanent in single bodies, and the definition of the natural sciences: "Nature is always in a body, a body that moves, and a body that moves in accordance with a principle. Thus Aristotle's natural science is fundamentally a set of principles for different kinds of bodies and their motions" (133). Aristotle thus excludes from the natural sciences all incorporeal objects (relations, properties, events, and so on), all bodies that do not have internal principles of movement (artefacts), and all motionless entities (numbers, words, or the famous unmoved mover). In Aristotle's physics, natural change has four forms: localization, generation/destruction, growth/diminution, and quality change. Although all natural bodies can be moved, only living entities have the characteristic of self-motion. Aristotle includes the animals and the stars in this group, but excludes physical elements (air, water, fire, earth), which have an internal principle or tendency, which is considered a "function." But when in an animal organism the physical elements are combined with the self-motion of life, it is a new "formula" in which the physical functions become absolutely secondary (the prevalence of them indeed should provoke a separation of the elements), while the *causa finalis* of the living substance is prevailing. This immanence represents the heart of Aristotelian teleology.

The teleological finalism in organisms is often objected to as a form of reverse causality, where the effect (the posterior) determines its own cause (the anterior). Everyone can see the impossibility of such inversion. In his reply to this objection, however, Johnson makes a logical error. He asserts that the final cause should not be considered an "efficient" cause, that is, it can not determine a sequence of change-processes, but at the same time he adds: "The cause for the sake of which explains *why* not *how* the process happens. The cause for the sake of which provides the explanation of the end-oriented activity which necessitates 'efficient causal' (moving and material) processes" (166). The primary objection, free of its heavy-handed exposition, maintains its validity.

Referring to the debate on reductionism, we can underscore how Johnson's Aristotle can

not be seen as a reductionist, because his teleology coexists with non-finalistic forms of determination: "Were there no for the sake of which, there would be no powers, potentials, or mechanisms. Notice that this does not mean that every single thing and event in the natural world is teleologically explicable" (186); on the contrary, Aristotle criticizes radical reductionism, or the "eliminativism" of his predecessors, who denied that animals were natural substances, considering them as merely accidents of elementary bodies in movement.

The conclusion highlights two main points. First, that the unmoved mover does not constitute an end that orients everything to a finalistic direction: all movements depend on internal ends or principles, and the universe does not coincide with the unmoved mover. Johnson is right to underscore the problematic nature of this point in Aristotle's philosophy, but he tends to underplay the function of the unmoved mover in Aristotle's text without fully justifying this reduction. Secondly, Johnson argues that those who reject Aristotelian anthropomorphism are driven by a form of anthropocentrism. To attribute ends to nonhuman entities appears to them absurd because the concept of "an end" presupposes the human capacity to think of aims and conscious purposes. On the contrary, Johnson tells us, Aristotle can help us precisely on this question: "There does not need to be a mind or intelligence in order to have ends" (290).

In his description of productive actions, Aristotle individuates the model of teleological acts. In *Metaphysics* Z 7 he asserts that every finalistic action requires a mental vision of the ideal aim and a non-mental process of realization. In *Physics* B 9 he says that as in technique, so in nature, we find finalism. Johnson omits to mention Nicolai Hartmann in this context, who argued that the extension of this principle to natural beings was unwarranted because natural beings do not show any sort of *noesis*. I agree with Hartmann. If teleology must be considered a basilar structure for explaining human behaviour, its extension would only weaken it. Thus, Johnson's conclusions do not resolve, but open this fundamental problem anew.

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Rome, Italy

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The Innate Mind, Volume 3: Foundations and the Future. By Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence, and Stephen Stich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), x + 444 pp. £54.00/\$125.00 cloth, £17.99/\$29.95 paper.

Volume 3 of *The Innate Mind* succeeds in its aims “to provide an authoritative survey of the state of contemporary nativist research” (4). Following an Introduction by the editors, eighteen essays, by psychologists, philosophers, and linguists, assembled in four loosely constructed parts, teeter between key concepts and causal processes and seesaw between theories of evolution and determinism.

In Part 1, Richard Samuels attempts to counter charges that nativism compounds hypotheses while using “capitals to name concepts (e.g., INNATE), italics to name properties (e.g., *innate*), and quotation marks to name words (“innate”) (18n). Similarly, Matteo Mameli carries contentiousness to inheritance, contrasting a “received view... [with] the process responsible for the like-begets-like phenomenon” (53). Peter Godfrey-Smith seems to be of the opinion that biology’s reductive genetics has nothing to contribute to psychology’s complex nativism, while Thomas Bouchard, Jr., defends genes’ relevance for quantitative psychological traits. Gabriel Segal waffles around rules “we did not learn... in any normal sense of learning” (91). “Debate becomes pantomime” (100).

