

≡ Book Reviews ≡

Traces 3: Impacts of Modernities. Edited by Thomas Lamarre and Kang Nae-Hui (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), 308 pp. \$49.50 cloth; \$24.95 paper.

Impacts of Modernities is a successful attempt at producing research across the boundaries of fields of knowledge and cultures. While on a thematic level the broad unifying element is a focus on the modalities through which socio-economic modernization and cultural modernity have unfurled in East Asia, the breadth and diversity of topics and methodological approaches covered by the contributors foster a sense of interdisciplinary dialogue. The volume comprises three sections: essays in the first part address the interlinking of modernity with comparative disciplines and the production of space. The second section explores the connections between literacy, speech and the consolidation of hegemonic narratives; in the third group of essays the notions of subjectivity and sovereignty are investigated.

On a theoretical level, I would suggest that the underlying element of cohesion informing these contributions is a preoccupation with the totalizing tendencies of modernity. As Thomas Lamarre writes in the long and comprehensive introduction to the volume, tackling the problem of socio-economic modernization and cultural modernity entails a confrontation with “a tireless systematization, homogenization, unification, standardization and globalization of resources, exchanges, institutions and people” (3). In metaphysical terms the idea of totalization has been associated with notions of logocentrism, foreclosure and the assimilation of the Other under the banner of the Same. Actualisations of this assimilatory power in modernity are highlighted for instance in Law Wing-Sang’s admirable essay on Derrida, Levinas and Chuang Tzu, where through a “para-comparative reading between Derrida and Chuang Tzu” (80) the author engages with the problems of comparativism and post-colonial identities.

The volume significantly problematizes the very notion of totalization, as well as the strategies to counter it. As it emerges from a number of contributions, efforts aimed at the construction of local identities have turned out to reproduce, at another level, the very logic on which Western modernization is predicated. By striving to construct seamless self-consistency they have ended up mimicking the characteristics of Western discourses, and have ultimately lent themselves to recuperation. Kang Nae-Hui’s and Atsuko Ueda’s essays on linguistic modernity in Korea and on the emergence of the modern novel in Japan, respectively, are exemplary in mapping this tendency.

The resources and analytical tools of deconstruction, detectable in many essays, appear central to the book’s rethinking of local identities and to its engagement with and problematization of post-colonial theory. Thus one of the issues emerging most forcefully from the book is how to construct strategies that may disrupt the process of cultural homologization without relapsing into the same assimilatory violence and essentialism that they seek to counter. Evidently multiplying sites by fragmenting the totality does not automatically generate fields of resistance *qualitatively* different from the model they oppose. And it is indeed difficult to see what the gain would be if instead of one grand totalizing narrative we had many equally violent micro-fundamentalisms.

Bids to go beyond the logic of binary oppositions and essentialized identities are not missing. For example, while critically discussing Benedict Anderson’s *The Spectre of Comparisons*, Harry Harootian chooses to counter the production of spatial abstractions such as the West versus local identities, allegedly reinstated in subaltern narratives, by focusing on the complex temporality of everyday life and on the spectral dimension embedded in it. Similarly, in the last section of the book, a possible way out of the impasse is suggested by a joint reading of Michael Goddard’s and

Lamarre's essays. Goddard engages with Deleuze's notion of subjectivation. He first considers how in *Foucault* Deleuze grappled with the problem of the all-pervasiveness of the power regimes and with the unavoidable re-stratification of "acts of resistance...in new relations of power" (211), a preoccupation that by now we have come to recognize as central in *Impacts of Modernities*. He subsequently explores how Deleuze developed a notion of subjectivity as a folding of the outside into an absolutely singular point of view, as an act of creative self-constitution: crucially, "this folding creates a space no longer dependent on the external forces from which it emerged, and therefore allows for an immanent conception of subjectivity" (217). Lamarre builds on the notion of folded subjectivities seen as the actualisation of new points of view—of new dimensions—each incommensurable to the others and independent from power. In his essay on religious rituals in southeast China he argues that these rituals can be seen in terms of creative subjectivations, "as a kind of fabulation or creative involution" whereby we are urged "to think differently from capital but not oppositionally, which implies very different forms of resistance and of transformation" (284).

Doubts may be raised on the political efficacy of these ways to rearticulate resistance and to think "beyond modernity." A critical discussion of these issues is clearly beyond the scope of this brief review. The volume, however, is a welcome contribution to the ongoing debate on identity politics in a globalized world and will be of interest in particular to scholars in East Asian and Post-Colonial Studies.

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The Coming of the French Revolution. By Georges Lefebvre. Translated by R. R. Palmer (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), xxxix + 235 pp. £12.95 paper.

It is not every day that a major university press republishes a historical work written some 70 years earlier in a field that has seen constant and sometimes intensive work. Nor is it usual for

historical works, distinguished though they are, to be translated by a leading historian of another culture. Yet Georges Lefebvre's *Quatre-ving-neuf*, first published in French in 1939, was translated by R. R. Palmer, one of the most incisive historians of the twentieth century, and published with a preface by him as *The Coming of the French Revolution* in 1947. The book, which has been in print continuously since its first appearance, is now republished in a "classic edition" by Princeton, with a new and useful introduction by Timothy Tackett, today the leading American historian of the French Revolution. Lefebvre's book, then, is a classic, but a classic with a curious history.

The juncture at which *The Coming of the French Revolution* appeared was ominous. Appearing not long before the German occupation of France, the socio-economic categories and Marxist orientation prominent in Lefebvre's book were unacceptable to Nazi cultural policy. The Occupiers did Lefebvre the honor of hunting down and destroying all copies of the book they could find. After the war, Lefebvre's *The Coming of the French Revolution* became an authoritative and widely used text on the origins and first stages of the French Revolution. The reasons for this are straightforward.

Lefebvre was a master of his subject, having produced a long series of articles, monographs and syntheses that made him the acknowledged leader in French Revolutionary studies. Indeed, it is doubtful whether there has been another historian of the French Revolution whose knowledge of the archival sources equaled Lefebvre's. But the significance of *The Coming of the French Revolution* extends well beyond the author's encyclopedic knowledge of his subject. This is a little book with nothing superfluous about it. It is also beautifully constructed, moving in ever wider and more inclusive circles from the aristocracy (Part 1) to the bourgeoisie (Part 2) to the urban masses (Part 3) to the peasantry (Part 4), which included 80 per cent of the population of France, but was often overlooked. The almost mystic unity of the French people on 14 July 1789 described by Jules Michelet is given by Lefebvre a firm social base tied to the interests and mentalities of the people and classes involved. But Lefebvre's analysis is not restricted to economic and social categories alone.

He has a valuable section on the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (Part 5) in which he puts the content of this key document in the context of old-regime values and practices and the exigencies faced by the members of the National Assembly whose acceptance of accelerated political change was offset by their mistrust of direct popular action and their respect for order. Unlike historians who believe that structures alone provide an adequate basis for interpretation, Lefebvre was aware that there is usually an element of contingency in events, and that they must be described empirically, as his accounts of the fall of the Bastille (Part 3, chap. 7) and the October Days (Part 6) show.

Lefebvre's acknowledged expertise in the French Revolution and the clear development of a readily intelligible thesis assured *The Coming of the French Revolution* a place in the curricula of many university history courses. However, the historical perspective from which Lefebvre wrote, the broadly Marxist social interpretation of the French Revolution, came under increasing criticism from the 1960s. Scholars such as Alfred Cobban, George V. Taylor, and William Doyle questioned the appropriateness of the use of key categories in the social interpretation, and argued for a more central role for politics. William Doyle's *Origins of the French Revolution* (Oxford University Press, 1980, with subsequent revised editions) was intended, apparently, as an updated substitute for Lefebvre's *The Coming of the French Revolution*. Doyle says that Lefebvre's book "remains and will remain a classic: a model of historical writing by a master of his subject" (7). Still, it was Doyle's purpose to provide an account of the coming of the French Revolution that incorporated recent scholarship and addressed the concerns of moderate revisionist historiography.

The first section of the *Origins* is a masterful discussion of the historiography of the French Revolution. The second part, which addresses explicitly the origins of the Revolution, is in a way an indirect tribute to Lefebvre. Doyle follows the French scholar in moving from the apex to the base of society with chapters on the nobility (chap. 6), the bourgeoisie (chap. 7), the urban workers (chap. 11) and the peasantry (chap. 12). In between are chapters on government, politics,

public opinion, economic crises and, again like Lefebvre, the Declaration of Rights (chap. 13).

Though Doyle's outlook differs significantly from Lefebvre's, on a number of key points his account is similar. Summarizing recent research, Doyle finds that the bourgeoisie was indeed as expansive as Lefebvre maintained it was. Relying in part on the work of Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, Doyle argued for a more progressive and buoyant nobility than Lefebvre was willing to admit, though the older scholar's knowledge of old-regime society prevented him from portraying the second order as unified or in general decline.

In their approach to the Revolution, Cobban, Taylor, and Doyle used the same categories as advocates of the social interpretation, but questioned their validity or application. A school of historians of which Mona Ozouf, François Furet, and Roger Chartier are representative, and which has been highly influential in the past twenty years or so, approached the Revolution from the point of view of culture, ideology, discourse and symbolic representation. These scholars did not think social and economic categories particularly useful or important, and while much of their research was interesting and stimulating, it tended to portray the Revolution and revolutionaries from the shoulders up. More recent work in the field seems to be returning to more concrete and specific subjects, often involving pivotal events in the Revolution, such as the night of 4 August 1789 (Fitzsimmons), the flight to Varennes (Tackett; Ozouf), and the slaughter on the Champs de Mars (Andress), to politics as it has traditionally been understood, or to the realities of daily life. The pendulum of academic fashion would seem to be swinging back to the more down-to-earth approach of Lefebvre.

In his insightful introduction to this new edition of *The Coming of the French Revolution* Timothy Tackett points out that recent research calls for the elaboration or qualification of certain of Lefebvre's interpretations. His book does not do justice to tensions within the Catholic Church preceding and during the early stages of the Revolution, and it does not have much to say about the role of women. Our knowledge of the Pre-Revolution is more detailed and diversified than was Lefebvre's, and recent research has provided grounds for seeing the conflict between nobles and peasants

as rooted in more than popular anti-seigneurial sentiment (xxv–xxviii).

Tackett restores the final two paragraphs of the 1939 edition of *Quatre-vingt-neuf* calling on French youth to return to the democratic and liberal nationalism of the French Revolution and its Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen in the conflict with fascism and its values (218). One can understand why Palmer omitted this passage from his translation. However, at a time when the integrity of the nation-state is called into question by a purely economic globalizing theory indifferent to liberty and democracy, as well as in recognition of the historical juncture at which Lefebvre's book was written, one can appreciate why it is appropriate to restore this passage.

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The Other Side of Zen: A Social History of Soto Zen Buddhism in Tokugawa Japan. By Duncan Ryuken Williams (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), xiv + 241 pp. £32.50 cloth.

Much of the literature on Zen Buddhism in the West focuses upon the various forms of meditation practice in the Soto and Rinzai schools and the philosophical ideas which underpin such practices. Zazen and koans tend to be the primary objects of study, and the lives of a series of charismatic masters are treated as the main landmarks in the history of Japanese Zen. Duncan Ryuken Williams presents us with an alternative history, “the other side of Zen—the lives of ordinary clerics and lay people.” Buddhism is treated as a religion, “a complex of institutions, doctrines and rituals,” not as a philosophy (11). In studying “popular practice” rather than the “elite tradition” Williams describes and analyses the complex interweaving of communal rituals, festivals and acts of worship aimed at salvation, healing and “memorialising the ancestors” (13). Williams argues that the expansion of the Soto sect at a village level began with the proscriptions of the Tokugawa Shogunate against Christians in the seventeenth century. Japanese Christians who reverted to Buddhism were spared the harsh treatment meted out to other Christians and sympathisers.

Between 1620 and 1650 the Soto school built thousands of temples to cater for the needs of those people who had not previously been affiliated to a particular temple, but who now registered in droves as Zen parishioners.

According to Williams one of the main reasons for the rapid expansion of the Soto Zen school at this time was that the school authorities were quick and efficient at taking advantage of the government legislation that required, in the end, all Japanese to register as parish members of local temples. Registration brought with it financial and social obligations to support the work of the temple. Indeed, Williams claims, the spiritual and physical health of individuals could be adversely affected by negligence of parish temple affairs. Fulfillment of these obligations was also required to maintain individual and family welfare in the afterlife. The posthumous name bestowed on the deceased at their funeral became extremely important to families as an indicator of having a secure future in the other world and a secure social position in this world. Williams argues that the “selling of posthumous names . . . became a major source of revenue of Buddhist temples of all sects by the beginning of the seventeenth century” (28). He also maintains that Soto Zen priests actively participated in discriminating acts against socially disadvantaged and “outcast” groups who were considered to owe their low social standing to “bad karma” accumulated in a previous life. The outcasts included lepers, Christians, criminals, the homeless and “those who did not contribute enough to their parish temple” (30). Villagers and parishioners occasionally reacted against the power of the temple priests and the discrimination they exercised, almost as a quasi-governmental agency. These protests led to various religious directives to cut temple abuses and, in some cases, to the removal of particular abbots.

Williams describes the ways in which “death rituals” were central to Soto parish temple practices. He provides a wealth of interesting detail about these practices and the symbolism attached to the elaborate rituals associated with death and the afterlife, some of which are worthy of inclusion in a Gothic horror movie. For instance, all women, regardless of their social or religious status, faced the prospect of a gruesome life after death in the “Blood Pool Hell”—just one of a hundred and

thirty-six hells. Women fell into this dreadful place “because of the evil karma accrued from their menstrual blood, and that of childbirth, which was thought to soil sacred beings (nature deities as well as Buddhas and monks) after seeping into the water supply” (51). Descriptions of the sufferings of residents of the Blood Pool Hell are both lurid and precise. The following words of a dead nun believed to be speaking through a young girl she has possessed, exemplify the imaginative power and persuasiveness of such accounts: “In the blood pool, countless insect-like creatures with metal snouts come to pierce our skin and worm into our flesh to suck our blood, before grinding into the bone to feast on the marrow. There are no words that could describe this pain” (51). The Soto Zen sect popularised belief in this ordeal and administered the rituals without which women could not escape such a fate.

While, “funerary Zen” was a distinctive and very important aspect of the Soto school at this time, the rituals and other practices directed at human welfare in this life were of equal importance. Williams provides a detailed example of the complex rites and festivals that were typical events in the life of a prayer temple. Daiyuzan Saijoji in Sagami province was a temple and pilgrimage centre, “bustling with pilgrims seeking prayers for a multitude of practical benefits” (59). The picture he paints is far removed from the serenity and silence that we often associate with Zen temples in our imaginations. Daiyuzan’s importance as a centre of worship was the result of its protective deity, Doryo, portrayed in a statue that was open to public viewing on special occasions. Doryo rose to mythological status from humble beginnings as a Zen monk, to head cook and eventually becoming transformed into a *tengu* (often translated as a “long-nosed goblin”), in which guise he was worshipped as a protector of the Zen lineage of Ryoan, who had been Doryo’s teacher. A detailed account of the Doryo cult leads Williams to a discussion of medicine and faith-healing. He agrees with Paul Demieville that there are no clear boundaries between religious therapeutics, magical therapeutics and medical therapeutics, and that “all of Buddhism is a single therapeutic” (88).