Alan Leslie, C. R. Gallistel, and Rochel Gelman open Part 2 asking “can language learning come to the rescue of the accumulator model and show us how we get integers?” (115). Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis answer that a natural language counting system might help “children... acquire concepts of [precise] natural numbers beyond 3 or 4” (147). György Gergely’s analysis of imitative learning is, regrettably, jargon-riddled to the point of opacity, and Fei Xu’s use of Bayesian inference “to bridge the gap between... innate knowledge... learning and conceptual change” (201) results in “terminological confusion” (214). Luca Bonatti attempts to “determine whether... [the power of human statistical abilities] could obtain linguistic generalizations” (221) with similar ambiguous results.

In Part 3, Mark Baker advances a “non-biological version of nativism” (239) bereft of evolution, adaptation, and computational

theory. In contrast, Peter Carruthers proposes an evolvable “‘act first’ account... [for the generation of] a creative supposition” (256), and Anna Papafragou examines the “language-thought interface” and concludes that “despite differences in how space and motion scenes are encoded cross-linguistically... [l]anguage can provide support for memory” (288).

Part 4 looks at moral cognition. Lauri Santos and Venkat Lakshminarayanan begin with comparative-developmental studies on “components of the [human reasoning] heuristics that lead us astray” (295). Chandra Sekhar Sripada illustrates “why it’s adaptive to acquire information from culture” (316). Karen Wynn asks if “infants treat intentional agents... differently from other entities” (331). Daniel Kelly and Stephen Stich advance *innate mechanisms dedicated to norm acquisition* (350). Finally, Jonathan Haidt and Craig Joseph turn morality on its head, advocating instead “virtue theory,” a bottom-up, inductive theory for the acquisition through narratives of “skills of social perception and reaction” (387).

Ultimately, *The Innate Mind* advances a challenge rather than a theory: to find nativism’s empirically testable foundation (if that isn’t paradoxical). Despite a reliance on teleology, a surfeit of jargon, and flaws in methodology, including the misuse of statistics, dogma retreats and clarity presses onward throughout the book.

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Relics of Eden: The Powerful Evidence of Evolution in Human DNA. By Daniel J. Fairbanks (London: Prometheus Books, 2007), ii + 281 pp. \$24.95 cloth.

Daniel Fairbanks’s audacious *Relics of Eden* contains “eight chapters... focus[ed] on pure and solid science... [and] two appendices that explore some of the main topics... in more detail (8). But Fairbanks also peppers the text with hagiographic sketches, and a third appendix tells “how some of history’s best scientific minds laid the foundation for the discoveries” (8).

Fairbanks is equipped for grappling with “relics,” defined as “marks [or mutations] . . . that tell a story about how the message . . . [of evolution] was passed on” (13), and the data he presents support his thesis that the engine of evolution is “gene duplication followed by mutational divergence of copies” (48). But “Eden” seems to represent “ignorance . . . [of the] incredible diversity of life on Earth” (170), and Fairbanks’s “deep religious convictions” (15) seem to be his “wonder, even comfort, in embracing our biological relationship with all living things” (170).

The “two chapters [that] argue for the middle ground—that science and religion . . . need not be at odds” (8)—stumble before reaching this ground. Chapter 9, “When Faith and Reason Clash,” focuses on American jurisprudence, from the trial of John Scopes, charged with “the teaching of the Evolution Theory” (137), to the trial of the Dover school board, charged with requiring “science teachers to read a statement offering . . . [an] alternative to Darwinian evolution” (156). And Chapter 10, “Abandoning the Dichotomy,” argues that “belief in God (or in an intelligent designer) is a personal belief . . . [and] *such beliefs are not science and should not be taught as such*” (165).

Fairbanks fairly states that at issue is not “what people should or should not believe, but how evolution should be taught in the science curricula of public schools” (156). He traces the introduction of evolutionary science into the primary and secondary curricula to the “panicked [response] over the perceived crisis in American science” (140) following the Soviets’ launching of *Sputnik* in 1957, and he concedes that a “2001 Gallup poll showed that 45 percent of Americans . . . [are still] rejecting . . . scientific evidence” (166). But instead of acknowledging that science education was misguided in its conception and has failed to get its message across, Fairbanks defends “the establishment clause of the Constitution . . . [that] mandates separation of church and state” (142). Science teaching must be grounded in empiricism, history, and philosophy, not litigation, if it is to educate children!

Ultimately, the flaws in Fairbanks’s book must be weighed against its virtue. *Relics of Eden* does not unravel the mysteries of non-Darwinian evolution, of molecular polymorphism, and neutral mutations, and the book contains errors, such as, misrepresenting the

“central dogma” (79, 230). But Fairbanks’s virtuosity treading the scales of DNA sequences and the trills he plays with comparative genomics redeem *Relics of Eden* and vindicate his belief that “the vast amount of DNA sequence information now available allows scientists to accurately reconstruct evolutionary relationships among species currently alive on Earth” (130).