In his concluding chapter Williams tells the story of Kiku, a beautiful young girl who broke

a plate while working as a maid for a powerful samurai family. The plate was one of a collection of ten plates that formed an important family heirloom. The wife of the head of the family had been jealous of Kiku’s beauty and she urged her husband to punish the girl for her negligence. He ordered that one of Kiku’s fingers be cut off and she was locked in a room for a short while. Kiku was, unsurprisingly, distraught about the whole episode. She escaped from the room, threw herself into a well and was drowned. Later that night her ghostly figure appeared out of the well and a voice could be heard counting from one to ten, over and over again. When Kiku later appeared to a Zen master he told her that she would only be able to return to heaven if she made an offering of one plate. Thus began a tradition at Josenji Temple of worshipping a special plate that Kiku’s ghost was believed to have left behind.

As Williams writes, Kiku’s ability to travel “between ghostly, heavenly, and human realms reflected the fluidity of the Buddhist cosmos, and the point of such a narrative for the temple must have been to highlight the power of Zen priests to influence matters in the world beyond” (118). These legends also bring to mind the more ancient beliefs and practices of indigenous Japanese peoples, like the Ainu, who believed that the power of the shaman was such that communication between the living and the dead, between human and non-human realms, was possible and beneficial to the community as a whole. It is interesting to see how these kinds of beliefs are revised and reiterated, evolving in varied forms over long periods of time, perhaps forming a chain of imagining and re-telling that may go back to Palaeolithic times.

Williams uses the distinction between an ordinary plate, used at daily mealtimes, and a special ceramic plate, like Kiku’s plate, brought out from its display cupboard for special occasions, as a metaphor for another kind of distinction, that between the charismatic and extraordinary “ceramic plate priests” and the “ordinary plate priests” who went about their duties in the more than seventeen thousand Soto Zen temples in Tokugawa Japan (119). While much attention has been focused on the ceramic plate priests, the elite tradition, little attention has been paid to the ordinary plate

priests, and it is this imbalance of study that he seeks to redress.

In the cultural milieu described by Williams' indigenous folklore, myths of deities, goblins and magical potions, are intertwined with Buddhist therapies and developments in Confucian medicine. In tracing the ways in which ancient pre-Buddhist belief systems and symbolic codes are assimilated and modified within Buddhist temple culture, Williams provides an important counter-balance to the many studies of Buddhism which treat ideas and practices removed from their social, cultural and historical contexts. We are reminded that in some ways there are two contrary, but inter-dependent, currents in the development of Zen. On the one hand, Zen as a critique of many of the superstitions and bizarre speculations of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Japan (a realm of the imagination still energising some Japanese film-makers), and, on the other hand, Zen as a socially adept converter of such beliefs into the currency of Buddhist rationalism and practical wisdom. There is a parallel here with the Buddha's own role as both critic and sympathetic reformer of ancient Indian religious symbolism and belief.

In this timely and articulate study Williams provides us with a richly detailed, informative and fascinating insight into the "other side of Zen"—a world of murky superstitions, fantastic legends, plate worship, strange talismans and unusual funerary rites. His book raises a number of questions for further research and analysis, not the least of which is how the beliefs and rituals described so vividly in this account came to be marginalised in the Western literature on Zen, whereas a similar wealth of popular and archaic beliefs and practices in Tibet have often been studied within the context of Buddhist scholarship. How did "elite Zen" with its emphasis on *zazen*, *koans* and other meditation practices co-exist with "popular Zen"? To what extent do the beliefs and rites described by Williams persist in contemporary Japanese Buddhism and is there still a gap between popular and elite Zen? Perhaps Williams will address some of these questions in a further volume which brings together both sides of Zen. I certainly hope so.

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My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing. By Christoph Reuter (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), viii + 200 pp. \$19.95/£12.95 paper; \$26.95/£17.50 cloth.

Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, many books have been published, especially by American authors, in order to explain the event that shocked the whole world and will be remembered as the beginning of the war on terror. Christoph Reuter's *My Life Is a Weapon*, originally published in 2002 as *Mein Leben ist eine Waffe* and updated through 2003, distinguishes itself from the mainstream literature by its European, somewhat "neutral" perspective. Moreover, as a journalist, Reuter is able to reveal that the people behind the suicide-attacks are of "flesh and blood." He does this by giving special attention to the human stories of the would-be martyrs, their families and friends. He questions the assumption that these suicide bombers fit a typical profile with a specific kind of motivation. Reuter challenges the reader to rethink this "spontaneous" attitude toward "people whose life is their ultimate weapon" and to not just see them as "crazy fanatics."

Reuter's major contribution lies in his profound research, pertinent observations, and readable style. Having spent eight years of field research for this book, interviewing entire communities, Reuter introduces the history of suicide bombing by bringing together a considerable amount of material. The reader is treated to quite a detailed account of the complex issues related to this terrifying phenomenon. Reuter goes back to the suicide attacks of the early days of Islamic warfare in trying to grasp the motives of groups and individuals that commit these attacks today. As such, the book provides a good historical overview covering a wide variety of topics from different periods, including the Japanese Kamikazes and the Indian Martyrs. However, the fact that this material is not strictly related to suicide terrorism confuses the issue sometimes. Far more than merely addressing the topic of suicide terrorism, *My Life Is a Weapon* can be read as a short historical reconstruction of the fundamental issues that underlie the most important world conflicts. In this way, the book discusses the suicide battalions in Iran, the Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict, and the conflict areas of Sri Lanka and Kurdistan.

In the last chapter, Reuter draws hope from the democratic yearning of the Iranian people. In Iran, suicide bombings seem to have stopped not by military intervention but by the internal development of Iran as a democracy. The fact that military interventions only seem to increase anger and justify suicide bombings confirms Reuter in his conviction that the war on terrorism can't be a solution. According to him, only military restraint and patience, as well as co-operative foreign policy between Western nations and Islamic societies, can lead to the spread of democracy. In this sense, for Reuter, only freedom can be the ultimate answer to the threat of terror.

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Sex, Marriage and Family in World Religions. By Don S. Browning, M. Christian Green, and John Witte, Jr. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), xiii + 450 pp. \$42.00 cloth.

Bringing together the views of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism on sex, marriage, and family, this collection offers perspectives on how these religions grapple with these topics. Specialists of each religion have chosen texts, ranging from ancient to modern, that highlight the tradition's teachings. Each chapter is devoted to one religious tradition and includes an introduction that assesses its history and evolution.

A major premise of *Sex, Marriage and Family in World Religions* is that to address current and future issues, it is necessary to understand the role of world religions in influencing attitudes and policies in the past. Modern debates about family and marriage often collide as religious traditions differ. Therefore, it is useful to return to primary texts that illumine each religion's views and these, in turn, offer potential insights into resolving contemporary clashes. Major topics include sexual pleasure, procreation, and intimacy; the nature of the family; the meaning, purpose, and institutionalization of marriage; and the place of same-sex relations.

Further, the editors stress that while there are differences, there are also commonalities and analogies between the religions. Some of these include, for example, the view that marriage is a significant institution held as a public contract and as a commitment to which a majority of people are disposed, and that it produces fundamental goods such as the procreation and upbringing of children. These religions view marriage as a particular promise or contract. They point out that the mutual consent of the man and woman is required. Further, men and women are not free to marry just anyone. Marriage has economic implications in that exchanges of property take place in many societies. Each tradition has developed wedding liturgy or ritual to celebrate the marriage.

As expected, these religions differ in their understanding of sexuality and the erotic. Whether these religions regard themselves as minority or majority religions also impacts their treatment of sex, marriage, and family.

Besides the traditional texts, some current texts are also discussed, including, for example, "Contemporary Developments in Jewish Marriage Contracts"; "A Contemporary Liturgy for Same-Sex Unions" in the Christianity section; and an Islamic document by Shaykd Syed Mutawalli Ad-Darsh which states: "It is the husband's duty to care for his family and home, not just sit in front of the television for hours on end while his wife does the cooking and looks after the children" (218). There is also a description of a contemporary Hindu marriage ceremony from the Arya Samaj tradition.

In sum, this book is a scholarly and well-written text. It will be a welcome addition to courses at college, university and professional school and to experts in the fields of religion and sociology as well as to counselors, psychiatrists, and psychotherapists. Of note is the excellent overall selection of primary texts that emphasize key points regarding sex, marriage, and family.

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The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self: An Intellectual History of Personal Identity.

By Raymond Martin and John Barresi

(New York: Columbia University Press: 2006), 383 pp. \$29.50/£19.00 cloth.

As its title indicates, *The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self* has a story to tell. It offers a panoramic historical view of Western theories of personal identity, tracing various lines of engagement through synoptic discussions of thinkers and relevant conceptions from the ancient Greeks to Postmodernity, from Soul to Self and from Self to a fictional construct. The difficulties facing such an undertaking must be recognized at the outset for a full appreciation of the fine balance which the authors manage to strike, as they resolve the tension between a telling of the story in the specific historical and cultural contexts of its various episodes and an account which focuses on the relevance of these phases to an overarching theme and to contemporary concerns.

The thread that runs through the authors' accounts of the various theoretical approaches—beginning with the Platonic and ending with the Foucauldian—is the enduring questions of what the self is and what personal identity means (i.e. the constancy and sameness of that self over time), which are often extended into the question of some form of afterlife and the possibility of a posthumous, disembodied survival. In spite of the great diversity of historical and cultural contexts, what clearly emerges from this survey is a persistent concern with the same question which may well serve as a response in and of itself—a human self, one may argue, is precisely that which is concerned with and conscious of itself.

Be that as it may, the need for a scholarly survey is very much there, and it is addressed in a thorough and painstaking manner by the volume. The authors follow the itineraries of three main lines of response—the Platonic, the Aristotelian, and the line of Materialist Atomism—which, they argue, began with the ancient Greeks but were subsequently taken up in various guises, modified, and developed throughout the history of Western thought. The watershed points along this history are the transition from the idea of the immaterial soul as a scientifically useful concept, which began with the ancient Greeks and endured through the Middle Ages, to a conception of the self, first as a real entity and then, as

merely a theoretically useful notion, which emerged along with the onset of the secularization of Western culture, and finally the transition to the conception of the unified self as a cultural or psychological construct which has no unifying or explanatory force, but—on the contrary—needs to be investigated and explained. The final demotion and dismantling of the self, the authors argue, is evident throughout the second half of the twentieth century in the work of philosophers, psychologists, and cultural theorists, whose focus of inquiry is the behavior of human beings, which not only puts the self in various hyphenated positions, but shows no sign of agreement or coherence as to the nature and status of this hyphenated entity.

This, then, is the general plot-line of the rise and fall of soul and self, as the authors conceive and persuasively present it. It is, perhaps, inevitable that readers who have a particular professional interest in specific aspects of these questions, specific thinkers, periods, or theories, would find themselves frustrated at times as they follow this narrative. In the case of the present writer, for instance, it is the extreme paucity of the space dedicated to Bakhtin, to Merleau-Ponty, or to Paul Ricoeur, which appears to be a real lacuna, as a discussion of these thinkers would have served to set up a philosophical counter-weight to the “death of the subject” school of Postmodernity and its implications for questions of agency and ethics. But as these issues are yet unresolved and there is no grand synthesis in sight, it is arguable that a broader historical perspective is needed for a clearer picture of the contemporary arena. In any case, the volume makes an important contribution and one can only be thankful for the ambition and the courage of its authors.

The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self is remarkable not only by virtue of the historical scope of the survey, or the truly interdisciplinary approach of the authors, but primarily by virtue of the kind of writing it offers. This historical account, which clearly addresses itself to an intelligent general readership rather than to specialists, is entirely free of jargon and terminological shorthand, but manages to retain and relay the complexity of the theoretical issues it covers in an admirably limpid prose. It does not seek to inspire awe in its

readers, but to seriously engage them in an ongoing conversation. There is certainly a lesson to be learned here.

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A History of Odessa, the Last Italian Black Sea Colony. By Anna Makolkin (Wales, UK: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2004), viii + 270 pp. \$119.95/£74.95 cloth.

The best way to characterize both the style and the main argument of Anna Makolkin's penetrating description of the Italian contribution to the architecture of historical Odessa is a lengthy quotation from chapter 2, "The Italian Predestination," part 2, "The Italian Destiny":

And Italy, with her most developed civic culture, with the most beautiful and well-run cities in Europe, since the day of the Roman Empire and later on, offers her most perfect example of harmonious living with the Other. Italy's most refined, flourishing and picturesque cities stage a permanent architectural exhibition, the open European archive urbanity. Most European countries have modeled their cities after Rome and Genoa, Milan and Turin, Pisa and Venice (32).

Makolkin reminds us that St. Petersburg was called "Russia's window to Europe," though, rather strangely, given the theme of her book, she does not mention that it was a Venetian, Francesco Algarotti, who coined the phrase. As the reader would expect, Makolkin introduces Odessa as "The Second Window onto Europe."

On the first page Makolkin informs us that contemporary Odesseans do not know that Italians "lovingly" built their city. However, the Odesseans are not alone in their amnesia, because the history of the Italian migration to Russia under Catherine II is "a 'blank page,' a gap in the collective European memory, the memory of the southern Slavs and Italians" (1).

Accordingly, Makolkin tells the untold story of an Italian microcosmos in nineteenth-century Russia, where Odessa remains "forever, definitely and unmistakably, Italian in all respects" (79). Russian historians both in tsarist and Soviet times, as well as Italian historians, according to her, have hidden this fact. Makolkin's own arguments are based on a

sample of information derived from meticulously perused scattered archival sources on artists, merchants and servants of the state in Odessa. She argues that in the city records many people are misleadingly labeled under other nationalities than Italian and, moreover, that many people must have hidden their ethnic identity. The text is replete with lengthy speculations on people's ethnic identification and identity and their propensity for mimicry. The reader is left with the conclusion, which is not the author's own, that the many "foreigners" that served under Catherine II and the tsars who succeeded her really did not act in any ethnic capacity at all. The argument about the neglected or outright denial of Italianness of the earlier historiography on Odessa is in a way self-defeating. It seems that the history of Odessa is European, no more and no less.

A History of Odessa makes interesting reading both as a kind of sophisticated guidebook through the architectural history of the city, with the remaining traces from different epochs pinpointed, and as a speculative but thought-provoking essay on European history and ethnic identities. It is not necessary to agree with the author's superlatives concerning the unique Italian contribution to European civilization. The remaining important point is rather what can be called the "de-ethnification" of European history. This story of migrations, cross-fertilization of traditions and customs, and the interplay between the grand schemes of state actors and the projects of individual adventurers, is a case for kaleidoscopic history writing.

This idiosyncratic but entertaining book is an argument and not really a narration. Its proper title would be *A Post-Modern History of Odessa*. It is no coincidence that Makolkin observes that it was Sergei Eisenstein's famous 1925 movie *Bronenosets Potemkin*—one of the most celebrated movies in film history—that made the huge steps that descend on the harbor, designed by the city's architect Francesco Boffo in 1820–44, into "the unique *urban sign* of Odessa," au pair with the Eiffel Tower, the Moscow Kremlin or the Acropolis in Athens. The difference between the Potemkin Steps and the other three landmarks is that the latter are urban signs in their own right, whereas the Potemkin Steps owe their fame to a historical incident as told in a film. As for the city of Odessa, it turns out that its history is overlaid

with different stories, Makolkin's tale being the oddest one so far.

It is not for nothing that the publisher's advertisement for the book informs us that Anna Makolkin is a student of both Jacques Derrida and Thomas Sebeok (<http://mellenpress.com/>).

KRISTIAN GERNER

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The Selfish Gene. By Richard Dawkins. Third Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), xxiii + 360 pp. £14.99 cloth; \$15.95/£8.99 paper.

In *The Selfish Gene* Richard Dawkins primarily tries to answer the following question: What is the unit of selection upon which the forces of natural selection act? As the title of the book suggests, his answer to the question is the *gene* and not any higher-order entities such as the individual (a whole organism) or groups. Dawkins is fond of using analogies as a tool of persuasion and one analogy he provides to make his case is that of tryouts for a crew team. According to Dawkins, while individual boats win races (i.e., single organisms manage to survive and reproduce), it is clearly the individual rowers (i.e., genes) that are responsible for the successful outcome. Moreover, if rowers are constantly switched around to form different teams and compete in many different races (i.e., there is genetic variation upon which selective pressures can operate over a longer period of time), by and large, good rowers will tend to be disproportionately represented among the winning boats. In other words, what is important in Dawkins' view are the *gene frequencies* in a population's *gene pool*. A "selfish gene" is one whose fraction in the gene pool increases with successive generations. While organisms may often seem to be the unit of selection, they are in fact merely transitory vehicles for the benefit of their "gene replicators."

In addition to his rejecting the individual as the unit of selection, Dawkins also rejects the group as the unit of selection. For instance, a fair amount of space in the book is devoted to showing how various "altruistic" behaviors (or those that seem beneficial to the group) are really "selfish." For example, it may seem that a gazelle that high-jumps when a predator

approaches is acting altruistically by drawing attention to himself and warning other members of the group of an approaching threat. One "selfish" interpretation of this behavior, however, is that the gazelle is trying to demonstrate to the predator how fit he is and why the predator ought to attack other, frailer members of the group.

The target audience for *The Selfish Gene* seems to be the general reader who has an interest in science, but who might have little or no prior understanding of the basics of biology or evolutionary theory. Dawkins excels at presenting the material clearly, staying away from jargon and big words. Further, the text is narrative in style, with a focus on careful explication of the main argument and presentation of a relatively small number of illustrative examples. The main text of the book was written in 1976, and in 1989 a second edition added two new chapters, new endnotes, and a new preface. While the third and latest edition contains a new introduction, some reviews of the book in its earlier editions, and also restores the original Forward left out of the second edition, it offers no other new material—a serious drawback—considering the ongoing discussion (and controversy) *The Selfish Gene* has generated.

OMER GERSTEN

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Bakhtinian Perspectives on Language and Culture: Meaning in Language, Art and New Media. Edited by Finn Bostad, Craig Brandist, Lars Sigfred Evensen and Hege Charlotte Faber (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), x + 235 pp. £54.00 cloth.

As with so many geniuses in history, it was the fate of Mikhail Bakhtin (1895–1975) to be unknown to the wider public and to be misunderstood and despised by the academic world throughout his life. But like many other geniuses in history, Bakhtin was discovered after his death. During the last two decades his reputation has grown throughout the Western world, and he is now considered to be among the most significant thinkers of the twentieth century, a widely cited and credited theorist of literature, culture and language.

Bakhtin's works deal with a broad range of subjects and have inspired many thinkers, such as Neo-Marxists, Structuralists, and semioticians, whose theories echo his ideas.

One of Bakhtin's fundamental contributions is the idea of "dialogism." It was introduced in his first major work, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* (1929), and has affinities with Martin Buber's (1878–1965) dialogic philosophy, among other streams of thought. According to Bakhtin, literature, language and culture in general are relational and dynamic. For instance, a literary work carries on a dialogue with other works of the past, present and future. It is not only a question of the influence of the past upon the present, since perceptions of previous works are also altered by this dialogue: the past remodels the present and the present remodels the past. At the level of language, dialogism assumes that all utterances are responses to past utterances, and anticipations of future utterances.

The present book is a collection of eleven articles, including contributions from Germany, the United Kingdom and Finland; however, most of the writers and the editors are Norwegian. The aim of the book is to study the impact of Bakhtin's ideas on linguistics and art and to compare his theory with other theories. The central issue of the book is the concept of meaning. The authors want to demonstrate that dialogism offers a way to deal with cultural meaning in fields such as language studies, literature, art and new media. "Meaning," in accordance with dialogism, is considered as a relational phenomenon. The different signs that constitute culture do not have fixed meanings, but rather relative meanings, varying with interlocutors, time and space. Meaning is directly connected with dialogue: "meaning springs out of the dialogue and belongs to dialogue, thus making the dialogue a core aspect of all forms of culture" (7). The writers are thus committed to the view that the dialogic approach can contribute to the understanding of meaning in all the fields surveyed.

The book is divided into three sections, beginning with a section devoted to the Bakhtin Circle. The first Circle, founded around 1918, reflected the truly interdisciplinary interests of Bakhtin that extended from the natural sciences to humanistic scholarship.

The Circle consisted of intellectuals with varying interests, but all sharing a love of discussion of literary, religious, and political topics. Accordingly, contributions in the first part of the book range from German jurisprudence to rhetoric and philosophy.

The second section deals with the application of dialogism to the theory of language. Bakhtin extended the dynamic and intersubjective nature of language beyond the rigid Saussurian model. And nowadays there are clear affinities between Bakhtin's ideas and the theory of (critical) discourse analysis where recurrent concepts like "interpersonality" or "intertextuality" echo the dynamicity Bakhtin attributed to language. This section contains articles dealing with the definition of meaning, the notion of language in Bakhtinian and non-Bakhtinian theories, and affinities and diversities between Bakhtin and other linguists.

Dialogism can also be applied to the theory of art and to multimediated electronic culture, and this is the main topic of the third section of the book. The notion of a static art system, in which a work of art is a monological declaration by the artist, is opposed to the concept of a dynamic art system that implies a conversation between artist and audience. Interactivity is the extreme form of this latter system and is nowadays one of the basic modes of social behaviour in Western culture, in which the Internet, the forum par excellence of interactivity, has an ever more central role in everyday life. In addition to articles dealing with the new media and electronic art, the third section includes a contribution about the application of dialogical thinking at the Trondheim Academy of Fine Art.

There is no doubt about the currency of Bakhtin's ideas in a postmodern society that cherishes diversity and mocks authority. Particularly with the expansion of the virtual reality created by the Internet, dialogical ontology seems to have once and for all replaced monolithic ontology, and for this reason these contributions to the analysis of the state of Western culture are important.

However, shifting from scientific (pseudo-) objectivity, it is stated in the introduction that "the book wants to be more than a mere contribution to the Bakhtinian studies" (11). In somewhat biblical tones, the authors express their willingness "to take dialogism seriously as

a foundation" (10). Maybe this kind of militancy is not necessary.

MARJA HÄRMÄNMAA

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Slumming: Sexual and Social Politics in Victorian London. By Seth Koven (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), xvii + 398 pp. £12.95 paper.

Historians have often been sceptical of the motives which impelled significant numbers of upper- and middle-class Victorians to enter the world of the poor in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As Derek Fraser observed in 1973, "charity often helped the donor as much as the recipient" (*The Evolution of the British Welfare State* [Macmillan, 1973], 118). However, Seth Koven believes that this interpretation fails to do justice to the "altogether messier mingling of good intentions and blinkered prejudices" which lay behind the "slumming" phenomenon. At the same time, he also wishes to pay particular attention to the way in which erotic and sexual motives informed the relationship between rich and poor in Victorian and Edwardian London.

The book is divided into two parts and contains five substantial chapters, sandwiched between an Introduction and a Conclusion. The first three chapters are largely concerned with the way in which affluent observers represented the urban poor in literary and photographic forms. In Chapter 1, Koven dissects the work of the mid-Victorian journalist, James Greenwood, who published a highly-coloured account of "a night in the workhouse" in the *Pall Mall Gazette* in 1867. This is followed by a detailed investigation of the conflict between the Charity Organisation Society and Thomas Barnardo over the methods which Barnardo used to publicise his work and attract support for his charity. In Chapter 3, Koven examines the output of Elizabeth Banks, the "American girl in London," who published descriptions of the work of female servants in the 1890s.

The second half of the book is more concerned with the careers of those individuals who not only wrote about and photographed poor people but also chose voluntarily to live and work among them. In Chapter 4, Koven

examines the work of a number of Victorian and Edwardian women, such as Mary Higgs, Muriel Lester and Honnor Morten, who abandoned their comfortable existences for lives of voluntary poverty. In Chapter 5, he focuses attention on the male settlement workers who went to live in institutions such as Toynbee Hall and Oxford House. He argues that "slumming" provided young people of both sexes with the opportunity to develop "innovative solutions to urban poverty" and explore new conceptions of sexual identity.

As Koven himself observes, the tension between "Eros" and "altruism" lies at the heart of this study. In the final chapter, he argues that we need to take more seriously the claims made by the inhabitants of Oxford House and Toynbee Hall, together with those of other "slum-workers," to be genuinely committed to the improvement of social welfare, but this commitment is often obscured by the author's emphasis on eroticisation and the exploration of sexual identities. Despite its intentions—and for all its undoubted qualities—this book still tends to suggest that the slum-visitors whose work it describes were more concerned with the needs they found in their own lives than with those they found in the lives of others.

BERNARD HARRIS

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Manliness. By Harvey C. Mansfield (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), xiii + 289 pp. \$27.50 cloth.

The current attempt of western democracies to create the "gender neutral" society is doomed, according to Professor Harvey Mansfield. The reason for this conclusion is that *nature* still exists. Indeed, not only are there natural differences (psychological as well as biological) between men and women: the survival and cultivation of these differences are essential to civilization. In fine, even a generally pacific regime like liberal democracy requires the masculine qualities of risk-taking, assertiveness, and aggression, to prosper.

In challenging the dogmatic social constructivism of our time, Mansfield takes his reader on a stimulating journey through the great works of philosophy and literature to

understand the meaning of masculinity. While the author is careful not to celebrate the masculine *in toto* (a society governed by an Achilles would not be a just one), he emphasizes that all of the civilizations of history have been patriarchal for one obvious reason: the male authority figure has always represented the archetype of toughness necessary for commerce, politics, or war. Yet Mansfield does not necessarily attempt to exclude “manly” women from these occupations. His main complaint is that a gender-neutral society ignores the fact that manliness is still the inescapable criterion for leadership, whether the leaders are male or female.

It is clear that the author sides with the ancients against the moderns for their superior understanding of the nature of gender. Plato and his heirs grasped the unchanging essence of nature with greater depth than Hobbes, whom Mansfield believes to be the first feminist for attacking the masculine virtues of courage and pride. Oddly, however, the author ignores that other great tradition of western thought—biblical revelation—for its contribution to an understanding of gender. In considering only ancient and modern texts of philosophy and literature, Mansfield does not discuss whether the Bible is ancient, modern, or neither. While he acknowledges that Machiavelli and Nietzsche faulted Christianity for being effeminate, Mansfield himself is silent on the extent to which the triumph of Christian virtues like charity, mercy, and forgiveness may have contributed to the rise of modern feminism. (This omission is especially surprising, since the author’s teacher, the famous political philosopher Leo Strauss, taught that the Bible grants no moral authority to nature.)

This omission perhaps contributes to the confusing meaning of Mansfield’s final conclusions about the power of nature. While he insists that human beings “do not get altogether above nature nor do they conquer nature” (216), he admits that “nature does not prescribe exactly how she is to be respected” (228). If nature is so ambiguous, then how do we know when we are either conquering or respecting it? Mansfield makes clear throughout his book that he does not want to subscribe to the Darwinian view that nature is amoral, or has nothing to teach about ethics. Yet if nature is mysterious, how do we know when we are simply projecting our own meaning onto it (as

feminists have argued)? If nature yields no clear guidance, why should we live according to it?

GRANT HAVERS

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Nationalism and Irony: Burke, Scott, Carlyle. By Yoon Sun Lee (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), x + 222 pp. \$55.00/£35.00 cloth.

Yoon Sun Lee delivers a complex new political contextualization of Romantic irony in *Nationalism and Irony: Burke, Scott, Carlyle*. Lee briefly introduces the German Idealist context with which Romantic irony is generally associated, and then returns to it in a final chapter on Carlyle that addresses his synthesis of the German philosophical tradition and English political discourse. But Lee’s interests depart much more widely from traditional accounts of irony than this rounded narrative shape might suggest. *Nationalism and Irony* is much less a work of philosophical literary criticism than a literary-historical study of how the British debate over the French Revolution foregrounded and cultivated the performative aspect of political rhetoric. The book sets out to show how “Romantic Britain’s ironic nationalism explored the correspondences between civic emotions and the discourse of theatrical experience, between patriotism and the marketplace, between conservatism and fetish-worship” (5).

Burke’s *Reflections on the French Revolution* sets the original terms of these binaries, and Lee’s surprising turn to actual theater history in her Burke chapter makes his work a powerfully compelling historical anchor for the whole argument. Arguing that “openly manipulable artifice,” for Burke, “is the essence of civic emotion” (41), Lee contextualizes Burke’s *Reflections*, with its dramatic rhetoric and many theatrical references, by way of uncannily close verbal echoes in several actors’ manuals and by way of Burke’s theatrical connections with David Garrick and others. Echoing recent work on theater history, Lee concludes that the “public emotions” of theatergoers and political actors alike “can be felt as natural and recognized as manufactured at the same time” (64). While the episode of theater history

effectively mediates Lee's notion of irony as civic performance, the institutions paired with Sir Walter Scott (the marketplace) and with Thomas Carlyle (fetish-worship) do not work as well in this role, and in fact irony comes up less frequently in the last two chapters.

The historical conjunction of theater, Romantic irony, and revolution also supplies a vital counter-instance of "deference as a form of critique" (118) in the form of ironically titled radical works such as *Pig's Meat*. Lee argues that the historical works of Scott and Carlyle encourage a more readerly performance of ironic nationalism, but the political force of this irony is less clear, both because of constraints on the public sphere after the 1790s and because these readings lack the historical depth of the first half of her book. The main problem is a notion of antiquarianism that neglects the vast primary literature, established institutional forms, and popular reach of eighteenth-century antiquarianism as it was actually practiced. Scott's *The Antiquary* and Carlyle's *Past and Present* do, of course, foreground the reading and rewriting of history, and thereby call attention (like Burke) to the facticity of institutions and the voluntary nature of consent. But their representations of antiquarianism are caricatures that do not contain the complex varieties of nationalism already present in various antiquarian pursuits.

Lee's analysis seems actively to resist the standard political binary of left and right. At one point she distinguishes her project for its (by and large recuperative) attention to "public deference" rather than to "social reform" (32). In the case of Scott, ironic deference can appear downright subversive, if we accept Mac-Ivor's clan in *Waverley* as an authentic representation of "subalterns [who] insist on professing their equality with their masters" (22). In the case of Carlyle, however, the ironic deference of imperial citizens, trained in the virtuous private reading of history (143), carries the argument to the opposite extreme. Any recuperation of this ironic nationalism must be ambivalent at best. The significance of the argument would be clearer to me if ironic nationalism as enjoined by these three authors could be situated, at least speculatively, in relation to the problematic nationalisms of the present day, and also historically in relation to other forms of political agency.