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A History of Feminist Literary Criticism.

Edited by Gill Plain and Susan Sellers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), v + 352 pp. £65.00/\$125.00 cloth.

A dense volume, for all that it is not a long one, *A History of Feminist Literary Criticism* manages to cram an amazing amount of analysis, as well as opinion, from a considerable diversity of sources, in its 352 pages. Covering the Middle Ages—“Pioneers and Protofeminism”—to the present—“Postructuralism and Beyond”—it offers something for everyone on the feminist spectrum. That is not to say that it is uniformly excellent (although pretty close). From my point of view, the more historical essays are among the most enjoyable, while a few of the more contemporary occasionally suffer from either a too-close perspective or a faddish approach. For one, Linda Anderson’s “Autobiography and Personal Criticism” while superior in its analysis, resorts too often to jargon which obscures rather than enlightens.

Part 1 deals with the historical aspects of literary criticism, tackling such questions as “Was there such a thing . . . in the Middle Ages?” asked by Carolyn Dinshaw in “Medieval Feminist Criticism” (11); and “Early Modern Women: Courageous or Silent?”, addressed by Helen Wilcox in “Feminist Criticism in the Renaissance and Seventeenth Century” (27).

Susan Manly investigates the legacy of Mary Wollstonecraft, as controversial now as she was in her own era. A woman of contradictions, Wollstonecraft simultaneously seemed to reject sexuality, while at the same time supposedly embracing several lovers, bearing an

illegitimate child, and so on. What she actually rejects, as Manly (the name is ironic) implies, is “artificial femininity” (49f.)—weakness, sentimentality, and sexual submission, which leads to self-degradation.

As an historian, these and the other historical contributions are, as I stated above, the ones which appeal to me the most—not that I am unconcerned with what is or what is to come. The struggles and desires of the past never fail to inform the present as well as the future—subjects that are taken up in Parts 2, “Creating a Feminist Literary Criticism,” and 3, “Poststructuralism and Beyond.”

The authors included in Part 2 are faced with the difficulty of being inside, and thus overly close to their subjects. Their struggle is a double one, since it is easier for everyone to parse the past, and/or speculate on the future, than to assess the moment; and, in the words of Mary Eagleton in “Literary Representations of Women,” one must “cut through a long history of laws, precepts, ideologies, institutional and cultural practices” (105), laid down by men. Eagleton suggests this attitude is implicit in virtually all women’s writings from the “second wave of feminism” beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, since there was little to base feminist literary criticism on except what men like Norman Mailer, Henry Miller, etc., had created.

Another worthy inclusion is Arlene Keizer’s discussion of black feminist literary criticism, described by her as “[tracing] the history of black feminist literary criticism through the concepts articulated by its most important exponents,” such as Alice Walker, Toni Morrison, Maya Angelou, and Toni Cade (154f.). However, she does pay attention to what she terms “fellow travelers,” who engage in black feminist criticism but are not, themselves, black women (160). By delineating the difficulties and controversies within and without the subject, she also implicitly asks questions such as “Is there a canon?” “Should there be a canon?” These are thorny questions for feminist criticism as a whole, even more so where racism and sexism intersect.

A similar thorniness obtains for Caroline Gonda, who articulates lesbian feminist criticism, and Calvin Thomas, who assesses men’s role in feminist criticism. A brave man, Thomas acknowledges the “complicated history” of men and feminism, stating “the complications may

be thought to arise from the sheer impossibility of the relationship itself” (187). While Thomas does not use the word outright, he implies that a good bit of the difficulty arises from the appearance of condescension involved in men’s adoption of a “feminist” viewpoint. For Gonda there is difficulty as well, which I suspect stems from the fact that lesbian concerns are, to a large extent, those of women as a whole—respect, recognition, acceptance, and so on.

In Part 3, Judith Still discusses the “Holy Trinity” of French feminist critics—Cixous, Irigaray, and Kristeva—stressing the fact that none of the three is actually French, but rather Algerian, Belgian, and Bulgarian; a point to be kept in mind. Chris Weeden weighs in with “Postcolonial Feminist Criticism.” Heather Love connects it with Queer Theory, and Stacy Gillis with “Technologies of the Body.” This last ventures somewhat into science fiction territory, since, as Gillis says, she is “particularly concerned with how the body is articulated in cyberspace and cybertheory” (322). I do not mean to neglect Madelon Sprengnether’s excellent discussion of feminist criticism and psychoanalysis. Although it fails to rehabilitate Freud for me, it is a persuasive dissection of the topic.