Lee's analysis of *The Antiquary* is loaded with highly wrought close readings and splendid insights into the work done by antiquarianism within the plot of this historical novel and against other works of Scott, particularly *Paul's Letter to His Kinsfolk*. But the novel's apology for antiquarianism is partial at best when seen against the radically divergent politics and methods (and, not infrequently, class backgrounds) of important contemporary antiquaries such as John Carter and William Hone (the examples actually cited by Scott himself—Joseph Ritson, John Pinkerton, and many others—are particularly worth exploring here). It seems that Lee refuses to engage the issue of how representative Scott's view of antiquarianism really is, and this refusal seems to me a product of her argument's indifference to political categories of left and right. Having made this qualification, though, I am still persuaded that Scott deploys antiquarianism to ironize "the ideology of patriotic traditionalism" of the 1790s (101), and to reconcile it with the modernity of a meritocratic, commercial society—to summarize Lee's original and subtle argument about this important and atypical Scott novel. The readings of Carlyle, too, often carry the same conviction. If this concise work of scholarship cannot quite resolve the disorientation produced by its provocative argument, its learned close readings of major works by these three authors, and of their filiation, will stand as a lasting achievement.

NOAH HERINGMAN
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On Justification: Economies of Worth. By Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), viii + 389 pp. \$39.50/£26.95 paper.

On Justification (originally published in French in 1991), which offers a new view of social economy and is one of the founding documents of the "economics of convention" school in France, addresses the relation between "person-states and thing-states" (which constitutes what we define as a situation) (1). The authors do not speak about social groups (youth, women) or social classes (labourers, employees). They apply Pierre

Bourdieu's anthropological research to the relation between classifying operations and practical interventions (3), taking as their point of departure the works of Max Weber. Boltanski and Thévenot want to show how social peace is possible between the individual and the society, by a quantifiable scale of values on justification (chapter 11). The book, written as a great essay, follows the French tradition of philosophical discussion of a subject, differing very much from Anglo-American scientific writing. It is also a very interesting book.

The authors examine a wide range of situations where people justify their actions, whether involving themselves, things, or others, instinctively drawing on their experience to appeal to principles they hope will command respect. They recognize that individuals often misread situations and that many disagreements can be explained by people appealing, knowingly and unknowingly, to different principles. They discuss the values of the aristocratic state and of the popular state to find out the benefits of justice (chapter 3). Honor, as worth (or value), allows a person to work for the common good, but it does not fit into the current forms of institutionalism, organizational ecology, network analysis, rational choice, or transaction-cost economics. In their search for a solution to this problem, the authors do not follow any of the major theoretical perspectives of social economy, but show the great potential of charting new territory and of enlivening the debate. They argue that justification falls into six main forms exemplified by six authors: civic (Rousseau), market (Adam Smith), industrial (Saint-Simon), domestic (Bossuet), inspiration (Augustine), and fame (Hobbes). They discuss each writer's philosophical tradition and methods to show their sociological characteristics. Turning to philosophy to define their goal of constructing a common humanity, they choose the notion of the *polis* (French, *cit  *) to justify the order of ranking people and things. They use *cit  * as it is used in St Augustine's *Civitas Dei*, showing how often their presentation of values depend on theological ideas (chapter 4). The valency in this polis may be criticized by other forms of justification (using their six forms of justification). Thus, the world of the family can be criticized by the world of citizenship.

The authors show how justifications conflict, as people compete to legitimize their

views of a situation, and provide a theoretical framework for analysing society by abandoning critical sociology. Their aim is to discover a new way of examining justification, since the statistical processing of data does not succeed in wholly eliminating the presence of persons. Therefore, to assign the respondents to a category, the agent responsible for processing the material has to imagine them in comparison to people he knows: "By treating the operations of qualification and generalization within a single analytical framework in our diverse research projects, we were able to grasp both the type of case that can constitute a cause in which justice is demanded and the type of investment to ensure the adjustment of diverse resources within a common form" (8). What the authors mean by this is that their analysis allows them to bring to light the internal tensions at the heart of what constitutes the economy.

Their approach centers on the role of criticism: they see society as critical, because people can make public their unjust situation. This approach also enables them to overcome the conflicts between individual and collective actions. They want to generalize the individual, which is why critical sociology must be given up: for, the investigator has to distance himself from the object to be able to criticize it.

Some points of criticism need to be mentioned. One is the neglect of history, on which the concept of the polis is founded. The second is the sociology of consensus, which neglects the relationship of power between individuals and things, for they concentrate their attention on compromise. Boltanski and Thévenot want to propel political actions to transform the collective will and to help human beings view life as not socially, economically and biologically determined.

In *Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme* (2003) Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello discussed the dialectical relationship of criticism and capitalism, and attempted to make the model of the polis more dynamic by examining the history and the principle of exploitation. Boltanski and Thévenot return with their book *On Justification: Economies of Worth* to critical sociology but do not return to Marx's conception, because they cannot reconcile his ideology with their model of the polis. What they do is to analyse capitalism through its

revolutions in the last thirty years, thus making a more directly political contribution.

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The Dancer Defects. By David Caute (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), xiv + 788 pp. £30.00 cloth.

In terms of politics, the Cold War was a race between two understandings of modernisation. On the one hand, the Stalinist model was trying to prove that the Soviets were equal, if not superior, to the Western Bloc countries in terms of heavy industry and machinery. The Soviet universities were on a par with the leading Western universities and even surpassed them in some fields. Urbanisation and collectivisation of farmlands were projects aimed at creating a modern type of human being able to shed the traditionalism of the past. The Americans were trying to fulfil their side of the equation by doing more or less the same things with different titles. Therefore, one might read the situation as two sides trying to reach the same target using similar methods but following through different routes.

However, it was a completely different story in terms of the arts. The Soviets, thinking their appeal for the average West European person would be sustained by their creating a link with the common European past, embraced the classical/traditional forms of painting, sculpture, music, and the performing arts, promoting these as the cultural heritage of humanity and therefore the 'correct' forms of arts for the modern world. On the opposite side, the Americans and their allies were all for the progressive forms of art, from painting to the performing arts, and saw these as the most fitting forms for the modern world. As a result, the question how each side approached the works of modern artists became part of the Cold War confrontation. The Soviets focused on how an artist followed the classics, whereas the Westerners embraced modern, even post-modern art even if these did not appeal to the masses (as in the case of dodecaphonic music or abstract painting).

David Caute's work comes into the fray at that point. He tries to focus on both sides and, most importantly, on the chagrin of those who

tried to go against the tide. Caute explains that his colossal book of over 600 pages is part of yet a greater project and that he has limited *The Dancer Defects* to the display arts, performing arts, and music. It is very probable that literature is a clean and solid example of Cold War rivalry; but as Caute shows, these forms of art also have their stories, impressing us with how ideological involvement has affected and changed them.

For instance, the reader is awed by the ideological tension and confrontation experienced in the Hollywood scene during and even prior to the McCarthy period, in particular, by the stories on Joe Losey's *The Boy with Green Hair* and Arthur Miller's *The Crucible*, the relation of the two with Elia Kazan, who named names for the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) in the wake of the release of his *Viva Zapata*. The stories of Marlen Khutsiev and his *Ilich's Watchpost* and Khrushchev's reaction to Federico Fellini's *8½* during Moscow's Third International Film Festival (Chapter 8), and the whole chapter dedicated to the censorship of Polish director Andrzej Wajda throughout his career (Chapter 13) show that the situation was not too different on either side of the Cold War polarisation. The criticism levelled by the Soviets against Igor Stravinsky, who left Russia in 1910, and the ups and downs of Dmitri Shostakovich's career (Chapters 14 and 15, respectively) show how the Cold War was reflected in the world of classical music.

Ballet provided a more publicised ground for competition. From the 1953 defection of Nora Kovacs and Istvan Raab to West Germany, dancers' defection stories remained the most appealing to the general public. Of these, Rudolf Nureyev's defection in 1961, Natalia Makarova's defection in 1970, and Mikhail Baryshnikov's defection in 1974, had the greatest impact.

But it was plastic art—because it clearly depicted the modern-classical division—that remained the most controversial form. The Eastern Bloc favoured realistic art while the Western Bloc, at least in the ideological context, favoured abstract art. This created a great divide between the two blocs, though not everyone followed the official line: Picasso, Léger, and Pignon clearly violated the communist requirements of art. In Czechoslovakia, cubist and expressionist artists managed to have

an exhibition in 1962 and continued to display their art even during the 1968 Soviet invasion; in Poland and Hungary, dissenters worked in cooperation with abstract artists from the 1970s. Modern/abstract art therefore became an element of dissent in the Soviet-controlled regimes of Eastern Europe.

The performing and display arts thus summed up the social evolution of both the Western and the Eastern Blocs during the four decades of the Cold War. Dissidents were suppressed; the art scene tried to protect itself from the enemy's ideological infiltration; and new methods faced severe criticism from those in power. Cate claims that the West won the cultural cold war (612) not because it created better works of art or better artists, but because it created a freer environment for the arts to flourish in, despite its interest in "modern" arts.

In sum, Cate shows why the cultural cold war developed and ended as it did. By discussing key issues and events in theatre and cinema, music, ballet, and painting, the book succeeds in giving an overall picture of the period. However, this same point is also a weakness for it sometimes leads the author to bombard the reader with unnecessary information which increases the book's volume but does not contribute to the general narrative. This said, the many intriguing cases cited in the book show a very thorough and detailed work, which is highly commendable. As Cate writes in the last paragraph of the book: "cold war culture can be properly explored and understood only from multiple viewpoints based largely on evidence which resides within the public domain, the extraordinarily copious cultural production of the twentieth century" (617). *The Dancer Defects* indeed provides a strong cultural viewpoint to a public that has generally been exposed only to the political aspects of the Cold War.

CEM KARADELI

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The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Edited by Frank Jackson and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), x + 904 pp. £55.00/\$99.00 cloth.

From the blunt title of this large handbook through to the impressive list of contributors,

this is intended to be a landmark text of its kind and so indeed it is. Stretching towards a thousand pages, it divides analytic philosophy into seven sections, subdivided into three to five authorial contributions per section. The sections are: moral philosophy, social and political philosophy, philosophy of mind and action, philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology, and lastly, philosophy of the sciences. Thus, for example, the contributions on the philosophy of mind and action include Intentionality, by Gabriel Segal; Consciousness, by Frank Jackson; Action, by Alfred Mele; and Cognitive Science, by Martyn Davies.

Most authors survey the state of the various fields and, with some variation, most attempt to provide a little more depth and range to the spectrum of opinion. D. H. Mellor launches a fast-paced tour of the relative merits of the A and B series in the philosophy of Time in the metaphysics section, with the pithy observation that advances in this subject show precisely that there is real progress in philosophy contrary to the myth. He also shows how dependent it is on progress in other more or less distinct areas of inquiry such as causation, or theories of meaning, and is perhaps faintly resigned about the extent to which such a complex and speedily evolving subject area can be reviewed in a single short contribution.

No less absorbing is Rae Langton's contribution to the social and political section, on feminism in philosophy, which opens with the same myth about the lack of any progress in philosophy but to the effect that such putative inertia is not acceptable to feminists. Langton's tactic in dealing with the scale and diversity of the field is to dwell on two general ideas, androcentrism and dualism, and thereafter to consider the famous Kantian question of treating someone as an object, especially in light of the work of Martha Nussbaum. This becomes in part a discussion of pornography and includes, perhaps less unusually nowadays, footnoted references to websites. Here Langton follows through on an unexpected argument from Nussbaum that some sorts of objectification of others are not only permissible but desirable and, indeed, brings telling nuance to the initial dualistic contrast of noumenon and phenomenon that was the basis of the injunction against objectification. With one or two exceptions, the contributions by Mellor and Langton are broadly representative of the text

as a whole and reflect the clarity and balance of the editorial policy. Rather than a handbook as such, it works as a useful historical snapshot of the state of a number of areas in analytic philosophy. It is inevitable that this book cannot but be much more limited than the authoritative pretension its appearance suggests, and this is indeed a subtext of many of the contributions themselves.

INNES KENNEDY

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Baroque Fictions: Revisioning the Classical in Marguerite Yourcenar. By Margaret Elizabeth Colvin (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005), 177 pp. €36.00/\$45.00 paper.

A taste of the approach in this slim volume can be gained from the cover. It is contended that Marguerite Yourcenar's fiction exhibits "numerous characteristics of the neobaroque." The aim is to cast doubt on the "presumed transparency of her text as associated with the French neoclassical tradition." Rather, Yourcenar possesses a "subversive postmodern aesthetic" that "privileges extravagant artistic play, flux and heterogeneity."

Margaret Elizabeth Colvin offers an extensive account of how she sees this as working. Yourcenar's oeuvre is seen as employing "amazingly circuitous aesthetic strategies... both to disguise and to indulge in a liberating, transgressive revolt against certain Western notions of humanism and classicism" (143). This is a hint that the so-called neobaroque tendencies of the fiction do not jump out at the reader (Colvin repeatedly claims that Yourcenar should be seen as a modernist, and that her classicism is not transparent (e.g., p. 38). Colvin believes that Yourcenar's status as the first woman member of the French Academy underlines her complexity, and she cites her biographer Josyane Savigneau on her subversiveness and the difficulty of classifying her corpus (14).

The question after reading this book remains whether there is anything in the kind of approach taken by Yourcenar that is inconsistent with the neoclassical label that has been applied to her. The very constricting definition of the classical tradition that Colvin

adopts helps her case, but the reader may doubt that Yourcenar felt so constrained:

The classical tradition, in whose line Yourcenar is generally situated, tells us that form may neither stand alone nor dictate content; it should blend so unobtrusively with content as to be virtually invisible (159).

Yourcenar was, of course, a cultured European who was influenced by many quarters including the East, but eschewed adherence to any of the major literary movements of her day. Individualism was paramount. I think she would have been surprised to be hailed as a hero of postmodernism. Her Hadrian, the product of her eccentric European background with whom it may be psychologically interesting to compare his author, here "exhibits not so much signs of classical stability and unity as the centrifugal forces of difference and marginality." Her own personal history goes far towards explaining her interest in marginality, and this focus is far from inconsistent with the neoclassical tag.

Readers may wonder what advantage might accrue from applying the tag *neobaroque* to Yourcenar. Colvin cites Christine Buci-Glucksmann's "Baroque Reason" in which she claims that in a baroque world there is:

A regress towards or of history: since it cannot be totalized or mastered, history is acted or frustrated against a background of wars and absolute power. It presents itself as a catastrophe... the great disorder of the world, or the cosmic disaster of the end of the world so dear to the baroque poets (161).

Colvin thinks there is a good match between Yourcenar's domain and the baroque world. There are some grounds for this view, and some readers may find this essay provides a compelling argument, but the label seems to me to help little in the classification of Yourcenar's productions.

HUGH LINDSAY

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The British Slave Trade and Public Memory. By Elizabeth Kowaleski Wallace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), xiii + 248 pp. \$27.50 paper.

The British Slave Trade and Public Memory is an excellent study of how the transatlantic slave

trade has been represented in selected museum exhibits, television programs, and literature from Britain since 1990. The book summarizes key works on the role of Britain in the slave trade, written between 1970 and 1990, to interpret the impact of the representation of slavery in British public memory.

Elizabeth Kowaleski Wallace begins her analysis with an acknowledgement of the seminal work that prominent scholars of English history and literature such as James Walvin and F. O. Shyllon, Peter Fryer, Prabhu Gupatra, Fred D'Aguiar, Stuart Hall, Paul Gilroy, and the editors of *Black British Cultural Studies: A Reader* and *The Parekh Report* have done to give visibility to the Black experience in Britain's history. For instance, Wallace points out that Walvin's *Black Ivory: A History of British Slavery* (1992) uses a methodology that combines the views of both Blacks and Whites about British slavery, notably the records on slave ships and on the writing of early Black writers such as Olaudah Equiano and White writers such as Alexander Falconbridge (6). A related book is Shyllon's *Black People in Britain, 1555–1833* (1977) that gives a survey of biographies of famous Blacks in Britain prior to the mid-nineteenth century, such as James Albert Ukawsaw Gronniosaw, Equiano, Ottobah Cugoano, and Ira Aldridge.

The first chapter explores how two communities in the United Kingdom bring the history of slavery back to public memory. The author uses two examples, "The Transatlantic Slavery: Against Human Dignity" exhibition, displayed at the Merseyside Maritime Museum in Liverpool in 2004, and the "Bristol Slave Trade Trail," a self-guided walking tour through the city's connections with the history of the slave trade. Describing both the forms and meanings of the events as well as individual reactions, Wallace shows that commemoration sites help people connect their everyday lives with their traumatic historical past. Yet, while she credits "The Transatlantic Slavery" exhibition for working hard to oppose "the essentializing and dehumanizing notion of the African 'slave,'" Wallace criticizes it for failing to help viewers understand Africa on its own terms (38). She laments the lack of artifacts depicting the ordeal of life under slavery, specifically "the instruments of torture—not only the shackles, chains, and branding irons but also a

'punishment dollar,' a cast iron brace designed to keep the head torturously upright" (39). Alternatively, Wallace describes the "Bristol Slave Trade Trail" as differing from the former, since it put live bodies in action and allowed the White visitors to be "implicitly enjoined to imagine themselves as 'coeval,' or as sharing the same time of city fathers, purveyors of the slave trade" (54). Wallace's main goal in this chapter is to show the need of British museum curators and other agents of public memory to involve visitors in the history of the slave trade in which they are accountable and implicated.

The second chapter, "Fictionalizing Slavery in the United Kingdom, 1990–2000," provides a fresh interpretation of the theme of hybridity, the resistance to binary thought, the danger of the totalization of history, and the inevitable contradictions and biases in the narration of history. Using major British novels, written between 1990 and 2000, including, among others, Caryl Phillips's *Cambridge* (1991), Barry Unsworth's *Sacred Hunger* (1992), Phillips's *Crossing the River* (1993), and Graeme Rigby's *The Black Cook's Historian* as examples, Wallace shows how these books, which differ in genre, fictionalize slavery in the United Kingdom. These works oppose racism and binaristic treatment of themes and characters while expressing a multi-voicedness that Wallace describes as "a polyvalence that may not center on a particular assertion but that allows for more than one truth to exist simultaneously" (123). This theory suggests the impossibility of one stable, unifying narrative of history and thus offsets the power of hybridity in story telling.

The third chapter deals with the representation of the British slave trade in films such as the 1995 short biopic on the life of Equiano, *A Son of Africa*, the 1999 Channel 4 broadcast of the series *Britain's Slave Trade: Telling the Untold*, and the BBC production of *A Respectable Trade*. Wallace credits these films for rendering "a visually accessible history of the transatlantic slave trade" (128), presenting an image of "Black agency" and "otherness" that was "already a part of the fabric of English daily life," and for providing alternative versions of an "authentic" England (128). Yet Wallace criticizes the manner in which these films may play into "a scopophilic impulse" by eroticizing the representation of the slave trade and attempting to make viewers "love visually

the very world we have been asked to judge intellectually” (147).

The fourth chapter interprets Biyi Bandele’s 1999 adaptation of the play based on Aphra Behn’s *Oroonoko, or the Royal Slave* (1688) to show how he reweaves the original narrative into a modern and cosmopolitan performance about the African holocaust in Britain’s history. The Nigerian-born and London-based playwright, Bandele, appropriates and revises the story that was performed by White British actors in the eighteenth century, linking early forms of transnationalism and representation of race, the body, and identity with their later portrayal in twenty-first-century England. Bandele sells the story of British participation in the slave trade without falling into the traps of global capitalism. This marketing of the history of slave trade reflects the power of human beings to have agency, to be capable of doing evil, to be perpetrators or victims of violence, and to suffer injustices.

BABACAR M’BAYE

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Homecomings: Returning POWs and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany.

By Frank Biess (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), xiii + 367 pp. \$35.00 cloth.

In a masterful blend of social, political, cultural, gender and identity history, Frank Biess examines the consequences of the return of two million German soldiers and prisoners of war (POWs) from Soviet captivity in the decade after the Second World War. The book revolves around a comparison of the construction of postwar identities in East and West German society, tracing the efforts in each state to transform former POWs into model citizens. In each case, we see a shift from the issues of the Second World War and the struggle against Nazism to new postwar narratives linked to the Cold War. To support his arguments, Biess relies on a wide range of archival sources, oral history interviews, and a number of contemporaneous publications, such as medical journal articles from the postwar decade.

The account begins with an examination of the post-Stalingrad phase of the Second World War. The Nazi regime had attempted to glorify dead soldiers as fallen heroes of the Reich, but the large number of German prisoners taken by the Soviets at the conclusion of the Battle of Stalingrad created a dilemma. These prisoners occupied a liminal space between the fallen hero and the soldier on active duty. Removed from German society from 1943 to 1945, Biess examines the implications of the separation of this population group from the homeland (*Heimat*) and its return in the postwar era.

The defeat and incarceration had lasting effects on the POW population, many aspects of which were not apparent until their return. Biess explores the negative influence of these experiences on the masculinity of the POW population, particularly when combined with the postwar return to a German society marked by increased roles for women both in the home and the workplace. The POWs also returned with widespread medical problems, most notably dystrophy, whose highly politicized diagnosis and treatment is described by Biess in Chapter 3.

Biess traces parallel efforts in West and East Germany to reintegrate former POWs into society, each recasting the returnees as both victims and heroes in newly constructed narratives of the Second World War. The development of redemptive memories in West Germany, the focus of Chapter 4, had its origins in a range of different sources, most notably in the Association of Returnees, the Verband der Heimkehrer, or VdH. This organization served as a political mouthpiece for former POWs in the early 1950s, advocating a POW compensation law based on former service to the German state, as opposed to remuneration for suffering while in Soviet captivity. The Western narrative which emerges is that of survival under two totalitarian regimes, first Nazism then Stalinism. The memories of the East revolve around universalizing the experience of anti-fascist resistance, enabling a remasculinization of returnees in the East and East Germans as a whole.

In summary, Biess provides the reader with a fascinating examination of the postwar

period, which is useful not only for specialists in modern German history but for those interested in gender, identity, and cultural changes in modern societies.

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Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues.

Edited by Igor Primoratz (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), xxiv + 215 pp. £15.99 paper.

Comprised of fourteen chapters, *Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues* offers insight into many of the important philosophical issues surrounding terrorism. The authors draw on a number of disciplines including sociology, psychology, and history to help clarify matters of terrorism that defy simple definitions and categorization. The two main questions that recur throughout the text are the nature of terrorism in general and whether it is ever morally justified, both of which prove to be very difficult to answer.

Following the Introduction, the first two chapters, "Defining Terrorism" by C. A. J. Coady and "What is Terrorism?" by Igor Primoratz, offer working definitions of terrorism that focus on non-combatants, the innocent, and civilians, rather than the active agent and his or her ultimate goal(s). By concentrating on the "direct victims of terrorism" (xii), both Coady and Primoratz want the notion of terrorism to be broad enough to include the practice of state terrorism. These two chapters try to make sense of the mess of ideological and political rhetoric surrounding notions of terrorism. The third chapter, "A Defense of the 'Red Terror'" by Leon Trotsky, questions how we should consider the connections, if any, between revolution and terrorism, in relation to the thought of Karl Kautsky.

In the fourth chapter, "The Burdens of Terrorism," Nick Fotion offers three arguments against terrorism, showing why it is that we are "instinctively repelled" (53) by terrorist acts. The fifth chapter, "Political Terrorism as a Weapon of the Politically Powerless" by Robert Young, lists the features he believes most aptly describe terrorist activities, followed by a discussion of its practice by individuals or

groups, i.e., non-states. Virginia Held's "Terrorism, Rights, and Political Goals" then raises such questions as: "Is intentionally harming non-combatants always wrong, and terrorism always wrong because it involves this?" (67), and "Are rights being violated, and can this be justified" (69)? Next, in "Terrorism, Morality, and Supreme Emergency," C. A. J. Coady asks if terrorism is wrong. He argues that it is and then goes on to consider what sort of wrong terrorism constitutes.

The eighth chapter, "How Can Terrorism Be Justified" by Uwe Steinhoff, examines the justification of deliberate acts on the innocent by setting it within a larger question of why the *justifiability question* is or is not asked and by what standards it may be said to be a valid question. Chapters 9 and 10 question the nature of state terrorism and why it exists. "State Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism," by Igor Primoratz, points to a needed "typology" of state activities in terrorism and argues that state terrorism is in many ways a worse kind than that done by non-state agents. Douglas Lackey, in "The Evolution of the Modern Terrorist State: Area Bombing and Nuclear Deterrence," briefly examines circumstances of state endorsed attacks on civilians, beginning with Churchill's decision to area bomb at night, which resulted in hundreds of thousands of non-combatant deaths. Lackey argues that a new era of warfare began with state terrorism which now seems routine.

The last four essays, "Terror Bombing of German Cities in World War II" by Stephen A. Garrett, "Violence and Terrorism in Northern Ireland" by Peter Simpson, "Terrorism in the Arab-Israeli Conflict" by Tomis Kapitan, and "The Catastrophe of September 11 and Its Aftermath" by Burton M. Leiser, are case studies meant to test some of the arguments and principles discussed throughout the book, and to challenge the ability to properly apply sometimes overly general concepts to specific situations, from World War II to September 11.

Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues is far from a comprehensive treatment of the issues it raises. Even so, it is a competent introduction to key concepts, themes, definitions, and moral problems, as part of the ongoing discussion that, as yet, involves little agreement.

Moreover, while not all the contributors agree, some standing in direct conflict with others, this should be taken as a healthy sign of dialogue and not inconsistency or error. It should also be noted that this work comes across as less about creatively rethinking how philosophy at large might think about terrorism and more about clarifying issues within traditional boundaries, boundaries that are often quite vague. Thus, both the strength and the limitation of this text are its attempt at clarity within the typical limits of philosophical thought.

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Rosenzweig and Heidegger: Between Judaism and German Philosophy. By Peter Eli Gordon (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), xxix + 330 pp. \$65.00/£41.95 cloth; \$24.95/£15.95 paper.

This award-winning book fittingly appears in the Weimar and Now: German Cultural Criticism series, joining other classic studies of an intellectual scene of endless richness and resonance. This study restores Franz Rosenzweig's work "to its proper setting among developing patterns of German thought in the Weimar era," including "the very idea of an authentic Jewish philosophy dissociated from the German horizon" (120), which owes much to his magnum opus *The Star of Redemption* (1921). Most interpreters have thus confined Rosenzweig to a distinct Jewish canon, moved by a hagiographic agenda of commemoration that prevented them from acknowledging that he spoke from within a German philosophical community where such distinctions played only a small role at the time.

Rosenzweig mercifully died in 1929, the year of the pivotal Davos disputation between Cassirer and Heidegger, whose position he had time to fully endorse in a review. However ironic, given later political turns, this philosophical alignment with Heidegger was Rosenzweig's genuine testament. Judaism *per se* was, on his own admission, only incidental to "The New Thinking" that he defined in a 1925 essay on *The Star of Redemption*, since similar conclusions could have been reached from Christian or pagan premises. This is just

what Heidegger was doing, using post-Christian theological language to retrieve original Greek thinking, where Rosenzweig used the Bible as the myth of origins. Both attempts at recovering existential authenticity from sources upstream of Western metaphysics employed a typical Weimar diction of "archaic modernism" to translate religious concepts into modern philosophical ones and vice versa, in a correlation method not unlike that devised by Protestant thinker Paul Tillich under Heidegger's influence—one of the few Weimar parallels and links the author seems to have missed. For Rosenzweig and Heidegger were but two of the foremost interwar thinkers seeking to overcome "onto-theology" by taking seriously temporal finitude and embodied particular subjectivity, refusing to subsume them under timeless general categories of pure mind. Resolutely seeking "redemption-in-the-world" instead of religiously reaching for a beyond, they were both post-Nietzschean thinkers of the "death of God"—the God of rational religion and idealist philosophers. Rosenzweig's philosophy could thus embrace theology on this existentialist basis, where Heidegger's ostensibly rejected it. The similarities ran deeper, down to the ambiguities of a Romantic emphasis on holistic national community. An ahistorically conceived "Jewish-being" in exile as redemption provided Rosenzweig with a convenient alternate allegiance after the wartime collapse of the German State, matching for him that of the Hegelian dialectics of historical integration. Did this turn to messianic futurity also adumbrate Heidegger's quietist recoil (his "*Kehre*") after his own political disenchantment? This question might be added to the many delicate ones Peter Eli Gordon raises as he skillfully unravels the long-observed kinship between two powerful contemporary challenges to the Western intellectual tradition, bringing fresh clarity and coherence to our understanding of its Weimar moment. This much-needed revisionist demonstration that "the history of ideas . . . need not be understood as grounded finally and fully in political reality" (310) is however slightly marred by linguistic inaccuracy in many foreign citations.

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A Cultural History of Causality: Science, Murder Novels, and Systems of Thought.

By Stephen Kern (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), ix + 448 pp., \$22.95/£14.95 paper.

Stephen Kern's self-styled "specificity-uncertainty dialectic" proposes that, in science, philosophy, and novels, "causal understanding moved in the direction of specificity, multiplicity, complexity, probability, and uncertainty" (6) from the Victorian to the modernist/postmodernist epochs. Kern illustrates his thesis abundantly in *A Cultural History of Causality*, but his attempt to reduce his massive subject by concentrating on causes of homicides portrayed in 135 fictional sources by 91 authors (see Bibliography) is not entirely satisfactory.

Beginning in the Introduction, Kern's style rarely approaches that of the authors cited: "Prior to around 1980, complexity referred to something complicated, with many layers of meaning that are difficult to sort out; after that time it began to refer to the specific science of adaptive and self-organizing systems" (9–10). Someone should tell Princeton University Press to pick up on editing!

Repetition, circularity, and reliance on correlations blight every chapter. Chapter 1 focuses "on the ancestral causes of murder" (28). "In place of the Victorians' linear and positivist explanatory models, moderns offered more multiple, complex, and probabilistic explanations and drew spiritual and artistic sustenance from the increasing uncertainty" (41). Chapter 2 turns on "Freud's conception of the childhood determination of adult mental life" (64), suggesting that "the causal role of trauma . . . is analogous to the role of the gene in hereditary transmission and the role of germs in disease" (105). The "pivot" in chapter 3 is "the linguistic turn" that "came to see philosophy not as a direct study of thought and reality but as a study of the ways that thought and reality are constituted by language" (108). Chapter 4 describes the swing in sexuality "from Victorian circumspection to modern directness" (147) that followed "break-throughs in sex research" (149). Chapter 5 runs from modernist interest in "moods or emotions [that] create a specific feeling but at the same time generate a unique sense of uncanniness and uncertainty" (190) back to Victorian

preoccupations with hatred, "jealousy, revenge, and greed . . . fear, anger, and shame" (217). Chapter 6 traces the movement of ideas "toward increasingly specific identifications of the cerebral location of mental functions and more precise definitions of 'the guilty mind'" (226), from craniology to forensic psychiatry and from the etiology of monomania to the intricacies of the insanity defense. In chapter 7, "the pivotal new social science is sociology . . . [manifested as] a growing sense of the complexity of social causation" (266). And, "the intellectual pivot" of chapter 8 is, again, "the modernist transition from the causal role of religious and moral ideas to that of aesthetic and existential ideas" (304–5).