Susan Guber sums it all up with “Postscript: Flaming Feminism?” She asks whether the phrase “feminist literary criticism” is now obsolete and can be discarded. Citing Virginia Woolf, who realized that the word “feminism” could not be thrown out of the vocabulary of women, Guber comes to the reluctant conclusion that the time has not yet come. I would suggest an even unhappier answer—it may never arrive.

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The New Film History: Sources, Methods, Approaches. Edited by James Chapman, Mark Glancy, and Sue Harper (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), xi + 256pp. £50.00/\$95.00 cloth.

In their Introduction, James Chapman, Mark Glancy, and Sue Harper make the claim that this volume, and its essays, is the result of a

radical new approach to film history utilizing the historical method—a bit of an overstatement, I'm afraid—it has been done elsewhere. Nevertheless, while there is actually nothing startlingly new about the *New Film History*, this is for the most part a provocative collection of essays for those interested in the history of film both “old” and “new.”

Part 1 deals variously with film history, including analyses of *Gone with the Wind*, by Melvyn Stokes, as well as essays on *Gallipoli*, and *Master and Commander: The Far Side of the World*.

Stokes focuses on the concept of the Southern “Lost Cause,” which generally speaking, provided a view of slavery as a benign and benevolent system. He cites those who have taken *Gone with the Wind* to task for its role in supporting that unrealistic and abhorrent viewpoint; but in his conclusion tries to absolve the film of much of its blame. I do not think the film can be let off so lightly for its place in promoting the benign South at the expense of the realities, both racial and political—unfortunately, Stokes's effort, in itself is a “Lost Cause.”

Part 2 is devoted to discussions of “Authorship” (i.e., the person considered most responsible for a film—usually the director), among them Laurie Ede's analysis of art direction in British film of the 1940s, which begins inauspiciously but proves to be more insightful than it appears at the start. Ede provides a convincing rationale for choosing '40s film—for one, the opening up of the productions, i.e., greater use of locations which then become incorporated into the overall design. He also notes the change to greater authorship for the new “production designer” and less for the art director, which had more far-ranging effects than foreseen.

Ede effectively contrasts the art direction methods of high end and low end production companies, as well. For this purpose, he chooses two—Two Cities Company and Exclusive Films. He reserves all his praise for Two Cities, especially the making of *Henry V*, in which Laurence Olivier had considerable influence on the art directors, Paul Sheriff and Carmen Dillon; however, he refers to Exclusive's product as “amongst the very worst of British cinema in the 1940s . . . shabby and repetitive” (82).

Part 3 concerns “Genre,” and examines, among others, *Now Voyager* (one of my favorites—who can forget the two cigarettes?)

starring Bette Davis and Paul Henreid. I tend to view it in a romantic glow and forgive its “melodrama,” but Martin Shingler strives for a more analytic tone. He insists that it is “more meaningful today to discuss [it] as a *melodramatic woman's film* (emphasis mine) than to call it an emotional adult drama” (163), as though emotion (especially women's) and adulthood were mutually exclusive. He does acknowledge that women in 1942 probably enjoyed the “pseudo-liberation” (not his term, but Jeanne Basinger's) at the end of the movie, represented by Bette Davis's control of hers and Henreid's future (162).

Never having seen any of the “Gansta” movies Jonathan Mumby discusses in this section, I'm afraid I have to write from a position of ignorance where his contribution is concerned, other than to say that his comparison with gangster movies of the '30s and '40s seems incisive and insightful, and the comparison appears apt.

Part 4, “Reception,” deals, of course, with “how meanings were generated by audiences within specific historical and cultural settings” (181). In other words, referring again to Martin Shingler's essay, how *Now Voyager* could be considered emotionally adult in 1942 and hopelessly melodramatic in 2007. The authors not only concentrate on the changing attitudes toward films considered to be “classics,” such as Hitchcock's *Blackmail*, lauded for its innovative use of early sound (1929), *Black Narcissus* with Deborah Kerr (1947), Ingmar's Bergman's *Persona* (1966), and *The Wicker Man* (1973); but they also take pains to describe for those who may not know, the methods used to determine audience attitude rather than critical.

As one example, *Blackmail* recounts the story of one beleaguered Alice White, who quarrels with her policeman boyfriend, accepts the invitation of another man to accompany him to his place, fends off the other man who is bent on raping her, and finally kills him with a bread knife. The rest of the movie deals with Alice's “guilt” at being a murderess, and her blackmail by yet a third man. Her policeman boyfriend covers her part in the “murder” and the blackmailer is blamed. The blackmailer dies in a police pursuit, and the audience is left to assume that Alice, in particular, and her boyfriend live with their guilt for the rest of their lives. As Mark Glancy points out, this film prefigures one of Hitchcock's favorite themes,

that of the beautiful blonde in jeopardy, and more than a hint of misogyny.