Finally, in his Conclusion, Kern admits that his dialectic founders on the conditional acausality of quantum mechanics: "quantum theory itself was not adapted widely to account for murders or any other human behavior" (365). He might have recognized earlier the determinist/reductionist morass engulfing contemporary science, philosophy, and novels, had Anglo/Christian/European/US-centrism not dominated his concept of murder and had genocide, terrorism, war, and weapons of mass destruction entered his purview.

STANLEY SHOSTAK
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Pieter Bruegel and the Art of Laughter. By Walter S. Gibson (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006), xxi + 266 pp. \$49.95/£33.45 cloth.

One would expect a treatise on the art of laughter to be a fairly enjoyable read, and so Walter Gibson's study of Pieter Bruegel's (I prefer Brueghel as the spelling) *oeuvre* proves to be. Although the depiction of humor is the subject of his treatise (mainly in the works of Bruegel but encompassing other Netherlandish artists as well), it is treated seriously by Gibson, who maintains that there has been much misinterpretation of the artist over the course of art history. Indeed, his Prologue is devoted to "deciphering Bruegel" (1ff.), where he chides historians/art historians (politely) for over-intellectualizing the content of the artist's compositions. Most of these writers followed the example set by Erwin Panofsky, who

expounded his ideas of “disguised” symbolism mid-twentieth century. However, in the last decade or so, a number of voices have been raised in refutation, essentially declaring “sometimes a cigar is just a cigar.” Even though this is true, and I would agree that Panofsky’s “principle” of disguised symbolism has been over-used; nevertheless, the principle is still (and most definitely) valid—the baby should not be thrown out with the bath water.

From there, Gibson goes on to investigate the “Commodity of Laughter” (14ff.) in the sixteenth century as opposed to our own. According to Gibson, some historians have suggested that “refined” people of the past did not laugh, but only indicated humor by smiling through closed lips. They seem to have been relying on the words of early Church scholars such as St. John Chrysostom, who deemed laughter a sort of “reefer madness” which led from foul speech to foul actions, resulting in murder at the very least (sex being even worse). Hildegard of Bingen is another who also regarded laughter with suspicion, considering it the result of original sin (16). What would those bluenoses have made of St. Francis of Assisi, who actually seemed to regard religion as joyful?

Gibson also reports that there were a number of writers in the sixteenth century, such as Erasmus, Juan Luis Vives, and Jan Roelants, who decried raucous laughter but did not condemn laughing overall, partially on the grounds that humans were the only creatures who could laugh, but who, nevertheless, preferred more decorous comportment. On the other hand, there were just as many, if not more, contemporary writers who considered laughter absolutely essential for a healthy mind and body, even suggesting that pregnant mothers laugh often to insure a healthy, happy infant. Gibson quotes Bonaventure Des Périers, for example, as exclaiming “Let’s laugh! . . . With our mouths, noses, chins, throats, and all our five natural senses. But that’s not enough if we do not laugh with our hearts” (18). Since, as Gibson reminds us, there were quite a few jokebooks (*luchtboeken*) circulating in the sixteenth century, and, since there is a considerable body of ribald stories still known from the period, one suspects such “refinement” was honored more in the breach, than in reality.

Gibson uses the positive writers (Des Périers, *et al.*) to support his contention that Bruegel was pursuing humor more than social morality in his works. But while his choice of a number of images, both Bruegel’s and those of other artists, certainly contain obvious humor, one cannot escape the moralizing behind the obvious. *Dulle Griet* (Angry Margaret), for one example, who strides cartoonishly through a landscape of grotesques which may amuse with its bevy of malformed hybrids, but which, for that very reason, could hardly be a better evocation of the horror of war (whether waged by women, or not).¹ Another example is Peeter Baltens’ *Peasant Kermis with the “Clucht van plaijerwater.”*² Baltens imitates Bruegel closely in both style and composition; his *Kermis*, although more crowded, resembles Bruegel’s *Netherlandish Proverbs*. Its moral tone may be more subtle, but his reveling peasants appear all too oblivious to the poverty, strife, and greed shown surrounding them.

Also included in Gibson’s examples, rather oddly, I think, to make his point, are some of Bruegel’s more poignant works, such as *Christ Carrying the Cross*, or *The Blind Leading the Blind*. Gibson, himself, refers to them as “Bruegel’s most moving depiction[s] of human emotions” (62). While he is praising Bruegel’s ability to capture humanity (Bruegel’s “physiognomical genius,” 62), as in the *Wheat Field*, he seems to contradict what is ostensibly his major point, that Bruegel is, on the whole, more funny than profound. Even though he compares these examples to the *Wedding Dance* and other scenes of peasant revels, by judging them solely on their human qualities,³ his arrow misses the humor mark.

One cannot doubt that Bruegel and his fellows were using humor to make many of their moralizing points. Certainly, people laughed and nudged each other when they viewed the depictions of rowdy drunks, shrewish housewives, and bratty offspring (there’s nothing like a good laugh at *others*); nonetheless, I feel that Gibson overstates the case for amusement and minimizes the moralizing tone. He also tends to downplay the rather mean-spirited aspect in many of the representations of the peasantry, most frequently in Bruegel’s *oeuvre*, but also well demonstrated in Jan Steen or Adriaen Brouwer. Steen, of course, unlike Bruegel,

who considered himself an intellectual and financial cut above *hoi polloi*, frequently included his own portrait in the midst of the boorish revelers, thereby establishing camaraderie with the lower classes.

Bruegel's many depictions of peasants represent them as cloddish, awkward and unattractive, with dull, pudding faces, and huge, clumping feet. He is a little kinder to the children, rendering them less cartoon-like and more appealing, especially the little girls—the boys are more like their elders. Of course, to be fair, Wilhelm Buytewech, who pictured the upper classes arrayed in fine feathers, but on their worst behavior, was no less unsparing in showing them sottish, and sluttish. In contrast to the sarcastic, unflattering portrayals of peasants, however, the upper-crust is generally handsome, gracefully-footed, and of slender, fine physique.

Still, in spite of the above reservations, Gibson's book is, as a whole, well-done. Much of his analysis is right-on, knowledgeable, and certainly exhaustively researched—the notes and bibliography occupy nearly as many pages as the text. To those interested in sixteenth-century Netherlandish painting, there are many valuable insights into the art itself, and into the larger societal picture, as well. Furthermore, he succeeds in placing Bruegel actively in his own world, rather than as a detached philosophical observer, as many would have him.

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NOTES

1. While a detailed analysis of this painting is outside the scope of this review, I have to quarrel with Gibson's interpretation (taking his cue from Karel van Mander) that Griet is a looter. She and her army of housewives seem more to be preserving their households from attacking demons (the enemy) than looting them. I believe he, and the art historians he quotes, have hold of the wrong end of the stick.
2. This was a popular farcical situation wherein a married woman, feigning illness, sends her husband on a wild goose chase for *plaijerwater* (fake water) so that she can entertain her lover.

3. Gibson states airily, "scholars have mined these pictures so industriously for whatever nuggets of profundity [they possess]...they have generally overlooked the marvels that Bruegel presents to the naked eye.

Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair. By Adeed Dawisha (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), vi + 340 pp. £29.95/£12.95 cloth.

This is a well-written account of the history and, I hope not over-optimistically, the demise, of Arab nationalism. The great bulk of the book deals with the twentieth century; readers interested in the earlier antecedents of the movement should consult Albert Hourani's *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939*, first published in 1962, which, forty odd years later, is still the standard guide to the nineteenth century.

Like most writers on the subject, Adeed Dawisha eschews notions of the timelessness of Arab nationalism, and generally subscribes to Hourani's view:

That those who speak Arabic form a 'nation', and that this nation should become independent and united, are beliefs which only became articulate and acquired political strength during the present [i.e. twentieth] century.

Dawisha notes the general reluctance of Muslim writers like Afghani or Kawakibi to "champion political independence for the Arabs [sc. from the Ottomans]" (25), while noting that some Arab Christian writers had fewer scruples. In *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism* (2001), Bruce Masters considers that it took the demise of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, the point at which the notion of "Ottomanism" ceased to have meaning, for the idea of Arab nationalism (in the sense of a belief that the Arabs had a separate identity like "the Greeks" or "the Bulgarians") to gain a critical mass of adherents. Until then, Masters writes, "the [Ottoman] empire, for most Muslims and even some Christians, was simply seen as the only remaining political force capable of forestalling European colonial ambitions" (176). Hence George Antonius's conviction (expressed in

The Arab Awakening in 1938) that the desire for Arab independence had spread like wildfire among the “Arab masses” does not stand up to empirical scrutiny; as Dawisha remarks, “Prior to World War I, therefore, the majority of the Arab people were not ready for a break with Istanbul” (33).

Rather charitably, in my view, Dawisha credits Sati’al-Husri with giving “the concept of ‘Arab nationalism’ intellectual coherence and sophistication” (48), devoting his third chapter to an exposition of al-Husri’s views. Here I must declare an interest: I have always regarded Arab nationalism and its pernicious and racist offspring, Arabism and Pan-Arabism, as among the most intellectually vacuous, the most ahistorical and the most misconceived, political ideologies of the twentieth century, and it is clear that al-Husri was primarily responsible for inventing both doctrines, and through his insidious influence on the educational system in Iraq, Egypt, and Syria, for disseminating them in school textbooks. This nonsense, part of which can be roughly summarised in the notion of a “once-united-Arab-world-rent-asunder-by-the-Ottoman-conquest” (compare the quotation from Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal on p. 137), has been trotted out to me as something resembling gospel truth by more Arab friends of my generation (b. 1943) than I care to remember.

Put simply, if there was ever such a thing as a “united Arab world”—and medieval contemporaries would neither have recognised nor understood the notion—it disappeared from sight with the fragmentation of the ‘Abbasid empire, a process which was already well under way by the mid-ninth century. Similarly, given the many invasions of the Arab Mashriq from further east, it is difficult for a historian to give much credence to the notion of an “Arab people” or an “Arab nation.” For the greater part of the period between the mid-ninth century and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, the rulers of the Arab Mashriq were either of Arab, Kurdish, or Turkic/Turkish origin, a fact which was of little consequence to their subjects, since religion, not ethnicity, was the main marker of identity. Non-Muslims only ruled the region for some forty years, from the fall of Baghdad in 1258 until the conversion of the Ilkanid Ghazan in 1295.

One of the more obvious paradoxes of modern Arab history is the contradiction between the desire for “unity” preached by various Arab states at different times since the First World War, and their “real-life” insistence on sticking to the frontiers with which the colonial powers endowed them either before or after the Treaty of Lausanne. There have only been three realignments of frontiers in the Arab world since the First World War: the transfer of Asir from nominal Yemeni control to Saudi Arabia in 1932; Syria’s loss of the *sanjak* of Alexandretta to Turkey in June 1939 as the result of a dubious plebiscite; and the union between North and South Yemen in May 1990. Attempts to unite two or more states have been short-lived, and usually rancorous.

Of course, this is not to discount the genuineness of “Arab fellow-feeling” in particular political circumstances, especially with the advent of a relatively free press and of wireless broadcasting in the late 1930s. Dawisha notes the strong emotions evoked in Egypt by the news of the Syrian revolt in 1925–27 (82) and, more acutely, over the course of the Palestine rebellion between 1936 and 1939 (108–20). Furthermore, he gives due weight to the forces ranged *against* Arab nationalism, citing evidence from Jabal Druse, the Syrian Jazira, and the Iraqi Shi’i community as a whole, as well as noting that the broad mass of Egyptians were far more attached to Egyptian *wataniya* (and of course to Islam) than to “Arabism” (see Chapter 4, “Competing Loyalties”).

Nevertheless, and in my view because of its essentially unconflictual and status-quo-accepting content, pan-Arab nationalism did spread quite widely in the 1940s, although the shambles, inter-Arab distrust and divisions revealed by the first Arab-Israeli war did the movement a great deal of damage (128–30). It recovered momentum a few years later largely because the Egyptian Free Officers took up the baton in an effort to secure their own revolution against what they saw as the countervailing forces of imperialism. This refashioning of Arab nationalism as a weapon against the “imperialist other,” found readier acceptance in the region, especially given Egypt’s virtual monopoly of inter-Arab radio broadcasting. Paradoxically, while other Arabs eagerly hailed Egypt under Nasser as leader of the Arab nation, the knee-jerk tendency of the

vast majority of Egyptians was to regard their own country as being at the centre of a political entity that did not transcend its own borders. Thus, as is well known (see Chapter 8) the farce of the United Arab Republic was initiated by the Syrians; Nasser was “effectively cornered” (198). While the euphoria induced by events in the decade and a half after Nasser’s seizure of the Suez Canal caused the principle of “Egypt first” to be laid aside for a while, it returned to the agenda with a vengeance almost immediately after his death. Thus “‘Egypt’ became Sadat’s single-minded concern, constituting the primary motivation for his two momentous decisions: the October 1973 War, and his trip to Jerusalem and the consequent peace treaty with Israel” (265).

One little aside: on page 174 Dawisha claims that (in the 1950s) “Arab nationalism was also making inroads into some of the most intractable communal divides,” for instance by attracting Iraqi Shi’i supporters, and quotes, as many others have done, the fact that the first Iraqi Ba’thist secretary-general, was a Shi’i, Fu’ad al-Rikabi. But this is a little misleading: in 1951, al-Rikabi, an engineer from Nasiriya, was in charge of an organisation of about fifty people. By 1955, according to Batatu’s findings in the police reports (*The Old Social Classes*, p. 808) it had 289 members, many of whom were Shi’is and friends or relatives of al-Rikabi himself, primarily because, as in other clandestine movements, recruitment had as much to do with family and social networks as with ideology. In contrast, the Iraqi Communist Party had tens of thousands of adherents, and had also led the opposition to the monarchy and the *ancien régime* since the Second World War. Furthermore, while it is true that sectarian divisions were less important in the 1950s and even for much of the 1960s, virtually no Shi’is occupied positions in the upper echelons of the Iraqi Ba’th Party after the coups of 1968.

What is especially new and original in this book is the very detailed description of the apogee of pan-Arab nationalism immediately before and after the union between Egypt and Syria, and the almost mortal blow it suffered by the refusal of ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim and his supporters to go along with it (Chapters 7–9). Qasim, one of the most underrated Arab political figures of the twentieth century, simply refused to go along with the sloganeering vacuity and irredentist hysteria of

Arabism/Nasserism—however superficially attractive it may have seemed to many Iraqis at the time—preferring a pragmatic developmentalist ideology captured in the phrase “Iraq first.” Cracks in the façade of the UAR began to appear almost immediately the arrangement had been concluded (February 1958), and senior Syrian Ba’thists soon began to speak out against Egyptian authoritarianism, thus permanently splitting the nationalist camp some time before the break up of the Union in the autumn of 1961. Of course, all this was nothing in comparison to the shattering defeat inflicted by Israel in the Six Day War of June 1967, both on the Arabs and on pan-Arab nationalism.

There are four major lacunae in this useful account of Arab political trends and tendencies; first, the all-embracing absence of democracy and political pluralism characteristic of the Arab world for the greater part of the period since the First World War; second, the coercive nature of the nationalist regimes and their downright cruelty to their opponents; thirdly, their sheer dishonesty; and, finally, the absurdity and vacuity of their ideology. Towards the end of the book, we catch some glimpses of the first and second: “the inability of Arab nationalism to survive political setbacks was at least partly due to the disinterest of its custodians in creating workable democratic institutions... nationalism operated throughout its glory days in a sea of authoritarianism” (297–98). But there is a certain amount of confusion here as well: liberal democracy did not fail just because it was associated with “pro-Western forces” (303), but for the more substantial reason that, in what became the post-colonial states in the Arab world, social forces were not greatly engaged with the state, and no political organisation either bothered or was able to obtain any broadly-based national constituency. This gradually led to the extreme vulnerability of the state when its colonial protectors had departed, or its *relative autonomy*, that is, the sense in which the state was not firmly rooted in society and was thus “up for grabs” to the highest or, more relevantly, the most militarily effective, bidder.

As far as coercion is concerned, Dawisha notes that ‘Aflaq, “whose writings bear the unmistakable stamp of Husri’s ideas, candidly identified ‘cruelty’ as the most reliable instrument to affect the desired transformations

[sc. to bring errant citizens back to the truth]]” (300). But again he seems to take too much at face value, noting that Saddam Husayn, “that erstwhile Arab nationalist and life-long member of the Ba’th Party” (294), drew on an “enduring reservoir of tribal values [to] elevate tribalism to the forefront of Iraq’s political and ideological concerns” (294). Like other dictators, Saddam Husayn in power made use of an ideology, in this case, Ba’thism, as a means of justifying his barbarity, mendacity, and charlatanism; the suggestion here that he was some sort of “lapsed Catholic” seems a little far-fetched.

And what, finally, was the point of it all? At the end of the most perceptive book on Ba’thism, *Sovereign Creations: Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq* (Cornell, 1996), Malik Mufti writes: “At the end of the day . . . the borders of the Middle East remained unchanged and the people of Egypt, Syria and Iraq had nothing to show for their pains but two wasted decades. Did it have to be that way? One enthusiast [Kamel Abu Jaber] wrote in the mid-1960s: ‘Today’s Ba’thists are the Luthers, Rousseaus, Owens and Marxes of the Arab world. They have a vision, a program, a dream’ In fact the Ba’thist leaders and most of their rivals had neither a vision, nor a program: all they had was a hope of clinging to power with the help of whatever foreign patron happened to be available” (193–94). It is tragic, and almost incomprehensible, that this vacuous nonsense, with its over-inflated claims, its lack of historical perspective and its vicious intolerance, should have succeeded so completely in capturing the minds, as well as the hearts, of so many otherwise decent people in the Arab world.

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Gandhi as Disciple and Mentor. By Thomas Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), xiv + 279 pp. £45.00/\$75.00 cloth.

On 23 April 1928 Maganlal Gandhi, a ‘nephew’ of M. K. Gandhi died. Gandhi had described the nephew as his hands, his feet, his eyes and an ideal servant. Gandhi said that he

was more widowed than Maganlal’s widow Santokbehn. Thomas Weber’s book seeks to understand the nature of Gandhi’s widowhood. It is a book about those who influenced Gandhi and those who were influenced by him. Weber places Maganlal, Gandhi’s most trusted disciple for over two decades, in the category of those who influenced Gandhi. He is not alone; with him are two of Gandhi’s earliest European associates, Henry Polak and Herman Kallenbach and a man who adopted Gandhi as his father, Jamnalal Bajaj. A more routine list would have included *The Gita*, poet and ascetic Raychand, Tolstoy, Ruskin, and Thoreau; perhaps even the nonconformist Christians. This selection of Maganlal *et al.* reflects the depth of Weber’s understanding of Gandhi’s life and thought. Only a scholar who strives to understand Gandhi in his entirety—the Gandhi of his Ashrams, the Gandhi who led the people of India to freedom through a movement that advocated self-suffering, the Gandhi of constructive programmes and the Gandhi who wished to attain self-realisation, to see God face to face—could have written a book like Weber’s.

The book is divided into two sections, “Gandhi Influenced” and “Gandhi’s Influence.” Weber argues that in order to appreciate the essential unity of Gandhi’s politics and spirituality it is necessary to understand his experiments with building an ideal community and a self-reliant country. Polak, Kallenbach, Maganlal, and Bajaj were, according to Weber, pivotal to the four Ashrams that Gandhi founded, two in South Africa and two in India. The Ashram community, through its own experimentation and conduct, affirmed Gandhi’s spiritual and political experiments. It provided the space for dialogue; without the Ashrams neither Gandhi’s politics nor his spirituality would have been possible. Weber, unlike most of Gandhi’s biographers, is acutely aware of the centrality of constructive programmes in Gandhi’s politics. It was Maganlal who experimented on weaving and spinning, and Bajaj who provided organisational strength to village re-construction. The result of Weber’s insights is a fascinating account of four lives as they mingled with Gandhi’s life.

The section on “Gandhi’s Influence” takes cognisance of Gandhi’s obvious political legacy as reflected by a Martin Luther King Jr. or a

Vinoba Bhave. But Weber goes beyond the political. He is concerned with knowledge systems that have gained ascendancy in the West in the recent past. Arne Næss and deep ecology, Johan Galtung's structural violence and culture of peace, E. F. Schumacher's economics that was sensitive to beauty, sympathy and harmony, and Gene Sharp's pragmatic non-violence form the second part of Weber's study. Weber is able to see the departures from Gandhi in each of these philosophers. His reading of Gene Sharp is a case in point. He shows that Sharp's pragmatic and, to an extent, instrumental view of non-violence takes him away from Gandhi, who viewed non-violence as a morally and ethically superior force.

Weber's insights will hopefully open up the scholarship on Gandhi, on his associates and the institutions that he founded, which would allow us to understand him still more fully.

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From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics, and Racism in Germany. By Richard Weikart (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), xi + 312 pp. \$24.95/£14.99 paper.

With the publication of *On the Origin of Species* in 1859 and *The Descent of Man* in 1871, Darwin opened the way to various interpretations of his views of man and his evolution. To Darwin and some of his contemporaries, evolutionary progress became a new moral imperative. The historian-sociologist H. G. Zmarzlik wrote in 1972 that advocating the progress of the "fittest" and the "strongest" "was accompanied by a tendency to sacrifice the individual to the species, to devalue the humanitarian idea of equality from the standpoint of a 'natural' inequality, to subordinate ethical norms to biological needs" (4).

In the early twentieth century, it was not difficult for those embracing Social Darwinism to promote the eugenics movement, unwittingly inspired by some of Darwin's ideas and "to define eugenics as the science for improving human heredity." Among these followers,

"one who hijacked Darwinism, was an Austrian-born, German politician whose name—Hitler—conjures images of evil and death" (9). Richard Weikart, the author of this captivating and well-documented book, makes it clear that he intends to provide the reader with a scrupulously historical study of the Darwinian influence on eugenics, euthanasia, racial theory, and militarism in Germany.

The book comprises a preface and introduction where the author states his intentions of historical correctness, which are followed by Chapter 1, "Laying the Foundations for Ethics"; Chapter 2, "Devaluing Human Life"; Chapter 3, "Eliminating the 'Inferior Ones'"; and Chapter 4, "Impacts." In his conclusion, Weikart states that "it would be foolish to blame Darwinism for the Holocaust...but it would be also foolish to deny the influence of Darwinism on Hitler." This influence is acknowledged by almost all scholars of Nazism. Without Darwinism, Hitler and his Nazi followers would not have had "the underpinnings to convince themselves that one of the world's greatest atrocities was really morally praiseworthy. Darwinism—or at least some naturalistic interpretations of Darwinism—succeeded in turning morality on its head" (233).

PAOLA S. TIMIRAS
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Trade Liberalization and Trade Preferences. By Michael Michaely (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004), vi + 177 pp. £49.95 cloth.

Michael Michaely has once again produced a small *opus magnum*, this time dealing exclusively with artificial geographic discrimination in trade. As he did in his excellent *Theory of Commercial Policy: Trade and Protection* (University of Chicago Press, 1977), here too he compares Preferential Trade Agreements (a second best) with Free Trade, his benchmark (the first best) and not with Tariff-Ridden Trade (a second best). This is a clear departure from the "second best theory" developed by Lipsey, Johnson and Bhagwati in the 1960s, which led very quickly to a *cul de sac* both analytically and in terms of policy advice. The reason is basically quite simple: one cannot rank

two second-best situations without policy-wise quickly getting stuck.

Not only this. The book is full of practical examples, centered on Latin America, to which an entire chapter is devoted. It must be said, though, that because the book is a collection of previously published research, the empirical part sometimes seems outdated (e.g. chapter 6 cites data from 1993, available at the time of writing).

There are some policy insights which clearly derive from Michaely's theoretical musing. For instance, when discussing the importance of the relative size of a prospective partner any country ("our country") should look for in an arranged marriage (i.e. a typical preferential agreement), it appears that, all things being equal, the larger the partner, the more likely the welfare gain "our country" will obtain from the agreement. Why? Because a larger country is expected to be less specialized, less unique, more diversified and closer in its relative price pattern to the Rest of the World (i.e. world markets). Therefore, trade diversion, which is welfare-reducing, tends to be small, and trade creation, which is welfare-increasing, to be large. Incidentally, an agreement between two small countries is not likely to bring a gain to either; it is also the agreement least likely to be of substantial consequence (83). As between individuals, partnerships with high-income countries, whether large or small, promise a high potential of expanding the size of trade between the partners, especially when both are high-income nations.

Another factor that determines the choice of potential partners is geographical proximity, which, Michaely explains, is often a confusing issue. Certainly, all things being equal, countries that are close geographically trade more among themselves than countries that are not. But we often tend to forget that proximity *per se* is related to other attributes (apart from transport costs) which may either facilitate or hamper trade. Ethnic, cultural, and linguistic affinities among neighbours reinforce geographic proximity. Michaely suggests that these factors actually dominate the transport cost factor. But on the downside, hostility and historical fears are more common among neighbours—as implied in the saying, "good fences make good neighbours." Furthermore, one of the economic factors that diminishes

trade between neighbours is the similarity in their economic structures, as is often the case in the developing world. Thus, as between individuals, it is not at all obvious that countries should privilege neighbours as partners.

Should the past determine the choice of marriage partners? Or, in Michaely's world, should history (i.e. past trade patterns) play a role in choosing partners? Again, all other things being equal, countries tend to stick to their traditional clients or suppliers. Why? There are sunk costs in building up a relationship between countries (as between human beings), and starting with new partners is costly. Whether we speak about real costs, like the establishment of a distributional organization, about advertisement or about trade imposed by law by a colonial power is immaterial here. The point is that a new entrant to the trade will entail entry costs.

Now, assume "our country" (A) trades with country B for historical reasons, not because of any comparative advantage, and under a regime of non-discriminatory tariffs. It would then be better if "we" (A) sign a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with C than if "we" signed such an agreement with B. Why? Because there will be "reverse trade diversion," which is welfare-increasing, the reason being that the FTA neutralizes history. On the other hand, if "we" sign the agreement with B, there is no trade diversion but trade is increased with the traditional trade partner leading to less good results. And an FTA between "us" and C is also better than continuing with non-discrimination which historically favoured B. This applies, for example, to historical colonial links between the United Kingdom and New Zealand. Their traditional trade in butter was based on the 1932 Treaty of Ottawa introducing Imperial Preferences. Then in 1970 the UK concluded a Customs Union Agreement with the EC. Reverse trade diversion in favour of Continental Europe developed and was good for the UK (although there was "more" than reverse trade diversion because, to add insult to injury, the UK denounced its FTA with New Zealand, leaving the latter in the cold). Another, better example, would be the traditional UK imports of "Jaffa" oranges from Israel before its entry into the EC in 1973 (dating back to the time of the British Mandate). After 1973 the UK increasingly

imported “Jaffa” oranges originating in EC countries (first from Italy and after 1986 from Spain, when the latter joined the EC)—a step in the right direction as far as the UK was concerned.

What I like in Michaely’s writings, and the present work is no exception, is his combination of verbal argumentation and diagrammatic exposition, using mostly a partial equilibrium framework and refraining from mathematical analyses. Unfortunately, this method has largely disappeared from modern textbooks for the sake of elegance and rigour, at a tremendous pedagogic cost. At least Michaely’s reader can distinguish the trees from the forest!

ALFRED TOVIAS

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Strategies of Homer’s *Odyssey*. By Flora Manakidou (Thessaloniki: University Studio Press, 2002), 390 pp., n.p.g.

By studying the first four Books of the *Odyssey*, the well-known ‘Telemachy,’ Flora Manakidou aims at showing how it is intricately interwoven within the fabric of the Odyssean epic.

The Book comprises eight chapters organized as a tripartite structure. In Chapters 2–4 (chapter 1 being an extended introduction and overview of the vast bibliography on this topic) Manakidou, who adopts a unitarian approach, argues that one of the main aims of the *Odyssey* is to “turn the ‘Telemachy’ into an *Odyssey* before the *Odyssey*” (67). Under this light, the author shows how the search for Odysseus grows out of the evolution of Telemachus’ personality and, by extension, out of the narrative endorsed to make this search possible.

Chapter 5 stands for the linchpin between the narrative of the Telemachy and the study of the poetics of the *Odyssey* as reflected in the various internal singers and audiences of the poem. Manakidou explores the various thematic associations between the house of Laertes and that of the Atreides, arguing for the deliberate exploitation on the part of the *Odyssey* of a polarity between the former’s positive example versus the latter’s negative connotations.

In chapters 6–8 Manakidou focuses on the exploration of the way internal singers,

especially Phemius in Ithaca, are presented. In a profound narrative tease, the poet of the *Odyssey* makes Odysseus, his main hero and able singer, assist Phemius, who thus becomes the poet’s alter ego weaved in the epic’s fabric. Such metapoetical sophistication must be credited, so Manakidou argues, to the poet of the *Odyssey*, who has skillfully fused the external and internal audiences and singers, allowing his listeners to evaluate for themselves the way the plot unfolds. Under this scope, self-reflexivity is also studied on the basis of intertextual associations between the *Odyssey*, the *Iliad* and an older epic tradition as reconstructed by the post-Homeric *Aethiopis*. The meeting between Telemachus and Nestor’s younger son Peisistratus and their journey to the house of Menelaus in Sparta stand for a metapoetical iter to the vast sea of rival epic traditions which had been crystallized by the time the *Odyssey* was completed. This metaphorical pathway to the older generations of heroes becomes the measure of praise for the Odyssean *neotatē aoide*. In this way, the Telemachy acquires a larger scope as it becomes intricately Odyssean: it exemplifies two of the distinctive features pertaining to this epic as a whole—sophisticated self-reflexivity and constant narrative misdirection.

The book, which concludes with a bibliography and three indices (*Locorum*, *Rerum*, *Nominum*), is a valuable study of the poetic strategies employed by the poet of the *Odyssey*, in order to alert his audience to the correspondences between the action of the epic heroes and his narrative choices at large. It is well written and worth reading for all those interested in the poetics of the *Odyssey*.

CHRISTOS C. TSAGALIS

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Latvia in World War II. By Valdis O. Lumans (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), xi + 547 pp. \$65.00 cloth.

Valdis O. Lumans is Cleora Toole Murray Professor of History and chair of the Department of History, Political Science, and Philosophy at the University of South Carolina, Aiken. *Latvia in World War II* is the latest title in the Fordham University Press series World War

II: The Global, Human, and Ethical Dimension, edited by G. Kurt Piehler.