Glancy quotes several sources to demonstrate the presumed responses of the viewing public. Although based largely on critiques appearing in widely distributed newspapers—the London *Daily Mail*, the *Times*, the *Sunday Pictorial*, etc., he includes more provincial newspapers as well—Newcastle *Chronicle*, Glasgow *Bulletin*, and others, presumably closer to the heartland viewers. He feels the novelty of all sound, the reality of the London milieu, and its concomitant appeal to British nationalism, served the film well with the public. Glancy still finds the film worthy of being enrolled in the register of classics, even though admitting he finds the dialogue a bit slow by the standards of today. Nevertheless, the juxtaposition of his praise of *Blackmail*, which is pure melodrama, and Martin Shingler's dismissal of *Now Voyager* for the same fault, is rather amusing—the only difference between the two being the passage of thirteen years and the ubiquity of sound.

Sarah Street's discourse on the role of the Legion of Decency vis-à-vis *Black Narcissus* reveals an interesting facet of past film controversies, as does the essay on Ingmar Bergman's *Persona*, but Justin Smith's entry on the cult favorite *Wicker Man* is glib, but fails to excite.

As an enthusiastic film-history buff, I will say that I enjoyed most of the contributions to this collaboration—some because I heartily agreed, some because I just as heartily disagreed—but most (of which I have cited only a few) were thought-provoking and generally jargon-free, which is refreshing. One caveat, however, the book is not inexpensive for a slim volume; this may cause a few prospective readers some pause.

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The Mystery of the Missing Antimatter.

By Helen R. Quinn and Yossi Nir (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), xii + 271 pp. \$29.92/£17.95 cloth.

Despite its title, this book is not really about antimatter. It is nominally focused on the

cosmological problem of why the universe is made almost completely of matter, when the laws of physics do not seem to discriminate between matter and antimatter. But it is really an introduction to the standard model of particle physics for the general reader, with antimatter appearing as one of many topics. Unfortunately, its structure and writing do not adequately convey the complicated ideas involved, and it may end up confusing lay readers more than informing them.

Helen R. Quinn and Yossi Nir begin with the clever idea of repeatedly replaying the story of the early universe with respect to the behavior of radiation, dark matter, nuclei, followed by matter/antimatter. This ends up muddying the waters. A reader who didn't know the title of the book would have a hard time guessing that it was about antimatter and not dark energy or dark matter. The authors then move on to discuss particles, concepts, "tools of the trade" (e.g., accelerators) and end with speculations regarding the standard model. The book drifts from topic to topic without any real sense of how each chapter contributes to the overall subject of antimatter.

I did appreciate the emphasis laid on the principle that cosmology relies on the constancy and uniformity of natural laws. Another bright point is the book's discussion of symmetry in the standard model. This is a difficult topic to address in a useful way, and the authors do a good job.

But the bulk of the book is more obscure. A frequent problem is its overly technical language. For example: "The ordinary matter clusters into even denser regions than the dark matter because it is interactive and thus experiences collisions which provide a dissipative mechanism to damp out large individual particle momenta, redistributing it among many particles of lower momenta" (27). The over-technical style is aggravated by the lack of useful illustrations of phenomena such as redshift.

Sometimes strange choices were made, such as describing Hubble as observing the recession of stars rather than galaxies. While it is pedantically true that the spectra from distant galaxies do come from stars, it is a near universal convention to speak of the redshifts of the galaxies themselves. This odd choice makes the cosmological sections very difficult to follow—I had to read them several times to understand

what was being said, and a reader unfamiliar with cosmology would certainly be lost.

Overall, this is pitched at an awkward level: too complicated for the lay reader and too vague for experts. The one exception might be the advanced physics undergraduate. Most frustratingly, I don't know more about antimatter now than I did before reading this book. If asked how physicists resolve the matter/antimatter imbalance, I could only respond with: "They think they might be able to come up with a theory to explain it." It might be that antimatter is not a large enough topic to merit a book, or that physics is not far advanced enough to make it a compelling story. Regardless, I cannot recommend this book for the majority of readers.

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The Worlds of Renaissance Melancholy: Robert Burton in Context. By Angus Gowland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), xii + 338 pp. \$90.00/£50.00 cloth.

Angus Gowland, lecturer in Intellectual History at University College, London, provides a penetrating contextual analysis of Robert Burton's *The Anatomy of Melancholy* in its various versions published between 1621 and 1651. Gowland's work, part of the distinguished Ideas in Context series, edited by Quentin Skinner and James Tully, is directed toward specialists rather than the general public, but university libraries should purchase this volume. The book contains a very useful introduction, five chapters, a conclusion, extensive bibliographies of printed primary and secondary sources, and an index. Robert Burton wrote *The Anatomy* as a response to what he perceived as an epidemic of the disease of melancholy from which he suffered. He wanted to ease his own mind and to help others.

Gowland's aim is to show that "Burton's conception of his own melancholy was inextricable from his perception that the early modern world was suffering from the same condition" (4). For the six editions published between 1621 and 1651, Burton concealed his

identity behind the pseudonym "Democritus Junior," who embodied Stoic features. Using this Christian-Stoic conflation, Burton attempted to establish a collective melancholic madness of humanity by examining its sinfulness and susceptibility to passions.

Inspired by Erasmus, "Democritus Junior" attacked abstract scholastic pursuits and pressed for a *philosophia practica*. Burton used a quotational method in composing the book, based on the citation of authority, which goes back to sixteenth-century humanists such as Agrippa and Montaigne. As Gowland points out, the *Anatomy* reworked the Christian humanist vision for the seventeenth century, but "Burton's world was rapidly losing what little resemblance it still had to that of Erasmus, More, and Vives" (31).

Chapter 1 contains an excellent summary of the medical theory of melancholy, and Burton included the doctrines of Hippocrates and Galen alongside those of Avicenna and De Laurens. The next chapter goes into greater depth concerning medical learning and includes the humanist critique of medicine as well as Christian humanism and medicine. Chapter 3 focuses on melancholy and religion, with Burton claiming that religious melancholy was the most widespread and serious form of the disease. He associated "true religion" with tranquility. In regard to predestination, Burton stressed moderation, and emphasized the mercy of God and the universality of the call to repentance. Inspired by Erasmian *philosophia Christi*, Burton expressed skepticism in regard to the human capacity to grasp speculative theological questions.

In Chapter 4, Gowland examines Burton's analysis of melancholy and the body politic. Included in the chapter is a section on the humanist views of ethics in relation to politics, which in turn involve questions about the active versus the contemplative life. Many English writers applied the civic humanism that originated in Italy to the Elizabethan and Jacobean commonwealth. Burton, of course, was committed to traditional Christian humanist morality and thus rejected reason-of-state politics.

The final chapter deals with Burton's melancholic commentary on the status of learned culture in which he develops the themes of the marginalization of the intellectual elite and the vicious aristocratic ignorance. Burton lamented "the failure of the state to

bestow roles of political influence upon its philosophically learned inhabitants” (264). Gowland concludes this fine work by stating that Burton’s most historically significant legacy lies in the influence of “his formal designation of the religious subspecies of melancholy,” and in his exploitation of the “spiritual-polemical potential of the idea of the disease in general” (298).

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Science in the Looking Glass: What Do Scientists Really Know? By E. Brian Davies

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), x + 295 pp. £31.00 cloth; £14.99 paper.

If on first acquaintance this book seems “challenging,” it is well worthwhile to become more familiar with its very interesting contents. The author suggests that those who are “allergic” to science may skim over passages they find “difficult” but, having said that, this reviewer, no scientist, found it hard to resist attempting to solve some of the puzzles in the text, particularly those in Chapters 1 and 2, entitled “Perception and Language” and “Theories of the Mind.” A good bibliography, a comprehensive index and notes, usefully placed at the end of each chapter, complete the contents.

Two main themes emerge. The first is the proposition that nature is not necessarily governed by mathematics. Many phenomena turn out to be uncertain, the theory of evolution being a good example. Secondly, the author, a mathematician, contends that mathematics is a human creation, designed to explain phenomena.

Chapter 6 is particularly interesting, describing the discoveries of Copernicus and Galileo and the relationships of the two men with the Catholic Church. The ensuing controversies illustrate very well the importance of the environment in which they took place. What one community might find an unacceptable proposition a later generation might welcome if supported by observed facts. St. Augustine had earlier pointed out that if the Church was too dogmatic on

certain issues, it might appear “foolish” at a later date (149).

The author cites Newton as an example of a scientist who was content with the fact that gravity actually exists without having to seek a reason for the phenomenon (156). The importance of observation and experience and the empirical approach to scientific research is highlighted by the author and is a recurring theme of the book. This is emphasized again in Chapter 8, “Evolution as a Theory,” where E. Brian Davies states that each generation examines a theory for its strengths and weaknesses in the face of new evidence; the weak parts will be abandoned while the strong will be retained (220). Readers will be reminded of T. S. Kuhn’s explanation of scientific knowledge in terms of paradigms, which the author refers to here as “discontinuities in scientific research” (271).

Davies can find no evidence to support the claims of design or “guided evolution” which attempt to explain human origins and progress. More may be learnt about nature by trying to seek explanations based on evidence, and although “reality” may be far beyond our grasp, it can be a fascinating experience to try to make sense of an amazing world.

Do read this book. If you are not a scientist, you will gain insight into the world of scientific research; if you are a scientist, you will either have your worst fears confirmed or find your efforts well vindicated.

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The Woman Racket: The New Science Explaining How the Sexes Relate at Work,

at Play and in Society. By Steve Moxon (Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic, 2008), xii + 296 pp. £19.95/\$39.90 cloth.