Latvia secured its independence at the end of World War I, but by the late 1930s was struggling to maintain its independence under pressure from the Soviet Union and Germany. As a consequence of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, Germany conceded Latvia as within the Soviet sphere. Following the German victory in France in 1940, Soviet troops moved into Latvia and the other Baltic states, which then became peoples' republics. Soviet rule, brutal though it was, paled next to what happened after the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, however.

A great many Latvians welcomed the Germans as liberators, only to be bitterly disappointed by what followed. The Jewish community was especially devastated and, as Lumans makes clear, many Latvian citizens cooperated with the Germans against the Jews. By the end of the war only 1,000 of the 70,000 Jews in Latvia at the time of the German invasion in 1941 survived. Lumans also devotes a chapter to the SS Latvian Legion. At the same time, however, other Latvians fought for the Soviet Union against the Germans.

At the end of the war, the Soviet Union re-established its control over Latvia and the other Baltic states and sent in Russian immigrants, who soon threatened to become an absolute majority in Latvia. The vast majority of Latvians opposed the re-imposition of Soviet rule, and, in his afterword, Lumans discusses the hopeless guerrilla resistance against the Soviets that continued into the early 1950s. During the period 1945–52 Soviet authorities deported between 136,000 and 290,000 Latvians. Not until 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union did Latvia again secure its independence.

This is a most important addition to World War II literature and certainly the most comprehensive study of Latvia in the war to date. Taking advantage of the opening of archives after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Lumans makes full use of Latvian and Russian primary documents. *Latvia in World War II* belongs in every university library, where it will be of immense use to scholars working on broader studies of the war but also will be read with interest by anyone interested in Baltic history. Well-written in a clear and direct manner, the book is one of those rare works

that appeal both to the specialist and the general reader. Gerhard Weinberg, Lumans's major professor at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, must be proud indeed.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

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Hard Power, Soft Power and the Future of Transatlantic Relations. Edited by Thomas L. Ilgen (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006), xiv + 207 pp. £50.00 cloth.

Thomas L. Ilgen has produced an impressive edited volume that responds to the crisis in transatlantic relations that occurred in the months leading up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The volume includes eleven chapters by various authors from the academy and government in the United States and Europe. Divided into four parts, the chapters address how the post-WWII legacy of the transatlantic alliance affects contemporary U.S.-European relations, and likewise with respect to issues of contemporary security and strategy, monetary and trade policy, and domestic politics. The general thesis of the work is that while economic relations continue to be the most positive and stable aspect of the transatlantic partnership, issues of global security will increasingly become more divisive and difficult to handle, with the politics of domestic issues such as agriculture, the environment and political ideology remaining stable but with the potential of becoming more contentious.

Perhaps the most interesting arguments of the book are in Parts 1 and 2 that deal with security and strategy. In Chapter 2, Ilgen argues that post-WWII transatlantic relations were structured by two sets of institutions that now shape the way Americans and Europeans approach the contemporary world. One was the Atlantic Alliance, most significantly manifested by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the other the European Union (EU). According to Ilgen, NATO was conceived as an alliance to ward off the external threat of the Soviet Union, and was characterized by American leadership and even dominance of its institutions economically, politically and militarily. In contrast, the project of European integration represented by the EU was conceived as a partnership of equals meant to address an internal threat, the extreme

nationalism of European nations that had devastated the continent in two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century. Moreover, whereas the U.S. experience in leading NATO has left the Americans confident in the benefits of hard power and more eager after the Cold War to employ their military resources to solve problems, the European experience of integration has left them inclined to reject American leadership and the use of force, preferring to rely on soft power instead. According to Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Gregory F. Treverton in Chapters 3 and 4, Europe's soft power resources are considerable. The example of banishing war among nations that once fought bitterly and creating an island of peace and prosperity has a powerful attraction in many parts of the world. Concomitant with the attractiveness of the goal is the heightened legitimacy of the European methodology of ceding sovereignty to common institutions and the multilateral pursuit of a common agenda through the slow process of negotiation, compromise and consensus. Benjamin J. Cohen and S. Linn Williams suggest, in Chapters 6 and 7, that an underlying motive for the U.S. invasion and attempt to democratize Iraq may have been the desire to preempt the EU from becoming the new leader of the free world and model of economic and democratic values due to the European experience of integration.

Christopher Coker points out in Chapter 5 that the founding myths of the United States and the EU have led to a widening gap in the emotional, psychological and normative frameworks within which the governing elites of the two political communities operate. Whereas the American mythology arising from the War of Independence and Civil War have committed American elites to the inseparability of militarism and democracy, Coker argues that the European mythology arising out of the Battle of Verdun has led European elites to view democratic power as an alternative to military power.

Perhaps one shortcoming of the volume is the denseness of the chapters on monetary and trade policy for the non-specialized reader. However, the chapters on domestic political issues are more accessible. Especially interesting is Paulette Kurzer's chapter on the different responses of the American and European publics to genetically modified (GM) foods.

Kurzer traces these divergent attitudes to a number of causes, including the outbreak in Europe of mad cow disease (BSE) in the 1990s, and the prevalent view among American urban dwellers that farming is just another market-driven industry in contrast to urban Europeans who tend to idealize farmers as preservers of the cultural landscape and regional food traditions.

ANN WARD

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Shaping the Nation: England 1360–1461.

By Gerald Harriss (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), xxi + 705 pp. \$49.95 cloth.

Gerald Harriss, Emeritus Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford, has written a monumental volume for the distinguished series, *The New Oxford History of England*. In general, the present volume covers the period from the Treaty of Brétigny in 1360 to the defeat of Lancastrian forces at the battle of Towton in 1461. In a brief Preface, the author notes that over the last half century, the period treated in this volume has been the subject of much scholarly debate and revision; and this present work reflects that research and reassessment of the era as one of crucial transformation. Harriss conveys his understanding of the reassessment, which he summarizes in the Conclusion, but which can also serve as an introduction. The author also wishes to provide a "serviceable guide of the period at university level" (ix). The book is far more than "serviceable." Filled as it is with an enormous amount of information and analyses, it would be a rather intimidating volume for undergraduate students to digest; however, graduate students as well as specialists would find it to be extremely valuable.

Fifteen of the sixteen chapters in this magisterial work are divided into three topical parts, with the last chapter as a Conclusion. Part 1 (chapters 1–6) focuses on the political society. Theories of authority, the king and the court, various aspects of central government, a discussion of the nobility and gentry, and local polity are all expertly analyzed. There were two opposed theories of government. One held that the monarch was "infused with God's authority" and the other that the monarch "held authority in trust from the people" (6).

The king's court was a center of patronage and service. In addition, the court was also a religious and cultural center. Harriss notes that by 1360 the principal agencies of government were normally located within Westminster. This reflected the king's proximity to London and also the vast accumulation of records by the executive offices. The author looks closely at the secretarial offices, law and justice, state finance, the parliament, and other aspects of central government. In regard to the nobility, Harriss points out that the late medieval nobility "enjoyed a position of political, social, economic, and military dominance unmatched in any later age" (93). The discussion of chivalry and war, the domestic culture and religion of the nobility make fascinating reading. There is a lengthy chapter devoted to the gentry, who acquired a role in the polity in the century following the Black Death. Topics similar to those dealing with the nobility are touched upon in regard to the gentry, such as domestic culture and religion, as well as chivalry and war, which makes for an interesting comparative study of the two groups. Chapter 6 on local polity concludes Part 1. The author shows that networks on the local level had a high degree of continuity drawing on family tradition and relationships: "They provided the essential framework through which the shire was governed and through which magnate leadership could be exercised" (206).

Part 2 (chapters 7–10) on work and worship provides a vivid glimpse into the daily life of the period. The agrarian society, trade, industry, towns, the institutional Church, religion, devotion, and dissent, all receive close analyses. The thirty years following the Black Death were a time of confusion and contradictory trends in relation to the lords and peasants. In the course of one generation, c. 1380–1430, however, the legal and economic position of the manorial peasantry was transformed: "With the end of demesne management, servile obligations were permanently replaced by rent tenancies, leaving villeinage to survive as no more than a ghostly presence" (234). It was trade, however, that provided much of the wealth for English society, with wool as the bedrock. In addition to cloth, pewter and alabaster were two distinctive English exports. Few towns were autonomous; most were under lay or

ecclesiastical lordship. Most of the major towns were royal boroughs, however. Although there were tensions between the elements of urban society (merchants, craftsmen, journeymen, etc.), most organized violence occurred between the town and its lord. By the late Middle Ages there tended to be harmony and cooperation between Church and crown: "The Church exalted royal authority; the crown defended the Church's property, jurisdiction, and faith" (310). The great universities of Oxford and Cambridge were part of the Church and thus explored and upheld its doctrine as well as producing an educated clergy. In the last quarter of the fourteenth century the Church in general and the English Church in particular faced a multiple crisis in authority—the Great Western Schism, heresy, William of Ockham, the Spiritual Franciscans, and the rise of the laity. Harriss concludes chapter 10 with an excellent and extensive discussion of the great heresiarch John Wycliff and his followers.

In part 3 (chapters 11–15) dealing with men and events, the author provides a succinct political narrative of the Hundred Years' War from 1360, the rule and deposition of Richard II, and the War of the Roses. Although the events are quite complex, the chapters flow with remarkable smoothness and clarity. In the Conclusion (chapter 16), Harriss summarizes his own views regarding the transformation of medieval England from a feudal into a national society; and the reader would be advised to read this first as suggested by the author in the Preface. His concluding remark is worth citing: "This society, furnished with enduring structures of government, using a common written language, and articulating its identity in war and religion, gave shape to the English nation for the century and a half that followed" (653). All those interested in this critical period of English history should purchase this volume that is so reasonably priced and so filled with information.

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Pictures of Nothing: Abstract Art since Pollock. By Kirk Varnedoe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), xvii+ 297 pp. \$45.00/£26.95 cloth.

Kirk Varnedoe's stimulating A. W. Mellon lectures (2003)—delivered at the National Gallery of Art (Washington, D.C.) a few months before his untimely death from cancer—have now been published. They reaffirm the vigorous ways in which Varnedoe responded to a myriad number of issues he identified in the evolution of contemporary abstract art, while providing an appreciative blueprint for the ways in which abstract expressionism and abstraction in general continued to influence other artists up until the 1980s.

From his first chapter, "Why Abstract Art," until the closing paragraphs in his last segment, "Abstract Art Now," Varnedoe sets out to create a book (scrupulously edited by Judy Metro to reflect how he presented the Mellon lectures) that demonstrates with great clarity why abstract art mattered and how it became the defining art form of the latter twentieth century. Determined to challenge Ernst Gombrich's *Art and Illusion*, Varnedoe makes the case for the importance of abstract art. He sees it as a vital, self-renewing kind of art, which in its cumulative divorcement from realistic illusion continually creates a self-reflective type of imagery. In his sections on "Minimalism," "After Minimalism," and "Satire, Irony and Abstract Art," Varnedoe examines new territory, drawing on parallels between artists from different generations, while also suggesting how the design issues in minimalist creativity harkened back to earlier generations of abstractionists in Europe, such as Malevich or Tatlin.

In spite of its qualities, the book suffers from some major problems. While we can be appreciative of the ways in which Varnedoe sees interrelationships between works of art and brings disparate images together, what must have been challenging in the lecture hall does not carry over in the text. What the book cries out for are deeper social connections, a larger and more precise reading of the contextual battles involving artists and society, an awareness of the reception of various pieces by critics and, ultimately, by the public. What we have here is a book divorced from the period in which the art was created, reflecting the title "pictures of nothing" and the desire to keep abstract art—of all types—in a world free from extraneous illusions and pressures.

Thus, when Varnedoe does bring in social implications or period commentary, the reader is not prepared for what is being suggested or discussed. Some of these notations appear as remembrances on the part of the author as to how he saw certain works during a given moment in his own life rather than being reflective of a deeper probing of social history. There are moments of nostalgia suggestive of the ways in which Varnedoe was seeing aspects of his own life moving in front of him as he developed the lectures that served as the basis for this text.

In effect, then, we have a book that does not stand as a testament to Varnedoe's mind and career, as much as it presents some of his visual ideas and theories at a given moment in his life. We are chagrined by the fact that he did not have the time to go further. While we can marvel at his visual dexterity, we are ultimately haunted by what might have been rather than by what has been achieved with the publication of this book.

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Cloning after Dolly: Who's Still Afraid? By Gregory E. Pence (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), xiv + 211 pp. \$22.95 cloth.

Cloning is one of the relatively few scientific issues that simultaneously impacts well established ethical, psychological and theological positions. As I write, cloning remains a leading news story in Australia as the government reviews its position on human cloning for stem cell research, and the recent false claims of harvesting stem cells from cloned human embryos by Hwang Woo-Suk of Seoul National University have made headlines around the world.

Given the undoubted potential of cloning in many important areas, popular concerns simply must be addressed sensitively and rationally. Knee-jerk reactions, wild claims from fringe groups and rogue individuals, and basic ignorance on many sides ensure division between interest groups and prevent meaningful dialogue. This situation highlights the need for balanced, well-reasoned arguments that address a multiplicity of views, and it was

my hope that Gregory Pence's book would make a significant contribution to this end.

If any reader is unaware of Pence's position from the title of this book alone, the first few pages will leave them in no doubt as to his strong support of cloning. This book is definitely not the balanced account I hoped for, but it is sufficiently well-reasoned to be an important contribution to the ongoing cloning debate.

There is nothing in *Cloning after Dolly* to scare a non-technical reader, and this is necessary, since it is the non-technical population that will decide the outcome of the cloning debate. Pence's views rest on two main lines of argument: cloning is a valid reproductive tool and should simply be considered as such (along with many other such tools), and genotype manipulation and improvement is already accepted in many other contexts, so cloning is not as different (scary, new, dangerous) as its opponents suggest. However, these arguments are not always successful. To present cloning as simply an alternative means to an already accepted end does not convince the reader who (a) rejects the end (e.g. "we should not play God"), or (b) rejects the simplification of the "end justifies the means." To be convincing the argument requires a deep and sensitive discussion of the many relevant cases, but too often Pence resorts to glib statements and dismissals of alternatives, and he tends to caricature opposing positions. This is what I consider to be the main weakness of the book. Reasonable caution is a natural response when scientific advance comes up against ethical concerns, and must be respected. Many open-minded readers may well find his

attitude to such feelings slightly offensive. It is nevertheless both refreshing and challenging to be confronted by an unabashed, intellectually powerful supporter of cloning, and that is what Gregory Pence clearly is.

Pence's discussion covers several areas, such as animal cloning, therapeutic and reproductive cloning in humans, and even trans-species cloning. The book is not one that requires a cover-to-cover reading and, in fact, reading it as a single volume gets quite repetitive. There is a certain "soap-box" style to the presentation that can be somewhat grating. In addition, too much attention is given to peripheral matters (e.g. the Raëlians) and this tends to dilute the focus. However, his discussion of dignity is particularly powerful, and in my opinion the most effective aspect of his argument.

I started reading this book with unclear views on cloning, but favouring cautious progress. After having read it, I find I am of much the same disposition, but I feel bolstered—both by adopting versions of his arguments to support my belief in progress, and by having had to re-examine and thus strengthen my particular beliefs in favour of caution. In any reasoned debate, such an outcome in an independent observer must be considered a good thing, and so I conclude that despite a flawed presentation, Pence's book is an important contribution to the ongoing debate on cloning, and an interesting read for any concerned individual.

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