Steve Moxon’s *The Woman Racket* is published at a time when a number of authors are expressing their concern over various problems arising from gender inequity and its impact on many aspects of modern societies, including, among others, Kathleen Parker’s *Save the Males: Why Males Matter, Why Women Should Care*, Susan Pinker’s *The Sexual Paradox: Men, Women, and the Real Gendergap*, and Louann

Brizendine's *The Female Brain*. While these books offer sound arguments based on thorough research and a thorough understanding of feminist theory and the social and political changes effected by the historic women's movements, Moxon's research excludes these sources. Instead, he states that anybody claiming that women have been disadvantaged historically is wrong, as "the privilege that women enjoy is not contingent on any historical factors, but is biologically based" (91). Despite the promise of the subtitle of "the new science," there is nothing new about this claim. His handling of science is to the exclusion of all the research that refutes his claim, such as on page 85 where he leaves out a large body of evidence showing many factors for shorter male life expectancy (such as a different pattern of going to the doctor at later stages of illnesses or older injuries).

Moxon calls his second book "a 'popular science book' rather than another exposé" (vii). It arose, he informs us, from "my decade of research into men-women [which] helped me to see the wider damage caused by PC [Political Correctness] in the part of the Home Office where I was working" (vii). The result: a "polemic turned into popular science exposition" (viii). Moxon claims that the intended polemic inadvertently turned itself into a scientific study, albeit without "full explanations of research" and thus "uncluttered with excess references" (viii). The British author dedicates the book to Norman Mailer, from whom he borrowed the title. To readers familiar with Mailer's famously misogynist, often repulsive descriptions of sex, this foreshadows Moxon's bias and exclusion of a large body of research.

The Woman Racket is divided into 15 chapters with such titles as "The True Sufferers for Suffrage: Votes not for Men," "Sex at Work: Why Women are not in Love with Work, yet the Pay Gap Is so Small," "Rape: Fact, Fantasy and Fabrication," "Who's Exploiting Who? Prostitution Defrocked," "Proscribing Male Thought: Erotica as 'Pornography'," "Excluding the Family: The State as the Real Absent Father," and ending with "Coda: Seeing the Game." The volume lacks notes but offers a bibliography and an index.

I take issue with many points Moxon makes. For example, contrary to his assertion, the fact that there are indeed false rape claims

does not make actual rape less of a crime. With logic weaker than that put forth by average freshmen students he hopes to convince his readers that in fact women enjoy "a unique privilege in law enforcement" (184). Moxon's focus is on the victim of "malicious allegations," and on "political correctness." On the basis of opinions such as "none of the female detectives or uniform officers I know would estimate" (186), he makes rather flimsy arguments. Instead of substantiating his claims with solid statistics, he calls rape, the ultimate tactical subversion of the male DH [dominance hierarchy] and the ultimate reason for 'policing' the male DH. With males never indispensable and females the 'limiting factor' in reproduction, there is a clear biological reason for the prejudice that the murder of a man is not seen as being as serious as the mere rape of a woman (208).

While readers might welcome solid evidence for how men are disadvantaged in certain situations and can be convinced that such occurrences are significant, Moxon strikes out with claims such as: "But the truth is that through history not only were women never disadvantaged but they were privileged. It's always a mistake in looking at the past to impose today's outlook on the behaviour and thinking of people in former times. When you look in terms of what was needed to achieve social justice at the time, then as now it was for the benefit primarily of women" (107). Tell that to women who were sexually mutilated.

Readers looking for a coherent, sophisticated logical argument find instead gross oversimplifications and overgeneralizations. Thus he offers profound insights such as "men and women are forever and totally different (except when it's more convenient to regard them as exactly the same)" (1). Countless are the inexactitudes, and one finds a frequent inability on Moxon's part to decide one way or the other. After starting out with references to "our own culture" (which is that of his native Great Britain or his adoptive American culture as a resident of the United States?) he loses focus by the next paragraph and claims that "it is not women at all, but men—not all men, but the majority—who make up the biggest disadvantaged sub-group in every society. Women by contrast are universally and perennially privileged: *over-privileged*" (2).

Moxon's exposure to science leaves questionable traces. For example, at the beginning of the chapter that promises to explain "Why There Are Males," he quotes James D. Watson, who earned the Nobel Prize for the discovery of the double helix of DNA, saying: "Almost everything I ever did, even as a scientist, was in the hope of meeting a pretty girl." In summary, Moxon's "new science" is not much more than pseudoscience, much like what can be found in Otto Weininger's 1906 book, *Sex and Character*.

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Four Jews on Parnassus [A Conversation]: Benjamin, Adorno, Scholem, Schönberg.

By Carl Djerassi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), xviii + 203 pp. \$29.50/£17.50 cloth.

Four Jews on Parnassus comprises five docu-dramatic scenes about six people: the philosopher-intellectuals Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno, the Judaist/Zionist Gershom Scholem, the inventor of the twelve-tone method, Arnold Schönberg, the artist Paul Klee, and the scientist-turned-literatus, Carl Djerassi. The last two are a quiet (omni)presence throughout this wonderfully illustrated book, which is a piece of art in itself.

In primarily dialogic form, Djerassi presents humanizing views on the four (or six) well-known and canonized intellectuals/artists, gathered on Parnassus for some final clarifying ruminations and debates. The structural leit-motif is Schönberg's coalition chess (*Bündnisschach*), which involves four players in two coalitions. On Parnassus, the four men meet in different alliances, also with their respective wives, to talk about life and the afterlife, identity and canonization, all triggered by Benjamin's fervent demand to know what happened to him, his remains and his belongings, after his death in Port Bou in 1940, which is still shrouded in mystery.

Djerassi's (archival) . . . Despite the canonization of all four men and the abundance of already published biographical minutiae, their respective wives have so far remained relatively obscure, and the conversations between the

spouses on Parnassus highlight strong personalities and difficult past relationships. All four couples discuss adultery, (in)fidelity and emotional bonds, reasons for their failed marriages (the Benjamins and Scholems), and moments of marital crisis (the Adornos and Schönbergs), seeking answers to open—sometimes throbbing—questions. In these scenes, the author provides his readers with many remarkable and previously barely known bio-bits and food for thought. With the Scholems, for example, Djerassi's (archival) research in Jerusalem converts the dramatic dialogue into an eye-opening scene.

The third chapter, "One Angel," focuses on the canonization or even fetishization of Paul Klee's *Angelus Novus* (1920), once owned by Benjamin and made legendary in his "Theses on the Philosophy of History," then guarded by Adorno, and finally inherited by Scholem. With the help of additional Klees and Seethaler's photo-collages, Djerassi, himself an avid Klee collector, contextualizes and historicizes the drawing, criticizes both Benjamin's inappropriate interpretation of the Klee and its canonization on the sole basis of repeated publication, in order then to hypothesize that Klee's angel might indeed communicate an early prophecy by giving an indirect reference to Adolf Hitler—certainly a daring yet convincing argumentation following the art historian J. K. Eberlein.

The book's core theme, however, is Jewish identity in a non-religious sense. What makes a "Jew" a Jew, and how did the four (or six) "Jews" deal with their Jewishness—Adorno, the "German Jewish Non-Jew," Benjamin, the "German Jew or Jewish German," Scholem, the "German Zionist Jew," Schönberg, the "Austrian Jew-converted-Protestant-converted-Jew," and Klee, the "non-Jewish Jew." In order to demonstrate the absurdity of the claim that someone can look "Jewish," Djerassi, the "assimilated Viennese-American expatriate Jew," has his fictional characters photoshop pictures of each other, culminating in a composition reminiscent again of the epitome of anti-Semitism: Hitler. In a long, intense and gripping dialogue, the characters discuss what it means to be a Jew for Jews and Non-Jews, for themselves and for others, for their individual identities, self-understandings, and for their lives.

The book closes with inferences on Benjamin's "grip," the heavy bag he had schlepped over the Pyrenees during his flight to Spain, where, at the border, he died a mysterious death, most probably by suicide. The bag was never found, and neither were his bodily remains. Speculations have proliferated on what might have been so valuable for Benjamin that he doggedly carried it with him until his final moments. Djerassi argues that the famous bag held material Benjamin did not want to see preserved. Based largely on Benjamin's friendship with Georges Bataille, and embedded in a short lesson on etymology (e.g. pygophilia, agalmatophilia or genuphallation), Djerassi deduces that Benjamin was carrying a collection of "pornographilia"—books, sex toys, art work—for a new project on "Pornography in an Age of Technical Reproducibility/Transmissibility." The docudrama ends with Hannah Arendt's reminder to Benjamin that the resonances of the afterlife might be more significant than any physical manifestations of a past life.

Four Jews is a veritable treasure trove of fresh and exceptional anecdotes packaged in intriguing themes, a beautiful and well-researched volume with an extensive bibliography, and a CD providing rare musical pieces to accompany a wonderful read about six exceptional men of the twentieth century. Each chapter in itself provides a highly informative and, at the same time, always entertaining entrée to these icons, even for those previously not too well-versed with this captivating chapter of German/Austrian intellectual Jewry.

Djerassi's Schönberg is mistaken when he boasts that he is the only one who "was still alive down there after having reached Parnassus" (11). This also applies to that one faintly audible presence, immortalized on an (Austrian) stamp as well, who will hopefully bestow on the world of letters further extraordinary works such as this book.

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